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Cowardice asks the question- is it safe? 
Expediency asks the question- is it politic? 
Vanity asks the question- is it popular? 
But conscience asks the question -is it right? 
And there comes a time when one must take a position, that is neither safe, nor politic, nor popular; but one 
must take it because it is right.  
 
Dr Martin Luther King Jr. (In Shyne 2014) 
Abstract 
During the last forty years, there has been increasing interest in the concept of professional ethics, particularly 
in the area of medical ethics. Psychiatry as a medical speciality has been part of the process because it is 
deeply concerned with the view society holds and the ethical values that they place upon psychiatry. It is with 
this in mind that I have decided to address an ethical issue that exists within psychiatry, which is an intrusive 
psychiatric treatment. Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) is arguably of this description. With the advent of 
anaesthesia and muscle relaxants, the traumatic effects of ECT have been reduced but serious side effects are 
still evident within the patient population receiving ECT. My position within this thesis is to claim that ECT is 
unethical and should not be used, (except in absolute emergencies). This claim is based on the knowledge that 
ECT is a treatment, which causes iatrogenic injury to the brain. Electricity is applied in such a way to provoke 
an epileptic type seizure or convulsion. The issue of whether or not ECT is morally and ethically justified as a 
practice or as a recommended form of treatment will be approached from a number of different theoretical 
positions.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“My troubled thoughts prompt me to answer because I am greatly disturbed. ... Reproof which insults me and 
the spirit of my understanding makes me answer. ... I hear a rebuke that dishonours me, and my understanding 
inspires me to reply”.  
                                                                                                                                             JOB:  20.2: (Holy Bible 2010) 
Section 1.1: Opening Remarks  
Medical ethics examines not only violations of individual integrity in clinical practice, but also sanctions the 
available policies and legislation, which permits us to question medical practices. This point is important as 
accepted ways of practicing need constant vigilance in light of new perspectives of what is right and wrong 
within the field of psychiatry. As the above quote from Job illustrates new knowledge can be stimulated by 
exploration of the axiomatic incongruence between values and conscience, which can then be utilised to 
improve or alter practice. These opening remarks indicate the position I take within my thesis, namely that as a 
practitioner I am troubled by the use of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) and wish to analyse this accepted 
practice in light of new knowledge within this field. I feel it is appropriate to outline to the reader the 
influences on this thesis from a personal perspective.  
I was motivated to write this thesis on electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) by my considerable 
experience and first hand clinical hands-on care of patients suffering from severe mental health 
problems. The decision was prompted by my strong antipathy towards ECT as a treatment. This was 
a view I had developed through reflection and personal observation during my extensive 
professional experience. Despite presenting arguments for ECT within the thesis, I did not approach 
this issue as an impartial bystander; I firmly believed the clients within my care had been damaged 
by ECT. The intended aim was therefore to articulate my personal view that ECT is not a beneficial 
treatment. Also to challenge those pro-advocates, who offer evidence demonstrating that it is an 
effective and safe procedure, rather than to provide a more impartial starting basis and to then 
develop arguments for or against its use as part of a balanced analysis.  Although I make no secret of 
my prejudice towards this treatment, my approach within this thesis has been to seek to reconcile 
my strongly held views with ethical concepts and to use academic analysis to elaborate and 
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communicate my position. It is through using these resources that this work takes the form of an 
ethics thesis; albeit one with a very particular approach to the way these concepts and analyses are 
employed and thereby creating a somewhat unorthodox approach to structuring the arguments it 
contains.  
Beginning with the introduction in which I presented my reasons for condemning much -  if not all - 
of the use of ECT, except in emergency situations, I went on to explore and challenge views of what 
constitutes an emergency. It was my belief that the only justifications which could be convincingly 
offered for the use of ECT was that of emergency treatment scenarios, which meant that  presenting 
a challenge to our received views as to what constitutes an emergency in these circumstances was 
entirely warranted at the outset of the thesis.  
The rest of the thesis is devoted to considering some of the arguments surrounding the use of ECT in 
a clinical setting and goes without saying that in order to argue against a particular position one 
must understand it. Thus, my readings of the literature, coupled with my professional experience, 
had to focus on the positive as well as the negative. As this approach was also intended to conform 
to some of the demands of reconciling my position with the use of ethical concepts and analysis in 
my thesis, it was necessary to consider evidence that supported the use of ECT. This means that I 
have included in the thesis not just evidence supporting my beliefs of the damaging effects of ECT 
but also some evidence put forward of beneficial effects. I raise this to emphasise that having 
reached a negative conclusion regarding ECT it was not because I simply “cherry picked” the 
negative studies and entirely ignored the positive but, rather, that the subsequent discussion of 
these arguments surrounding the use of ECT was presented with the intended aim of supporting a 
clear and strongly held view opposed to the use of ECT in all but emergency situations. This thesis is 
therefore very much an attempt to present one particular viewpoint of the use of ECT mediated 
through the use of ethical resources.  
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My first position statement is that ethics is an endeavour. It refers to ways of understanding what is good and 
right in human experience. It is about discernment, knowledge, and self-reflection, and it is sustained though 
seeking, clarifying, and translating. It is the concrete expression of moral ideals in everyday life. It is about 
meaning, and it is about action. Therefore, what can psychiatry, a field that specialises in understanding and 
strives to alleviate affective disorders, offer ethics, and therefore judgements on procedures such as ECT? 
Ethics undertakes the conceptual, logical, and normative analysis and justification of moral principles, values, 
virtues, and judgements. I concur with Wallwork who outlines that psychiatry offers very little with respect to 
such esoteric issues. He contends that the ordinary language of meaning of moral concepts and the logic of 
moral reasoning is contested, but that psychiatry offers a great deal at the practical level (Wallwork 2001). In 
psychiatry, ethics is about the use of specialised expertise to prevent and alleviate the suffering of mentally ill 
individuals. During the last 20 years, there has been an increase in the interest of professional medical and 
nursing ethics and none more so than in the area of psychiatry and mental illness1. I accept that ethics is an 
endeavour and that psychiatry has little to offer this concept. Then it follows that we as practitioners must 
challenge the accepted status quo.   
In the area of psychiatry, ethics involves the use of specialised skills and expertise to prevent the suffering of 
mental illness and alleviate when possible their suffering. The validity of this point is down to the particular 
form of distress that the mentally ill suffer from. These include, the distortion of cognition, feelings, 
perception, and interpersonal behaviours that lead to an erosion in personal, professional and societal 
relationships. An ethical issue in psychiatry is to be examined within this thesis in the contexts between 
medical and paramedical practice parameters. The area of primary concern is the ethical use and in part legal 
enforcement of the administration of the operative procedure known as Electroconvulsive therapy.   
My second position statement is that the use of electricity to cause convulsions, in the hope of improving a 
person’s mental health, is one of the most controversial issues within psychiatry (Andrade, 2014). There are 
those who say that ECT is effective in depression, schizophrenia, and possibly other neuropsychiatric 
conditions (Andrade, 2014). The nub of the situation is that we do not know how ECT works. What also is 
evident is that we do not know what causes depression, schizophrenia and most of the conditions for which 
ECT is prescribed. Therefore, without a complete understanding of the etiopathogenesis of these 
                                                          
1 Hughes (2004); Fink (2001); Dowman et al. (2005); Bauer et al. (2007). 
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neuropsychiatric disorders, it is difficult to determine what action of ECT is therapeutic or if the iatrogenic 
action of ECT creates altered brain function. Therefore, we are prescribing a treatment of unknown action for 
disorders of unknown origin (Smith et al, 2014). This is a particular problem because ECT produces a large 
number of neurobiological effects; it is difficult to determine which effects are relevant and which are 
epiphenomena for what condition. Because we do not know its action, this brings me to the next problem; 
there is dissonance between explanations of action (Stein et al, 2004). Within this thesis, I will address the 
different explanations proposed as to how ECT may work. The rebuttal of these explanations are that it should 
be realised that when a change is demonstrated with ECT, we do not know whether it is corrective of 
pathology, compensatory, or merely irrelevant with regard to mechanisms of action for a particular outcome 
(Wysoker, 2003).  
My objection to ECT is simplistic, given that the defining feature of ECT (modified, bilateral or unilateral) –is 
indicated in its name, as it consists in the electrical induction of a generalised seizure. The use of electricity to 
cause convulsions, in the hope of improving a person’s mental health, is one of the most controversial issues 
within psychiatry (Carney and Geddes 2003). Unlike any other treatment in psychiatry, ECT still arouses such 
passionate controversy after seventy years, on which supporters and opponents cannot even agree on its 
name. Proponents call it electroconvulsive therapy or ECT. They say it is unfairly maligned, poorly understood 
and is remarkably effective for certain mental illnesses (Miller 2007; Gass 2008; Eranti et al 2009). Critics call it 
by its old name: electroshock. They claim that it temporarily lifts symptoms on certain mental illnesses by 
causing transient personality changes similar to those seen in head injury patients: euphoria, confusion, and 
memory loss (Haglund & Essen 2003; Cyrzyk 2013; Stefanazzi 2013). My third position statement is to 
challenge the widespread acceptance of the consequentialist perspective. Supporters of ECT have defended it 
for consequentialist reasons on the grounds that it ‘works’. The problem with this argument is twofold: firstly, 
there are negative consequences to be considered, such as memory impairment; secondly, in an era of 
evidence-based medicine, claims about the efficacy of ECT are insufficiently supported. In light of these points, 
it may be questioned whether it is irrational to refuse this treatment. This is important in light of further 
objections that relate to the wider context of delivery of treatment. There are further arguments as to its use 
in that “decisions about ECT are fraught with social considerations in the sense that the treatment is often 
aimed at re-establishing norms of behaviour within settings that partly determine such considerations” (Clarke 
1995.p.329). So what we need to establish is that are these arguments still relevant in 2015? Therefore , let us 
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question the term it ‘works’, what does that mean, what is the criteria for success? This treatment raises a 
number of concerns, which throughout the thesis I will address and will be arguing against its use. My final 
position statement is that I accept that in extreme circumstances where a patient is displaying suicidal 
ideations and the choice we are faced with is either death or ECT, then the use of ECT and life has to take 
precedence. However, they are extreme circumstances, which health professionals do not face on a daily 
basis. I will address the concerns utilising professional, ethical, and legal perspectives. My main argument will 
be based on the premise that here we have a treatment quite clearly involving iatrogenic injury to the brain 
(Versiani et al. 2011).  
ECT as a treatment is argued in some quarters as effective but its side effects are hard to prove due to 
numerous ethical parameters. Pro- ECT advocates make the argument that the use of the treatment is 
beneficial because it is a short-term procedure and has been shown to have therapeutic effects within a 
number of mental illnesses. Additionally, some patients request it (the right to receive) rather than having to 
wait for the therapeutic effects of medication to take effect. Within the collection of data for this thesis, I 
encountered many pro-ECT people. Within discussions with numerous colleagues, I have even had it said to 
me that “...Critics of ECT suffer from ignorance and ex-patients who complain about its effects suffer from 
paranoid delusions and impede the progress of modern medicine” (Mental Health Discussion Forum, 2007). I 
have to emphasise that there are those colleagues who take a different view and question the validity and 
reliability of ECT. My argument against the use of ECT is the method is unacceptable because of the 
consequences on a number of levels, which are professional, ethical, and legal. The sole purpose of this thesis 
is to present a substantial and ethical position that ECT is unacceptable to use as the first treatment of choice 
in a number of instances when treating the mentally ill. I will outline the central arguments against the use of 
ECT and summarise the central arguments in this thesis, indicating the main challenges that I will address to 
support my conclusion. 
Let me identify what is to come within this thesis. The ethical and rights based imperatives to be explored, 
include; its historical context, the legal aspects, right based imperatives of the patient which will include 
information presentation and communication of the health care providers, diverse cultural requisites, the 
review of new machinery, and pre and post ECT associated intra-disciplinary medical and psychiatric 
intervention. How the ethical framework of Principlism influences these imperatives, which become directed 
towards the patient, being brought to the foreground as aspects of patient autonomy and inclusion are 
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investigated through the issues of construction of consent and consensual decision-making. Issues of consent 
are complex particularly as different professionals have such contrasting views of the treatment itself, that it 
becomes difficult to agree what represents adequately informed consent. Even if one grants that the 
knowledge base we have on ECT justifies its use (which I refute) the ethical basis of ECT depends how closely 
the practical conditions of administering ECT conform to certain standards of medical care. Whether clear 
diagnostic criteria are practised (not just prescribed in the treatment manuals) in the use of the treatment and 
whether informed consent is obtained, and whether such consent includes information about possible 
cognitive effects following ECT.  
I will address this point when psychiatric healthcare providers should ensure that patients’ are fully aware of 
the range of options and choices available to them. This would seek to limit the impact of the ‘last resort’ 
rhetoric of which I address when discussing consent (Chapter 4.) 
Section 1.2: Central arguments against the use of ECT  
Ethical concerns have been raised about ECT since its inception in 1939, and psychiatrists are the first to admit 
that they do not know how or why ECT works, or what the convulsion, similar to a grand mal convulsion, does 
to the brain. However, they point to the fact that patients who have undergone ECT say it succeeds when all 
else - drugs, cognitive therapies, hospitalisation and others - have failed. (Mukherjee et al., 1994; Boodman, 
1996; Fink et al., 1996). ECT was initially, used for a variety of psychiatric disorders, although throughout this 
thesis I will signpost readers to the fact that these efforts often proved to be ineffective and potentially 
harmful. My arguments will also show that this treatment damages the brain, resulting in memory loss and 
long periods of confusion and that this damage is greater than the damage sustained if mental illness is 
allowed to run its natural course. Memory loss is not surprising since the electrodes are placed and discharged 
directly over the temporal lobe, which is responsible for memory function. This is an important point in the 
ethical discussion of ECT and I will discuss this in more depth in a later chapter (section 2.5). My argument 
against the use of ECT will therefore have the following structure: 
Premise 1: Moral agents, who have a duty of care to others, ought not to expose others to unreasonable risk 
(Athanassoulis and Ross, 2010). 
Premise 2: Psychiatrists and other healthcare providers within psychiatry have a duty of care (a moral or legal 
obligation to ensure the safety or well-being of others.) 
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Premise 3: Electroconvulsive Therapy exposes patients to unreasonable risk of memory impairment and other 
side effects.  
Conclusion 4: Therefore, psychiatrists and other healthcare providers within psychiatry ought not to prescribe 
and proceed with ECT as a form of treatment. 
In recent decades, researchers have intensified efforts to establish the effectiveness of ECT and its indications, 
to understand its mechanism and clarify the extent of adverse effects. However, although extensive data exists 
in yielding substantial information in many treatments of mental illnesses, the safety and efficacy of ECT 
remains unanswered. This thesis will be devoted to supporting and providing evidence for these premises. 
Further to the chapters within this thesis, the conclusion brings me back to my overall argument that ECT is 
unethical and should not be used; except in extreme emergency situations. 
1.3: Summary of the chapters 
In chapter 2, I will address the historical context and birth of ECT, arguing that from its early inception and use 
that it was unethical. Firstly, ever since its inception the main arguments against its use have centred on the 
fact that it is not known how it works. Secondly, because of not knowing how it works, how can we ignore the 
side effects patients suffer from and verbalise to healthcare workers. Additionally, I shall seek to explore the 
question ‘is psychiatry really a science?’ and I also discuss professional practice and ethics. I shall debate a 
number of studies, which have discussed brain damage, due to technological advances, indicating that modern 
day machines are actually more dangerous than previous ones used. Following this to examine the premise 
Pro- ECT, proponents put forward that ECT prevents suicide and refute this claim. Lastly, to review the 
literature on placebo controlled ECT, addressing the claim that ECT is effective, when the literature on real 
versus sham ECT offers a different conclusion. Lastly the role of the anti- psychiatrists and the role they played 
within psychiatric clinical practice. 
In section 2b, I will also address the arguments of how the Mental Health Act (1983) [revised 2007] sections 58 
and 62 are used as a way to implement the use of ECT, often without the consent of the patient. In light of my 
ethical argument on how the Mental Health Act (1983) [revised 2007] is used to enforce the treatment of ECT. 
Therefore, my position will centre on how section 58 and section 62 are implemented to enforce ECT and how 
mental health legislation can override the informed wishes of the patient. 
The application of the framework of Principlism within Psychiatry.  
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In chapter 3: I address ‘The application of the framework of Principlism within Psychiatry ‘. My opening 
statement within this chapter restates my premise that moral agents, who have a duty of care to others, ought 
not to expose others to unreasonable risk. I make this statement by questioning the validity of the sole use of 
Principlism as an ethical framework. With particular focus on how by using this ethical framework, Principlism 
structures practitioners to consider utilitarianism in the decision making process. Although there are other 
theories that healthcare professionals use to enable them to rationalise their decision-making, Principlism 
tends to be the most favoured rights-based frameworks, which is also popular within psychiatry. However, I 
make the statement and give examples that Virtue theory would fill the gaps that the use of Principlism has 
created and would enable enhanced decision making for the psychiatric healthcare provider. I address the 
issue that mental health care professionals are constantly encouraged to re-examine the professional 
decisions they make by using the framework of Principlism, and why the principles that form this framework 
Principlism are used as guides for inoculation. With the use of the principles that make up the framework of 
Principlism, this theory ethically denotes a wrong action cannot be justified by a desirable action, and in the 
arena of psychiatric care is criticised by some healthcare givers. Due to its lack of ability to support the rights of 
individuals, (to determine what happens to one’s body and the right to medical privacy). I will address the 
significant boundaries inherent in the framework of Principlism, which face mental health practitioners, when 
advising a patient that ECT is the best possible treatment or educating a patient as to possible alternatives. 
In chapter 4: I will address the area ECT and informed consent, and argue that in numerous cases serious 
questions arise in the area of capacity to consent. In particular, I will question; at what stage, do health 
professionals agree that the patient is making a decision with cognitive and rational ability? The dilemma that 
arises is how far we go in keeping a patient informed. Giving information is synonymous with informed 
consent; my position is that true informed consent is never obtained, because practically no one would sign a 
truthful consent form of ECT (if any exists) unless coerced to do so. Defenders of ECT claim that informed 
consent is scrupulously obtained, but it is at present impossible to evaluate this claim properly. It then must 
follow that despite the importance of divulging the risks of this treatment in psychiatry, no study to date 
describing ECT consent forms used in different hospitals and outpatients units has ever been published. 
However, I will consider the counter-argument to my last point in that the alternative to not consenting to ECT 
is the possibility of living with a debilitating mental illness. One of the main points I will address is whether 
those who give consent do so voluntarily and have the capacity to understand the information given to them. 
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In addition, information, which should be given in a format so that the patient can assess the risks, is not and 
informed consent is given lip service. My argument will also be centred on risk/cost benefits analysis; in that I 
believe that, the risks far outweigh any benefits that this treatment provides. The ethical and rights-based 
imperatives to be explored include the giving of information, its presentation, and communication, and pre - 
and post- ECT associated intra-disciplinary medical and psychiatric service intervention. These imperatives 
become directed towards the person, being brought to care arena, as aspects of subject autonomy and 
inclusion are investigated thorough the constructions of consent and consensual decision – making. 
Lastly in the conclusion: This thesis will be devoted to establishing the truth of these premises and the position 
I have taken and the validity of my conclusion, which follows these premises. The conclusion, following 
discussion with the chapters, will bring us back to my overall argument that ECT is unethical because of the 
risks outweigh the benefits and should only be used in the most extreme circumstances. The issue of whether 
or not a psychiatrist is ethically justified for the practice of a recommendation for Electroconvulsive therapy 
can and will be approached from a number of different vantage points  . I opened the thesis up with 
questioning the mechanism of action of ECT. It will be from the preceding discussions within this thesis I 
highlight that the question is quite complex, and that the answer is also complex, and that it needs to be 
broken down into many parts. For my thesis, I have chosen the route of possible explanations as to why ECT is 
prescribed, and why a psychiatrist might recommend this treatment, but then challenge these reasons and the 
premises they put forward. By doing this I will be better able to discuss the concomitant practical, moral and 
ethical considerations of ECT usage. I highlight a number of parts to give a clearer picture of my position when 
I address the many issues linked with ECT and the position psychiatrists put forward that it is their 
responsibility to extend the entire arsenal of their curative techniques. My belief is that the public demands’ 
protection from techniques or drugs which can be shown not to be safe and effective. In my final summing of 
my introduction, I refer to the work of an article I read over 40 years ago which I am convinced is still relevant 
in its message today. Giamartino (1974) wrote about ECT and the illusion of treatment and my thoughts mirror 
his thoughts of such a long time ago:  
“This illusion of treatment is an unconscious or possible conscious effort of psychiatrists to effect immediate 
cure by whatever means possible, even to the extent of utilising a treatment which has proven to be of little or 
unknown value for the disorder involved, to maintain the integrity of the professional and the patient’s desire 
for care. Electroconvulsive therapy fits the definition of this ‘illusion’ and upon this analysis should be 
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considered not only undesirable but also an ethically unjustifiable treatment in those cases where motives 
other than the welfare of the patient have influenced this choice of treatment.” (p. 1131)    
There are clear differences of opinion in what constitutes mental health treatment, and active public 
discussion is needed to translate ethical values in the use of ECT. It is hoped this process will stimulate debate 
in this area of practice leading to a review of this treatment. It is important to always identify the risks and 
involve ourselves within a clinical context to act in the patient’s best interests. Further development within this 
discussion will lead to greater sophistication, and a review of underlying ethical values as to why we use ECT 
needs to be examined explicitly rather than acted on implicitly.      
Section 1.4: The Who, the Why, and the Where.  
The relevance of this section in the introduction is to highlight the process of ECT and the personnel involved 
in its use. I believe awareness of these factors is paramount, because it gives the reader an insight into the 
framework and mechanics of treatment. This understanding will enable the reader to identify with the 
premises and arguments I question. The who, are for those patients for who ECT is a consideration are those 
patients who are acutely ill, and are said to require ECT frequently. ECT is the gold standard of treatment for 
most forms of depression and for those that have been refractory to other treatments. This standard also 
applies to those patients suffering from Delusional and Severe endogenous depressions, Acute Mania,  the 
Schizophrenic syndrome of Catatonia, Parkinson’s disease, Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome, Tardive 
Dyskinesia, Delirium and in Epilepsy (but with great caution). Particularly, indications for use differ vastly in 
existing guideline (NICE 2003). The why as to use ECT should be based on a thorough review of severity of the 
patient’s illness, medical indications and contraindications, and non-responsiveness to other treatments, the 
risks, and benefits of ECT in comparison to other treatment options and the patients’ preference of treatment 
modality and also, the why of treatment is evidenced by the wide variations in approved codes of practice 
internationally.  
The where is an area where ECT takes place should be designated for the administration of ECT and for 
supervised medical recovery. These areas are often away from the ward environment in hospitals and 
sometimes located within day hospitals. However, because some patients with compromised cardiovascular 
status are prescribed ECT, cardiac conditions should be evaluated and monitored closely. This area should have 
the appropriate health care professionals available and should include equipment and medications that could 
be used in the event of cardiopulmonary or other complications from anaesthesia or the procedure. The 
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anaesthetist will insert an intravenous cannula, and a short acting anaesthetic is given to the patient. 
Commonly used anaesthetic agents are methohexital, propofol, etomidate and sodium thiopentone (Eranti et 
al., 2009).   
A short acting muscle relaxant (succinylcholine) will then be administered, which will reduce the physical 
extent of the ‘motor seizure’. Electrocardiogram, pulse oximetry, blood pressure and expired carbon dioxide 
are continuously monitored throughout the treatment, while the cerebral seizure itself is monitored by dual 
channel electroencephalography (EEG). Electrodes are placed on the patient´s scalp and an electrical charge is 
passed through the brain. The amount of electrical charge is determined by a stimulus dosing protocol as 
recommended by the Royal College of Psychiatrists. (2005). The aim of the stimulus dosing protocol is to 
establish the patient’s seizure threshold and to titrate to an appropriate treatment dose to induce an adequate 
seizure. The patient is anaesthetised and muscles are relaxed to prevent injuries and minimise discomfort; the 
toes may twitch and become rigid, the patients jaw may clench (the anaesthetist will have inserted a 
disposable mouth guard to protect the patient´s tongue and teeth); blood pressure and heart rate may 
transiently increase during the seizure.  
The nursing role in ECT has evolved in recent years and now involves specialised nurses who liaise with the 
anaesthetist and the psychiatrist. The role is in three parts; the pre, during and the post ECT phases. The ECT 
nurse co-ordinates the service and is responsible for the management of the ECT clinic and care of the patient. 
While the actual administration of ECT involves predominantly the anaesthetist and psychiatrist, the nurse has 
a responsibility to address the psychological needs of the patient undergoing ECT.  
On the day of the treatment, the nurse should be fully aware of the patient’s present mental health status, 
their legal status and medical status. (Royal College of Psychiatrists [RCP], 2005).   On treatment days the nurse 
co-ordinates the arrival of patients, checks legal status, consent and all relevant documentation. The nurse 
should assist with the operating of the ECT machine and confirm the specified dose and electrode placement 
prior to treatment. Once treatment is completed and the medical team is satisfied with the patient’s condition, 
the ECT nurse transfers the patient back to the recovery room (RCP, 2005).  
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Chapter 2:  ECT: History, Science, and Nursing.   
“Those who cannot understand how to put their thoughts on ice should not enter into the heat of debate” 
             Friedrich Nietzsche: Philosopher and Author 1844-1900 (in Graham.2014) 
Section 2a.1: Introduction. 
This chapter will be structured into two sections, in section 2a I shall provide a historical overview of ECT and 
then to open a dialogue on what constitutes psychiatry and science, psychiatry and professional practice and 
psychiatry and ethics. After dealing with the issue of why I believe that the birth of ECT in its application was 
unethical my views and position continue with the statements that science and psychiatry have not progressed 
enough to give a clear indication of the advantages of the treatment of ECT. Lastly, I challenge the premise 
that ECT is effective when I offer my rebuttal by highlighting the literature on ‘Sham ECT’ and I also challenge 
the premise that modern day machinery is less harmful than its predecessors are. The controversy about the 
use of ECT in England and Wales in recent times has resonance with the past as it has polarised opinions as 
evidenced by discussions within the United Kingdom (UK) ECT Review Group (2003). In section 2b, I will 
examine and discuss the legal requirements that are essential for ECT to be given to patients who refuse it and 
the ethical considerations of this legal practice. I will also consider the issue of the use of ECT with suicidal 
patients and the legality of this practice.   
To date there has been little critical exploration of the ethical issues that arise in professional practice. In 
particular, exploration of the link between the science of psychiatry to the physical outcomes of ECT treatment 
and how it affects the practitioner (Chakrabarti et al 2010). We cannot avoid these issues due to our 
advancement in providing quality care and as we inevitably act in ways that affect the well-being of others; we 
make choices, which may support or violate dignity and can infringe personal rights. Psychiatrists, because of 
their training and experience within psychiatry, who have the capacity to inspire progression but also the 
potential to repel progression, use various theories in their own way to capture the drama of psychiatry to 
justify the use of ECT (Kavanagh and Mcloughlin, 2009). More than any other medical speciality, for example 
cardiology, nephrology and gynaecology, psychiatric treatment and diagnosis are affected by the surrounding 
culture and society.  
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What then must follow that as cultural values and beliefs change within society, then how we diagnose and 
treat mental illness changes (Shorter, 2009). Specifically, psychiatry is unable to protect itself from various in-
vogue treatments, such as the current vogue in diagnosing paediatric bi-polar disorder, and the constant 
changing of treatments that sweep back and forth such as the different uses of psychotropic medication (Klein, 
2008). This is not to say that psychiatry is immune to progressive thinking, merely that the problems are 
highlighted because there are many competing theories and models of care, scholars and clinicians working in 
psychiatry find it difficult to disprove these ideas. However, the pro-advocates of ECT insist that this treatment 
is a recognised survivor as it has been used for over 75 years since its inception in 1938 and is the sole survivor 
among out-dated and deceased treatments like insulin shock, camphor, and Leucotomy Therapy (Ottorson, 
1960). My first challenge is that -it has survived but it still falls into the realm of being a mode of treatment 
that changes in popularity, in so far that it is taken up with great enthusiasm for a brief period with 
exaggerated zeal. For example, within the decades of the 50’s 60’s and 70’s its use was widespread, but less so 
in contemporary times. However, we see an upsurge in its use for the treatment of bi-polar and schizoaffective 
disorders rather than uni-polar depression (Gaylin, 2009). 
2a.2: Outline of sections. 
In the sections that form the basis for this chapter, I will be making various points to advance my argument, to 
support my position and provide background information of the areas I discuss. To provide a more through 
explanation of these important positions, opposing explanations are discussed also. The reason for this 
chapter is it will also open up numerous points in developing arguments’ within the thesis.  
In the opening section 2a.3, I will start to discuss and examine the origins of ECT and the part it has played in 
history. This section starts with the historical context of work of Ladislaus von Meduna, predecessor to Cerletti 
and Bini, the creators of ECT and the crude historical beginnings of the therapy compared to what it is today. 
Its importance to the thesis is it gives me a platform to form my arguments from its historical discovery up to 
modern day.   
In section (2.4), I will explore the nature of psychiatry within science, ethics and evidence based care in 
nursing. I discuss these concepts and explore why I believe these concepts are difficult to predict and for 
which, in reality, we do not have this understanding. In section 2a.5 I put into context the relevance and 
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viewpoint that the anti-psychiatry movement played within the late 1950s through to 1970s and the impact of 
these criticisms upon psychiatric care. These criticisms of psychiatry were launched by charismatic individuals 
who rejected ‘coercive care’ and attempts to lock up the rebellious, on the grounds that they were insane. 
These individuals played a major part on the development of doctor-patient care. The importance of this 
section is that by looking at the anti-psychiatry movement a rich understanding and nuanced account that 
highlights its important contribution to the history of psychiatry is presented.  
Finally, in part 2a.6 I draw my thoughts together on the position I take and summarise the issues I have argued 
for and against solidifying my argument within this chapter that physically and legally there has been progress 
made but it remains unchanged ethically.  
2a.3: Section: Ugo Cerletti and Lucino Bini.  
This section of the thesis I believe is prevalent in a position to support my argument because it highlights the 
way that ECT was developed was unethical. In addition, the explanation regarding the invention of ECT sets the 
unethical standard which, to date, has never been truly addressed due to lack of empirical evidence. The two 
authors I identify are of importance to the overall theme of the thesis because not only were they were the 
two co-founders of the treatment of ECT but their scientific methods were highly questionable. The pro 
advocates of ECT argue that most discoveries could be deemed unethical by today’s standards, but the 
consequences of their argument for ECT are unacceptable. The points they make are superficially correct – the 
consequences of their argument are worse than the benefit that they claim will follow. My position on why I 
believe their discovery on the application of electroconvulsive therapy was unethical is that they based their 
treatment on two mistaken beliefs. One was that seizures somehow protected the individual against suffering 
from schizophrenia, and the second was that disrupting the patient’s memory was necessary for the cure  
Following work by Von Meduna, (a scientist whose experiments with camphor oil on mentally ill patients) it 
occurred to him that instead of applying and inducing ‘fits’ by chemical means, such electrical methods may be 
technically acceptable. The idea of using ‘cranial shocks' for the mentally ill would -emerge in 1938 with Ugo 
Cerletti and Lucio Bini in Italy. These two pioneers differed from others from the eighteenth century by 
deliberately using much stronger electroconvulsive shocks (Finger 2006).Cerletti, requested from the director 
of the slaughterhouse to experiment on the pigs, not wanting to try to kill the pigs but to keep them alive for 
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as long as possible. Cerletti endeavoured to find out the quantity of the current and length of time it had to be 
applied before death occurred (Cerletti, 1950). It became apparent to Cerletti that the more serious results 
(prolonged apnoea, sometimes lasting many minutes and sometimes death), appeared when the current was 
applied across the chest but was ‘less’ so when it was applied across the head. His findings in the Rome 
slaughterhouse convinced him that that application of electrodes to the head was both ‘feasible and safe’ 
(Gibson, 1971). He was now embarking on the transition of electricity by this method from pigs to men. The 
first shock treatment was given to an Italian man known as S.E; this potential subject arrived in the shape of a 
confused incoherent wanderer from Northern Italy, found by police in a Rome railway station. The subject was 
diagnosed as a schizophrenic as he was expressing incomprehensible gibberish made up of neologisms, 
paranoid ideas, and active hallucinations. His colleague Bini, together with an electrical engineer, devised the 
first electroshock box, which had two circuits: a direct circuit to measure the resistance of the patient’s head 
(in ohms) and an alternating circuit to elicit the convulsion. Upon administering the shock, the subject gave a 
sudden jump on the bed with tensing of his muscles; then he immediately collapsed on the bed without loss of 
consciousness. The patient started singing aloud at the top of his voice, and then fell silent. Cerletti deduced 
from  this that the voltage was too low bearing in mind that he had experimented on the pigs the previous day, 
so made arrangements for a repetition of the test. Then, understanding that the conversation was about him, 
the patient exclaimed, no longer in an incomprehensible jargon, but in clear words and in a solemn tone, “Not 
a second - deadly”(Cerletti, 1950, p. 84).     
 Bini suggested the repetition of ECT, many times a day led patients to a state he named ‘annihilation’. 
Annihilation resulted in severe amnesic reaction, which was reported as a benefit for those suffering from 
obsessive states and paranoia. Cerletti in his findings presents an argument as to why ECT is viewed differently 
to other treatments and discusses that electroshock has been applied in a number of different illnesses. 
Recovery had been frequently reported in the cases of patients suffering from ‘asthma’ and there had been 
success in the treatment of ‘psoriasis’ and alopecia. However, I challenge their terminology, calling it 
‘annihilation’ surely using a term that means to destroy (something or someone), or if we use the transitive 
verb: to cause to be of no effect, or to destroy the substance or force off. Were both these two people aware 
of the true power of ECT and inadvertently by saying that it resulted in severe amnesic reactions, were really 
trying to make us believe that the power of electricity was for the good of psychiatry? 
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 Cerletti  quotes Padre Dante: (c. 1265–1321) an Italian poet from the middle ages to emphasie his point: 
“Qual e colui che somniando vede, 
 E dope il sogno la passsione impressa 
 Rimane, e l’altro alla mente non riede…” 
                                  (Para XXX111, pp. 58-61)  
(As he who while dreaming sees  
And after the dream is over, 
The emotion remains while the picture has faded away…) 
(Cerletti, 1950, P. 94) 
When we question the ethics of watching this experiment, witnessing cognitive and behavioural changes, it 
was clear Cerletti was unresponsive when fellow researchers questioned its use. The conclusion one can draw 
from this is that on reading this quote from Dante, Cerletti adopted a single-minded approach detrimental to 
the care of his patient. 
Let me conclude my position on why I have argued that ECT was unethical from its early beginnings. These 
treatments had all the hallmarks of a heroic medical discovery but let us stop there and look at what we are 
saying; when we talk of heroic treatments that medicine and science has given us, then ECT cannot be listed 
within that category. This treatment came about by giving cranial shocks and inducing a convulsion in a man 
without his consent. Cerletti and Bini showed no recognition in their written reports of what had occurred at 
the end of the eighteenth century. When doctors talk about heroic treatments, they were not referring to the 
forbearance of the patients on whom they inflicted treatments; the term rather implied that they were classed 
as heroes because of making a medical breakthrough. These breakthroughs were frequently done on patients 
who were often unable to consent or who adamantly refused. Let us be clear that in the 1930s, the patients’ 
views were of little account and psychiatric ethics played no part in the decision-making process. In modern 
day, the rights of the patients are more acknowledged and consent to ECT is necessary. However, there are 
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exceptions within the Mental Health Act (1983), [2007 revised] of which I address in part 2b when I discuss the 
law and ECT.    
2a.4: Psychiatry: Science, Professional Practice, and Ethics.  
The focus of this section is that of the relationship between science and ethics in psychiatry and the influence 
these factors have on professional practice. This notion is considered the conceptual heart of the matter. 
Ethics has been defined as the ‘ the system or moral code of the individual, religion, group or profession’ 
(Robertson & Walter, 2014); science, with which psychiatry has strong links, is defined as a branch of 
knowledge concerned with establishing or systemizing facts (Thompson et al. 2000). Theoretically, science and 
ethics within psychiatry have been conceived of as two distinct and separate entities, almost anti-ethical 
insofar as science is descriptive and ethics is prescriptive or a science relying on validation; hence, ethics relies 
on judgement and science is concerned solely with ‘what is’ and ethics concerned with ‘what ought to be’ 
(Bloch & Chodoff, 1991). There are many scientific explanations put forward for scientific phenomena, the 
issue is how we can determine a good scientific explanation, and what weight we should give science in 
providing the answers in the world we live in. Consequently, here lies the nuanced conflict because the lines 
become less sharply drawn when the complexities of social reality are considered.  
In professional practice, the psychiatrist or psychiatric nurse is obliged to act as a ‘double agent’ to 
accommodate conflicts between the patient, the healthcare worker and, in most cases, family members. 
When one considers that the psychiatric healthcare provider straddles the ambiguous line of science and the 
art of psychiatric care, dual attitudes towards their professional identity differ in both degree and quality. 
There is still the question about whether psychiatry is a science at all or whether it is a mechanism, which is 
just used to deal with humanistic interventions; it is not a science but a body of knowledge, which frees it from 
obligations that other sciences have (Conte & Karasu, 1992). Concern with the interface between psychiatry, 
science, and ethics is not a new concept; major controversies since Laing, Szasz and others (which I will address 
in 2a.4.5) have long pivoted upon the question of whether psychiatric illnesses actually exist and whether 
psychiatric care actually propounds any particular values, especially values that may be unethical or biased. 
Some believe it does not (McFarquhar & Thompson, 2008) and others point out its political and repressive 
nature by the very virtue of its existence (Sadock & Sadock, 2003). 
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2a.4.1: Conceptual discussion: Psychiatry and Science. 
Let me present my position by presenting my view of science within psychiatry by looking at the relationship 
between psychiatry and science, which are argued, are based on facts. When using ECT we have no clear idea 
of how the electrical discharges work within our neuropathic system. Therefore, science is the total of a great 
magnitude of mysteries not established truths (Singh & Singh, 2009). The problem whenever ECT is discussed 
is that the exact sciences do not encompass all of the truth but only exact knowledge that is binding to the 
intellect and universally valid is based on fact. Science does not have all the answers and traditional psychiatric 
risk assessment used in professional practice and management may not be up to the job (Hiven et al. 2010).  
Chalmers (1999) in his book ‘What is this thing called science’ gives a nuanced interpretation of observable 
facts expressed as statements. He tells us that in normal linguistic usage, the meaning of ‘fact’ is ambiguous. It 
can refer to a statement that expresses fact and it can also refer to the state of affairs referred to by such a 
statement’( p.11).  He helps us understand by giving the analogy of mountains and craters on the moon. Here 
the facts can be referring to the mountains or craters themselves. Alternatively he makes the statement 
‘’...there are mountains and craters on the moon which can be taken as constituting the fact’ (p 11). When it is 
claimed that science is based on facts, clearly that latter interpretation is appropriate. Having an 
understanding about the moon’s surface is not based on and derived from mountains and craters, but from 
factual statements about mountains and carters. Now relating this to my argument on electroconvulsive 
therapy, those who base their argument that ECT works and is a fact, is an argument based on a false premise. 
Because of not knowing, how ECT works in a scientific manner, given that facts might constitute a suitable 
basis for science must be in a form of statements, the claim that facts are given in a straightforward way begin 
to look quite misconceived. Indeed, given the scope of finding an answer to the questions ECT poses, it could 
possibly be that science may never be up to the job of providing answers. Again, Chalmers (2008) has a 
position, which mirrors mine, he discusses and questions, both the fact that our perceptions depend to some 
extent on our prior knowledge and observation statements, which presuppose the appropriate conceptual 
framework, which indicate that it is a demand that is impossible to realise. “How can we establish significant 
facts about the world through observation of it, if we do not have some guidance as to what knowledge we are 
seeking, or what problems we are trying to solve” (Chalmers 1999 .p 13). It must follow then if I make the 
argument that facts based on ECT are not straight forward, reliable and valid, then they can be said to be 
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reversible and fallible. Following this then if we cannot accept this basis for scientific knowledge, then the 
knowledge based on it is equally reversible and fallible.  
Therefore, can science be helped by the various theories of psychiatry? Firstly, let me define what I mean by a 
theory of psychiatry. A theory of psychiatry refers to a field of knowledge within medicine focused specifically 
on the mind, aiming to study, prevent, and treat mental disorders in humans. It has been described as an 
intermediary between the world from a social context and the world from the perspective of those who are 
mentally ill (Lester & Gask, 2006). While the focus of psychiatry has changed little throughout time, the 
diagnostic and treatment processes have evolved dramatically and continue to do so. Since the late 20th 
century, the field of psychiatry has continued to become biological and less conceptually isolated from the 
field of medicine. The discipline is interested in the operations of different organs and body systems as 
classified by the patient's subjective experiences and the objective physiology of the patients. (Lester & Gask, 
2006).    
Reznek (1991), when looking at theories of psychiatry makes claims in his book ‘The Philosophical Defence of 
Psychiatry’ that for psychiatry to be a science it must have a public and repeatable observational base. 
Psychiatrists have postulated illness entities to explain the problems encountered with their patients where 
these subjective accounts and phenomena have taken the form of hallucinations, distorted thought processes, 
and low mood. However, are these observable and if so in what form? This is an important question to ask 
because as Reznek (1991) points out, if the whole edifice of psychiatric knowledge depends on observation of 
given symptoms, it is from these that we judge that the patient is suffering from a mental illness. It is also from 
this that the search for causes, underlying nature and treatment can begin and therefore, psychiatry stands 
and falls on the foundation of observation of subjective symptoms. He goes on to say that while we cannot 
observe the mental states of patients’ perceptual experience we can only observe from the behaviour that the 
patient is hallucinating. The observation is a hypothesis invoked to explain the behaviour of the patient. So if 
psychiatry has an observation base, it cannot lie in the subjective phenomena reported by the disturbed 
patients (Reznek, 1991). He continues that we do not have to find an observational base that is free of 
theoretical assumptions. All observational claims in science make theoretical assumptions, when scientists are 
measuring instruments, they hypothesise that these obey certain laws, thereby turning measurements into 
hypotheses? This can then be classed as a science (Lehoux et al. 2010). 
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Within psychiatry, we are in need of exact knowledge, which is universally valid, not knowledge that is based 
on presumptions as in the various theories of ECT. Varma (1989) articulates a similar thought when he says it is 
fatal to think that the scientific approach is the only one because most things do not lend themselves to the 
scientific approach. It may be preceded by exaggerated guesses but must be succeeded by unstinting critical 
enquiry. Additional to necessary analysis as to irrefutable conclusions from the existent state of knowledge, 
such critical enquiry and analysis is as important as the empirical enquiry itself and it may lead to further 
empirical enquiry that refutes these apparently irrefutable conclusions. This is the inevitable, inexorable 
process of scientific progress in psychiatry. It is Popperian refutation/falsifiability in action (Popper 
1935/2004). This is the only valid way to add to the corpus of empirical knowledge. My position and the 
criticism I offer when discussing ECT based on science, while the scientific approach is not the only one, it is 
the only one which can be empirically validated and refuted and can therefore lead to progression of verifiable 
thought. This is how it transpired with the discipline of science down the centuries (McEwen & Willis, 2010). 
Therefore, it is critical that psychiatry, which claims to be science driven and a scientific discipline, does not 
lose sight of this. It either gives up the claim of being scientific or learns to follow the cannons of science. We 
develop the necessary tools for all things we believe to be important to be able to study them and do not 
comment on them until we have validated them. That is the essence of scientific approach; my point is that 
psychiatry cannot say it has done that when commenting on ECT. A true scientist will follow two cardinal rules; 
firstly, he will never unwilling accept the worth of empirical evidence however damming to his/her favourite 
theories. Secondly and perhaps more importantly, for want of evidence he withholds comment (Singh & Singh, 
2004).  
Let me now enhance the psychiatric scientific discussion on the mind and the body. I make the claim that 
because ECT is a physical intervention, it will only be meaningful as a treatment for mental disorders if they 
too can be conceived as in some way physical, and that usually means as being correlated with brain states. I 
recognise that there are other positions in the philosophy of the mind that are not mind-brain identity 
theories, but reject discussion of these in-depth because  discussing the efficacy  of ECT would only make 
sense (placebo uses aside) in this context. If we make the point that the brain is part of the body then the 
question is what is the mind and what is the body? There has to be clear distinctions between structure and 
functions of both. Smith and Jones (1986) help me with this, by making the point that, “the leading idea of 
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what we have called the ‘two component’ picture is that we are a composite of two entities, one corporeal 
and one non-physical: and the presence of the second nonphysical component is essential if we are to function 
as thinking feeling human beings” (p 9). Let us use the correlation that the body is a house, it has bricks, walls, 
is used for shelter for people and appliances (Lehoux et al., 2010). Similarly, the body has a structure, the bone 
structure, which includes the neck, and thorax, torso and limbs. Its functions are numerous which include to 
think/sense (the head) to digest/evacuate/procreate (the abdomen and torso) and to move (limbs). Within the 
structure is the brain, which also has numerous functions but is connected to the body through a number of 
neuronal structures through the spinal cord, cranial nerves, and the neuro-endocrine system. Therefore, the 
functions of the body are included in physiology; similarly, the brain’s functions are included in the entity 
called the mind. The brain (structure) is connected to the rest of the body, (structure) and the function of the 
mind is part of the brain which is a physiology of the body; therefore, is a disorder of the mind a disorder of 
the body or not? Actually, the question, which should be asked, is a disorder of the ‘brain’ a disorder of the 
body or not. This summary is attractively tidy, but it requires us to draw a sharp distinction between mental 
and physical properties. Therefore this distinction is not at all easy to draw cleanly , at least if we try to do it in 
a way that accords with our everyday intuitions about what counts as mental and what counts as physical 
(Smith & Jones, 1986). I move my position forward by now linking this to someone suffering from symptoms of 
a psychiatric illness. Those patients suffering from tactile hallucinations or nihilistic delusions are actually 
manifestations of a disorder of the brain and therefore, can be called disorders of the mind. Such disorders of 
the brain are connected to disorders of the body since the brain is dynamically linked to the body. Therefore, 
my point is how do we know what is going on in the mind, and then treat it with ECT if we cannot observe a 
physiological abnormality. The view that mental diseases stand in the same way of thinking as, say urinary 
problems stand in relation to kidney disease is at best superficially attractive. The argument runs along these 
lines: the human body is a biological machine composed of parts, called, such as the liver, lungs, heart, and 
brain. Each organ has a specific function but all are linked in a number of ways. When there is a malfunction 
with any of these organs and they fail, we have a disease, such as emphysema, hepatitis, and coronary heart 
disease. Therefore, if we define human problems as symptoms of brain diseases, even in the absence of any 
medically proven evidence, we can then treat mental diseases as if they were brain diseases. All bodily 
phenomena involve physiological correlates and all diseases, psychiatric illness included, involve pathological 
correlates (Kendal, 1993).  
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The aim is to crack the code for this brain neurophysiology and gain evidence of brain function in both health 
and disease and in this way; we ‘may’ reach the scientific goal of how ECT works and in what way. Put this way 
it starts to unravel the scientific question. As the brain is part of the body, a disorder of the brain is a disorder 
of the body, therefore what we term the mind is function of the brain, and a disorder of the mind is equally a 
disorder of the body. In other words, if science can become the monster of philosophy, biology can be the 
monster of psychiatry (Singh & Singh, 2009). My rebuttal to the pro ECT advocates is without profound insight; 
it appears your position is invalidated unless backed up with validated robust empirical evidence. We should 
also remember not to preclude any psychosocial correlates as well. Nevertheless, evidence is the only bedrock 
of any theory within psychiatry and that empirical data are necessary to construct a theory, which will also 
stand up to valid scientific scrutiny (Fabrega, 2005). This has been the case for centuries in biomedicine, which 
has given us countless tested and proven treatments; psychiatry cannot be any different especially when we 
commit so much to our professional practice (Fabrega, 2005).     
Section 2a.4.2: Conceptual discussion on ‘Sham’ studies and ECT. 
The gold standard for the establishment of the therapeutic efficacy of a treatment is the randomized placebo- 
controlled trial. Upon first blush, it may seem difficult if not impossible to design something akin to a placebo 
or sham control for a procedure like ECT. However, my position here is to refute the premise that ECT is a 
treatment, which benefits all patients by the nature of its application. To challenge the pro-advocates of ECT 
by presenting my claim that there is strong evidence that ECT superiority over sham ECT can only be 
demonstrated in a positive manner in the short term, and only ‘marginally’ long term but with serious side 
effects to take into consideration. There are numerous studies2, which support my claim that sham group 
positive responses to illness are often surprisingly high, which leads to questions about what the mechanism of 
improvement actually was.  
Ross (2006) looked at a number of randomised prospective double blind, placebo-controlled trials. These 
studies varied in methodology but all involved the administration of real ECT versus sham ECT under double 
blind conditions. In the sham ECT condition, the patients’ receive a general anaesthetic, are connected to the 
ECT machine, the button is pushed but no current is delivered. The patients have no way of knowing whether 
                                                          
2 Ulett et al (1956), Brill et al (1959), Sainz (1959), Harris and Robin (1960), Wilson et al (1963), Fahy et al, 
(1963), Lambourn and Gill (1978), Freeman et al (1978), Brandon et al (1984), Gregory et al (1985). 
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real or sham ECT was delivered. The sham ECT studies provided definitive evidence that real ECT is no more 
effective than sham ECT except over long-term use. However, the negative side of the cost-benefit analysis 
with real ECT is due to death, cardiovascular complications, and memory and cognitive impairment caused by 
real ECT. Associated with this is ECT’s powerful placebo effect; sham ECT leads to improvement in patients 
levels of mental illness. If we are to base this treatment on scientific merit then the pro-advocates of ECT will 
find it hard to convince us of the value of ECT. A general sense of not having a firm scientific basis on which to 
base ECT use is discernible, but although clinically counter-balanced by the technologies dramatic effects it 
does not make a good argument for its scientific use( Wordage does not allow me to highlight all the studies 
but I will highlight two examples.) .  
The Northwick Park trial (Johnstone et al 1980), published results with analyses of subtypes of depression as 
predictors, electrode placement was described as ‘bifrontal’. In this study, 70 depressed patients were 
randomly assigned to real or sham ECT on a prospective double-blind basis. There were no differences in HAM-
D (The Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression) scores between the two groups at the beginning of the study or 
at 1 and 6 months. There was a significantly lower HAM-D score in real ECT group at weeks 2 and 3 while the 
treatment was being administered. It concluded that although people receiving ECT were better in the short 
term, no differences were shown in the control group and the ECT group at one month and six month 
intervals. Analysis and conclusion of the results were to highlight that with intensive nursing and medical care 
patients could recover from the most severe depression without receiving ECT.  
The ‘Nottingham study’ compared real ECT over sham ECT (Gregory et al. 1985). In the simulated group (sham 
ECT), the patient received everything that the group receiving real ECT experienced except the electrical 
charge causing the seizure. While there was improvement in the group receiving real ECT there, was also 
improvement in the group receiving the simulated ECT? So was it the electricity that created the seizure that 
caused the improvement or was it the thought of having the electricity and seizure that created the 
improvement? The researchers took it further by creating the seizure using flashing lights and the chemical 
flurothyl and patients improved as much as those receiving seizures from an electric current do. What was 
then shown was that the seizure and not the electric current created the therapeutic outcome and not the 
passage of electricity. The counter argument can always be made, for example, that the memory tests were 
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not sufficiently sensitive, that the autonomic regions studied were not sufficiently widespread, that the wrong 
biochemical constituents were assayed, the number of subjects was in adequate and so on.  
However, the main argument put forward within the studies does not show there is a vast improvement in real 
ECT over sham; it does not support the conclusion that ECT is powerful and effective. Therefore, the counter 
claim and position the pro advocates put forward can be rejected on two grounds; firstly, their position 
contains errors in reasoning about cause and effect of ECT, the post hoc fallacy. Secondly, their position is 
based on faulty assumptions because they assume the patient’s recovery is based on the treatment of ECT 
when it can be clearly demonstrated that it was not. Due to the refinement of research guidelines, a more up 
to date study is not available. In the absence of further research, it will remain the case that the effectiveness 
of ECT cannot be endorsed over sham ECT in the psychiatric literature.  
2.4.3: Conceptual discussion of ECT machinery. 
Within this section, I wish to challenge the premise that modern day ECT is safer than its historical 
predecessors, and the view presented by those who advocate for a newer safer ECT service, that they are 
improving the wellbeing of the mentally ill. Increasingly the presentation of improved technical administration 
is a feature promoted by advocates for its current and expanded application. Advocates will point to three 
facts to support their claim in that unmodified ECT given cannot be compared to modified ECT (current 
techniques), firstly because modified ECT now involves pre-oxygenation, anaesthesia and muscle relaxation. 
Secondly, most animal studies used historically are in no way equivalent, in terms of voltage, seizure duration, 
or electrode size, to current ECT use in humans. Lastly, non-dominant unilateral ECT has a clear and marked 
advantage over bi-lateral ECT with regard to (cognitive) neurological deficits. They will point to those results, 
which have been favourable3 without cognitive deficits and that the patient has recovered and point towards 
the nature and response in a variety of mental illnesses. 
I concede it is important to note that many psychiatric conditions warranting ECT as a treatment are 
associated with cognitive deficits, and the range of the cognitive deficits can be diverse across several 
domains. As such, discussion of cognition should include the effects of untreated psychiatric illness as well as 
the potential for impairment following ECT treatment, which advocates will say is a rare phenomenon. Indeed, 
                                                          
3 Kirsch et al (2008), Turner et al (2008), UK ECT Review Group (2003), Feske et al (2004) 
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I have experienced at first hand the views from colleagues that cognitive damage occurring in patients with 
modified ECT is not an established fact. I disagree with their position, the evidence simply does not warrant 
such an opinion. The basis of my rebuttal to these claims are that although a number of issues surround ECT, 
perhaps the two most significant are the loss of memory problems and the transient nature of its therapeutic 
outcome. Patients will attest that they have problems with retrograde (distant memory) and anterograde (new 
memory). Therefore, no matter how rare such a phenomenon may be, it must follow that it is important to try 
to establish its etiology. Historically the extent of memory loss may have been overestimated, however the 
dismissing of memory loss by those who advocate for ECT is an argument not supported by evidence. The 
second major issue associated with ECT is the transient nature of symptom reduction, when the treatment 
stops, symptoms return for up to 50% of patients sometimes within days. Given our inability to explain how 
the treatment works, our inability to explain why it stops working is understandable. The question we should 
be asking is did it actually work in the first instance.  
The next argument put forward by the pro-advocates of ECT is that the technique is now safer and much more 
sophisticated than that of the first machines developed by Cerletti and Bini. Yes, it is safer as we now have 
‘modified’ ECT in which the general anaesthetic and muscle relaxant stops the patient thrashing about the bed 
and sustaining fractures. However, safe is not a word I would endorse, I would say that modern day ECT is 
more controlled with the balance of power with the anaesthetist and psychiatrist and not with the patient. 
Conversely researchers state that the use of recent techniques of modified ECT actually increase risk of 
complications. The use of general anaesthesia, oxygenation, and additional medications for delivery are 
thought to require higher voltages to induce the seizure potentially increasing the risk to the patient (Breggin, 
1998, NICE, 2003).  
 The implication of the now discarded ‘sine’ wave machines which have been replaced by the ‘brief pulse’ 
machines hides a fact within its mechanism that makes me strongly question the ethics of using it. I also 
question the ethics of the actions of those using this new device, as only highly specialist personnel are 
allowed to operate this and are more than aware that danger lurks in the background of this new machine first 
devised by neurophysicist Reiter and an electrical engineer Wilcox. A number of researchers started to 
question this ‘new’ machine and many are reported to have indicated, that there is a case that retrograde 
amnesia, constriction of arteries, and capillaries and other bio-chemical disturbances in the brain are caused 
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by the increased electrical current in the brain. It was now recognised that Reiter and Wilcox had created the 
most dangerous electroshock machine in history, completely discarding the minimal dosage, adequate 
convulsion precept of ECT (Cameron, 1994). I emphasise my point by saying the use of uni-lateral ECT 
(although hardly used) is actually more damaging than bi-lateral ECT, a point made by Cameron in 1994 when 
giving his paper on consumer misinformation to both American and English psychiatrists. To give or create a 
seizure on the non-dominant side of the brain actually causes more damage to that side of the brain. Lastly, 
ECT machines are by way of scientific advancement much more powerful than those used 50 years ago. Let me 
enhance my position by explaining where the scientific differences are:  
• The frequency is increased: Frequency is the number of pulses of electricity per second flowing past a given 
point. Although old ‘sine’ waves are wider than ‘brief’ pulses, they are emitted at a rate of 120 per second. 
Modern day ‘brief’ pulse machines emit up to 180 pulses per second of electricity making the electrical jolt 
stronger and more powerful to the brain. The seizure threshold is the minimum electrical charge that induces 
an adequate seizure. The aim of a stimulus dosing protocol is to establish the patient’s seizure threshold and to 
titrate to an appropriate treatment dose to ensure an adequate seizure.  
• The current is increased: Current can be defined as electron flow per second. Old machines delivered between 
500-600 amps of current and induced a seizure. Modern day machines deliver between 700-900 amps to get 
the same result. The seizure threshold is the minimum electrical charge that induces an adequate seizure.  
• Duration is increased: Duration is the amount of time the current flows through the brain; modern day 
machines are four to six times the maximum duration of older models 
• Wave lengths can be increased: Modern machines can be adjusted, therefore leaving the door open for 
unethical use through higher and longer wave pulses  
                                                                                                                                         (Feliu et al. 2008, p. 616)  
I conclude this section by rebutting the arguments put forward that ECT is safer in the modern day than 70 
years ago and reiterate that the arguments put forward by the pro ECT advocates is not supported by 
evidence. I disagree with the claim that new ECT machinery is safer and argue that the most up-to-date 
machine actually creates more ‘internal brain damage’ than previous obsolete machines and is a point made 
by Andre (2009). Therefore, no matter how much the pro-ECT lobby try to repackage the idea that modern day 
ECT is safer, their position is contradictory. The variances of ECT technique both in the United Kingdom and 
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within worldwide healthcare systems are coupled with contradictions in diagnostic conditions. There is 
operative administration differences in size of voltage applied, length of seizure requirements, in ranges from 
the placement of the electrodes, associated pharmaceutical prescriptions for pre-medication and additional 
drugs to make the seizure occur. These factors combine to create an information void where ECT advocates 
are not able to produce reliable, current national statistics on which to base their positions.   
2a.4.4: Conceptual Discussion: Psychiatry and Professional Practice. 
The importance of this section is to present a position where I open up a discussion indicating that within 
psychiatry and professional practice nurses are expected to play an important role in the treatment of ECT. 
That they are involved in providing education both pre and post-operatively (Weiner & Falcone, 2013).The 
purpose of my literature review for this section was to determine the state of science in relation to nursing 
practice. My reason was that literature reviews are considered the sine que non of the gaps within science and 
its existing knowledge. This gives us direction for the next logistical step in our quest for further knowledge. 
From that, our understanding about the state of science in relation to nursing practice should bring about 
advances within our research, clinical and evidence based care. My concern is that there is a pro-ECT bias 
within numerous publications and books (Fink 2001; Dowman et al 2005; Bauer et al 2007) but an absence of 
those who challenge its use and of first person accounts (Johnstone 1999, Kershaw et al 2007). I start by 
providing an explanation put forward by the pro- ECT nursing publishers before I challenge their position. 
Within the nursing literature related to ECT, those in professional practices have several sub-themes. These 
include that ECT is effective in treating diseases of the mind, those who suffer from mental illness get better 
from having ECT, the cognitive side effects are not serious, and nurses need to understand what constitutes 
proper ECT practice, alleviate fear, and demonstrate proper knowledge and ethics (Daalen–Smith & Gallagher, 
2011). Firstly, it is important to look at the differences between what constitutes diseases of the mind and 
mental illness; disease refers to objective pathology, illness subjective awareness of distress and sickness 
refers to a loss of capacity to fulfil normal social roles (Gelder et al. 2001). There is a difference between a 
disease of the mind and mental illness. It seems that any disease, which produces a malfunctioning of the 
mind, is a disease of the mind and need not be a disease of the brain itself. For example, arteriosclerosis, 
epileptic episodes, diabetic hypoglycaemia, hyperglycaemia, delirium and some confusional states caused by 
physical illnesses. 
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The term has been held to cover numerous conditions. However, what is required is what is defined as a 
disease. Boorse (1977) in his paper ‘Health as a theoretical concept’ first questioned ‘is a disease anything that 
is inconsistent with health’ (p542). He goes onto say if the axiom has any content; to address the fundamental 
problem in the philosophy of medicine then what is needed is to break the circle with a substantive analysis of 
either health or disease. He starts by stating health is a normal function, the absence of disease and 
practicable health roughly the absence of a treatable illness. He then makes the point that the influence of 
values on health judgements has usually seemed most potent in the area of mental health. Within his paper, 
he analyses health and disease within traditional physiological medical definitions. However, he does challenge 
the premise that healthy people are those who do not need medical treatment, and that all diseases are to be 
treated by doctors. By précising, numerous writers’ views he gives a viewpoint on seven themes where he 
shows definitions in health, and shows that none by itself provides a necessary of sufficient definition of 
disease. His seven themes consist of one: value, where he says it is a desirable part of the mental welfare of 
the individual and views this concept as necessary for health. Nevertheless, he makes the point what happens 
when people are slow in reflex, short in height and unattractive, these conditions are not diseases; you could 
never distinguish them from diseases on grounds of disvalue alone. Secondly, treatment by physicians- it is 
often supposed that diseases are undesirable conditions that doctors happen to treat( p. 546) Thirdly, 
statistical normality- in clinical language, diseases, or pathological conditions are also called abnormal and 
healthy conditions normal( p 547). Fourthly, pain, suffering, and discomfort- Within his theme, discussions of 
health contrast with the pain and discomfort of illness. His challenge is that numerous conditions have been 
identified such as cerebral tumour, various forms of heart disease and breast cancer where there has been a 
complete absence of subjective distress. Therefore, right up to them being admitted into hospital or even 
death there was no reason to suspect illness as the person was classified as healthy (p. 547). Fifthly, Disability- 
he firstly makes the point that if all diseases cause physical suffering, perhaps any disease must at least tend at 
some stage to cause disability. His rebuttal here focuses on pregnancy, which he says is a painful, disabling, 
and unusual condition, which cannot count as a disease (p. 548). Six: adaptation- Here he makes the point that 
humans adapt to their environments, and that health is relative to that environment. However, unhealthy 
environments do not always give rise to unhealthy conditions and the recognition of diseases (p. 549). Lastly, 
seven: Claude Bernard and Walter Cannon first identified Homeostasis-the importance of homeostatic 
regulating mechanisms in body. Bernard looked at physiological processes as serving to maintain equilibrium in 
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the milieu interieur, while diseases processes were disruptions of the equilibrium. However many of life’s 
functions are not homeostatic, for example, perception, locomotion, growth, and reproduction upset an 
equilibrium rather than maintain one. One would recognise why various equilibria are important to life 
without confusing homeostasis with the broader idea of normal functioning (p. 550). He concludes by saying 
all ideas discussed have in some fact some connection with ‘normal’ functioning and what we shall argue 
would constitute disease would tend to diminish health on all seven counts. It would appear that we have two 
senses of ‘health’, in one sense it is a theoretical notion, the opposite of disease. In another sense, it is a 
practical or mixed notion, the opposite of illness (Boorse, 1977). Although I agree with many of the points 
Boorse makes, I feel it is necessary advance his argument and challenge his premise on five (Disability) and 
apply this to the area of mental health. My belief is a disease is an illness when it is deemed serious enough to 
be incapacitating ad debilitating. Mental illness refers to a wide range of mental health conditions, disorders 
that affect your mood, thinking, and behaviour. I will define the key terms for my argument because I believe 
they need deeper reflection to distinguish the nuanced differences, let me give examples to aid clarification.  
Firstly, disease as an objective pathology - ‘he is suffering from a brain disease’; secondly, illness as subjective 
distress - ‘I am feeling ill, have a high temperature and am suffering from a fever’ and lastly, sickness as an 
inability to fulfil a social role - I cannot come into work today because I am sick’. It is therefore possible to 
describe patients in any of the three terms as most patients suffering from diseases also suffer from illness and 
suffering. However, in psychiatry not all of these elements apply, because in some personality disorders only 
sickness applies (Mental Health Foundation, 1997). From the distinctions already provided further 
explanations are needed. Multiple sclerosis is a disease, a sickness and an illness (Lehoux et al. 2010). A disease 
since it has an objective pathology, an illness since there is a subjective awareness of distress and a sickness 
since it involves an incapacity to fulfil normal roles especially in the later stages of profound physical decline. 
Schizophrenia is a sickness; it is not always an illness and has yet to be proved a disease. It is a sickness since it 
involves an inability to fulfil societal roles, an illness because (depending on levels of insight) there is a 
subjective awareness of distress and not a disease because there is no universally accepted recognised 
objective pathology (Littlejohn, 2002). Therefore, when those in psychiatric practice state that ECT alters the 
disease process of mental illness, we need to unravel what belief they hold and if this belief is, research based 
or experiential. In addition, they have to prove in psychiatry that illnesses and sickness are also diseases or 
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they are open to criticism of their viewpoint. We live in a professional world where evidence based care is key; 
therefore, the ontology of evidence based care equates truth with the production of positive mental health 
changes in the individual. If it cannot truthfully do that, then all we are left with is very refined behavioural 
manipulation or ‘spin’ of the facts, which excludes as meaningless all the above questions. In fact, such a 
search is the very basis of scientific enquiry with psychiatry included. In answer to this statement, Shorter 
(2008) makes a valid statement ‘You negate this and you nullify the very foundation of science’ (Shorter 2008, 
p. 595).  
The stance that pro-ECT advocates take is that they try to ‘pick holes’ in the objectivity and reality of physical 
illnesses which is a brave attempt at deflecting serious criticism away from psychiatry. My position and 
rebuttal to this is; it is hardly likely to stand up to any form of serious reflection for a disease will always need 
an objective pathology and a disease cannot be wished away by argument, a view also taken by Shorter 
(2008). When it does prove its diagnostic categories are diseases, then I believe psychiatry as a discipline will 
have truly established itself and anti-psychiatry will die a natural death. Having made that statement, I believe 
it is relevant now to address the stance of those who favour the anti-psychiatry view.  
2a.4.4.1: The Stance of Anti-psychiatry on Mental Illness and Treatment.  
Following my concluding thoughts on psychiatry and professional practice, my viewpoint is that psychiatric 
diagnosis has weathered nearly a century of criticism. My viewpoint when discussing ECT is that it is in a 
contradictory position and can be considered unscientific. However, the healthy nature of any debate with 
proponents for and opponents against a stance, viewpoint, or theme, in any form, and its beneficial effects, 
are well known and recognised, within the psychiatric profession. The recognition of these debates within any 
discipline of science, including those of the medical sciences is immense. Yet, it would be unthinkable when 
dealing with anti-neurosurgeons, anti-paediatricians or anti-cardiologists but one could argue that these do 
not exist until something untoward happens and the science underpinning these specialities is on more solid 
ground compared to a treatment such as ECT?. However, this is the case for anti-psychiatry groups, who have 
pursued their beliefs and demand a more humane approach to psychiatry (Desai, 2005). Anti-psychiatry was 
established by David Cooper in the 1960s and was exemplified by Timothy Leary’s famous quotation ‘turn on, 
tune in, drop out ’; the British genius for muffling dissent who also came to the rescue when, prior to the 1970 
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general election, helped bring about the lowering of the voting age to 18. The whole genre of clinical action 
was that large psychiatric Victorian institutions were beyond hope, being too tainted by their inflexible 
institutional codes of practice and therefore unable to promote any spontaneity in staff and patients alike 
(O’Brian et al. 2001).   
This was in all, in essence, the position that the anti-psychiatry movement challenged, insofar as the logical 
status of mental illness, the intelligibility of madness, the dehumanisation of institutional care, a biological 
regime and the reframing of mental illness, as deviance. It is evident that the different forces from the anti-
psychiatrist movement, even if they are not based on common theory or conceptualisation, have opposed the 
power exerted by psychiatrists over peoples’ lives. One of their challenges was the psychiatrist’s authority in 
diagnosing, involuntary detention for treatment, and the increasing medicalization of mental illness with ECT 
being one of these treatments. The antecedents of the anti-psychiatry movement can be traced back to the 
early 1950s when deep divisions occurred between biological and psychoanalytical psychiatrists. 
Psychoanalytical psychiatry, which had exerted unchallenged control of the profession for decades, endorsed 
treatment that was subjective and dynamic. Biological psychiatry, which claimed psychoanalysis, was 
unscientific, costly, and ineffective (Reissmiller & Reissmiller, 2006). Conversely, society was starting to ask 
searching questions about compulsory admission into hospital, patients being coerced into the taking of high 
doses of neuroleptic medication, undergoing convulsive, and psychosurgical procedures. In the context of the 
social turbulence in the 1960-1970 era when criticism of psychiatry was emerging, came the counterculture 
group of psychiatrists. This rebellion came from within psychiatry that was influenced by the rejection of 
established authority. Overall, the task of the anti-psychiatry movement was to get psychiatry to take an 
existentialist approach in valuing human experience in preference to treating under a label within the 
dominant hegemony (O’Brian et al, 2001). They wanted mental health workers to focus more on the beliefs 
and values of their patients including the spiritual, political, and social-economic dimensions of their life 
experiences. Anti-psychiatrists did not just question specific coercive, custodial practices, they challenged the 
central concepts of psychiatry: its purposes, its basic doctrines of etiology and nosology, and the distinction 
upheld between traditional psychiatrists and psychiatric labels they attached under the umbrella of insanity 
and madness (Shorter, 2009).  
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It is important also that I make my position clear about as treating clinicians within mental healthcare we 
should be able to offer a definition of what mental illness constitutes and what it is we treat. Therefore before 
I endeavour to unravel the views of the anti-psychiatry body, let me build on the question of what constitutes 
mental wellbeing and mental illness (I addressed in science and psychiatry in section 2a.3), and build on the 
previous points made. On the face of it, this seems a strange question but if we cannot categorically say that 
mental illness exits why are we treating it with ECT in the first place? Within any scientific merit we should be 
able to define the object of our research and, as ethicists writing about mental illness, surely we should be able 
to provide a definition of the object of our investigation. So why is it difficult to accomplish these tasks?  
It could be argued that the range of opinions and strong advocacy positions of what constitutes mental health 
from many psychiatrists and the impact these opinions have had have only served to give the viewpoint that 
we still do not know what constitutes mental illness( Desai 2005). If psychiatry requires to be understood, we 
need to recognise the enormity of the challenge and the need to meet the challenge effectively and levelly. If I 
play devil’s advocate, I quite understand the anti-psychiatrist movement challenging a profession who cannot 
agree on the most important of issues like clear diagnosis of why a person suffers from a mental illness.  
Subsequently, this approach was far too restrictive and, returning to my original question of what is mental 
illness , this anti-psychiatry concept on its own, it can be argued, does not help us in understanding what 
mental illness is, so more deconstruction of what we believe mental illness constitutes to be, is necessary. I 
find their attempt to discredit the position myself and others take that mental illness is linked to the 
association of labels challenging, especially when their line of argument dismisses neuro-chemical 
abnormalities found in patients with major mental disorders. Then recognise counter arguments they put 
forward, empathise with their stance on society’s role, and confirmed by psychiatrists with the intent on 
coercion and controlling of individuals whose behaviour could be classed as deviant and who threatened 
society. This police officer’s role was symbolised by the use of ECT, other treatments thought to cause serious 
harm, and the anti-psychiatrists campaigned vigorously against these treatments (Berlim et al. 2003). Put 
rhetorically, there are no psychiatric patients, society is the patient, and the psychiatrist himself is the 
symptom of the social disease (Singh & Singh, 2009). The basic argument of the anti-psychiatry movement is 
that psychiatric disorders exist because the psychiatric establishments exist. This is a serious but 
fundamentally flawed argument; you could actually turn it on its head and say the psychiatric establishment 
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exists because psychiatric disorders exist. We could actually say that the myth of mental illness and anti-
psychiatry argument then go beyond their premises and therefore lead us to empty rhetoric . Moreover, in 
reality we should not overestimate the extent of the anti-psychiatry movement, as individuals within this 
movement had almost nothing in common except a deep criticism of psychiatry. They became an international 
phenomenon and I believe that at this point it is relevant to address ‘collectively’ the overall views of and 
fundamental positions of four anti-psychiatrists, which are Thomas Szasz (America), Ronald Laing (United 
Kingdom), Erving Goffman (America) and lastly Michel Foucault (France). 4. 
The main assailant of psychiatry in the United States was Thomas Szasz (1920-2012), he restricted the concept 
of disease to entities with defined anatomic, histological or biochemical substratum defending his position by 
arguing ‘disease’ means bodily disease … The mind (whatever it is) is not an organ or part of the body. Hence, 
it cannot be diseased in the same sense the body can. When we speak of mental illness, then we speak 
metaphorically’ (Szasz 1974.p.14). In summary, Szasz believed the labels given to mental disorders were no 
more than ‘myths’ or fraudulent impositions perpetrated by psychiatrists whose central intention was to 
protect and preserve their privileged professional status (Berlim et al. 2003). Szasz was opposed to involuntary 
hospitalisation and treatment of individuals; he believed that this practice was never in the patients’ best 
interests, but only taken to control them on behalf of their families or the state. In the UK, the anti-psychiatric 
movement condemned the practice of psychiatry in its institutional practice in favour of community-
orientated living. Its most prominent ideologist was psychoanalyst Ronald. D. Laing (1927-1989). In his writings 
in 1960 and his best seller ‘The Divided Self’ he saw mental disorders or at least schizophrenia as an 
understandable and even normal response of sensitive individuals to a mad world (Laing, 1960). He 
emphasised the importance of freedom and subjectivity over determinism, and believed that cure would occur 
when patients felt that they were free to make choices. He argued that patients with schizophrenia had a 
‘split’ inside their minds and were ‘playing mad’ to avoid social responsibilities. Later he claimed, on the 
strength of a rather weak study, that schizophrenia was a product of disturbed families, which ‘victimised’ one 
of their group.   
                                                          
4 Because of space limits other relevant ideologues of anti-psychiatry will not be mentioned (as for example 
Franco Basaglia (Italy), Aaron Esterson (United Kingdom) and David Cooper (South Africa).  
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It seems, like numerous others when we discuss myth and mental illness that I believe the problem lies with 
society’s attitude towards such phenomena. What anti-psychiatry did was to reveal that there is a crucial 
value-element to how we judge the desirability of certain actions or beliefs that are socially constructed. This 
view has a familiar ring to it; many will recall Citizen Wolfe Smith, leader of the Tooting Popular Front (BBC 
1977) and his embattled cry ‘Come the glorious day brother’. The latter implied that on some far off glorious 
day, we would all see the only way, which was socialism, and be converted. Fantastic, to be certain of some 
things like Wolfe seemed to be about everything. I agree the anti-psychiatry arguments for this element were 
extremely persuasive but personally I find the discussion of myth unpersuasive and I am not convinced. Within 
a few sentences in a paragraph the critique moves from promoting the myth that works for people, giving 
them stress-free lives, ideological satisfaction and enlightenment to the assertion that it provides a growing 
army of psychiatric health care workers with employment and social sanctions rationale to forcible treat 
people from mythical illnesses (Clarke, 2009).  
The dissent from sociological thought and perspective came from a sociologist from America, viz. Erving 
Goffman (1922-1982). His view was that psychiatrists used asylums as brainwashing machines to control 
disturbed individuals. His observations did draw serious attention to the provision of mental health care, and 
highlighted serious weaknesses. What he saw was individuals wasting their lives in the name of psychiatry like 
inmates in prison because of being institutionalised, a dubious medical speciality responsible for the very 
conditions it was supposed to treat and cure. However, the legacy left behind from the government’s 
proactive willingness to push forward deinstitutionalization from the thinking of Goffman is still evident in the 
modern day. The process of deinstitutionalization has proven that asylums did perform important functions; 
deinstitutionalization has proven paradoxically that it helped perpetuate the stigma of those suffering from 
mental illness, by causing a record growth in the number of those mentally disordered homeless (Lamb & 
Bachrach, 2001).  
Laing was much influenced by Madness and Civilization by the French philosopher and social theorist Michel 
Foucault (1926-1984), In Madness and Civilization: A history of Insanity in the Age of Reason (Foucault 1965), 
Foucault traced the social context of mental illness and noted that economic and cultural interests have always 
defined it. The work argues that conceptions of madness are not discoveries but cultural (legal, political, 
philosophical and medical) constructions of a given time and place, that vary from civilization to civilization 
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and time to time (Foucault 2006).  One of the lasting features of Foucault’s work is the way his histories 
challenge the historiographical pretensions of all who appeal to the “historical record”, the way they have the 
historical record challenge itself. Here, the brief title History of Madness may be misleading. It can lead the 
unsuspecting reader to think that the text is a history of a particular “object” called madness. Yet part of the 
fascination exerted by this text is that it evokes something variously called madness, folly, insanity, precisely 
not as an object but as an something else called reason, and this, for a certain period and in a certain place 
(principally the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe) (Reissmiller & Reissmiller, 2006).  
Although the mission of Szasz, Laing, Goffman, and Foucault was to get the psychiatric fraternity to view 
mental illness in a different light and question in a nuanced way custodial psychiatry, it was but a batch of 
radical departures, which has designated the counter culture of the 1960s and all which followed. Questions 
about freedom and being free, what is the true meaning of freedom? What is my true self? Do I really have 
choices? Am I free? Moreover, how do I become free? These questions were an everyday occurrence and were 
central to the then radical thinking of that generation. However, it is a quizzical link between social and legal 
changes and the counter-rhetoric of the then swinging sixties (Clarke, 1999). Bob Dylan said the answers were 
‘blowing in the wind’ and if we were to embrace his meaning literally, there were no answers, or at least those 
that had been given were no longer good enough.  The underlying argument put forward was, the different 
forces in the anti-psychiatry movement, even if they are not based on any common theory or 
conceptualisation, opposed the power that the psychiatrist and the psychiatric fraternity held over people’s 
lives and what they saw as the lack of humane approach to care. The anti-psychiatry beliefs that endorsed the 
need and promoted the basic rights of the mentally ill are concepts that we cannot shy away from or disagree 
with and I hold that position. Nevertheless I will admit one serious objection remains for which I can see no 
adequate response   namely Szasz’s description of modern psychiatry ‘inventing diseases’ does not seem too 
farfetched in the ever expanding seamless scope of the current systems of what constitutes mental illness, 
adolescent anti-social disorder, communication disorder, neglect of child and premature ejaculation( DSM 4 
and ICD 10).  
Once again, let us return to the question ‘what is a mental illness?’ On the face of it, this is a strange question. 
Clinicians should be able to give a definition of the illness they are trying to treat. Surely mental health 
researchers should be able to offer a definition of the research they try to define. Finally, philosophers writing 
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about mental illness should be able to provide a definition of the object of their investigation. The childhood 
story of Humpty Dumpty illustrates my point. The problem lies in the Humpty Dumpty world of shifting, 
ambiguous, and idiosyncratic terminology. Humpty Dumpty: “When I choose a word it means what I choose it 
to mean” when it comes to defining the term mental illness or figuring out which conditions qualify, we enter 
back into Humpy Dumpty’s shifting world. Let me highlight this by giving two examples. “Mental illness refers 
to a wide range of mental health conditions — disorders that affect your mood, thinking, and behaviour” 
(MIND, 2014). “Mental illness is a term that is often used to refer to a wide range of mental health conditions 
that can be diagnosed by a health care professional” (DSM 4, World Health Organisation 2005). This is just two 
of many and what is a fact is that the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM 4) is the 
American psychiatric association’s standard reference for psychiatry, which includes over 450 different 
definitions of mental disorders.  
This, I argue, is a fundamental weakness in the whole field of mental health and the care of the mentally ill. 
Many crucial problems would be less problematic if it were possible to group or distinguish a definition of 
mental illness that really worked. Nosologists could use it to guide the decision-making process so that aspects 
of human distress and malfunction should be classified as mental disorder. The providers of care could use it 
when deciding whether to diagnose and treat and it would clear up the confusion in the legal system where 
matters of consequence often rest on whether a mental illness is present or not. However, before I look at the 
law and ECT let me pose the question will psychiatrists help to make psychiatric problems ascend from 
psychiatric illness to sickness to diseases and in doing so bring about the dismantling of the whole branch of 
psychiatry? As this section of the thesis concludes, we need to address other ideas for taking action and 
possible directions for future structure and maybe the quest for the answers lies in the ethics of psychiatry.   
2a.4.5: Conceptual Discussion- Psychiatry and Ethics. 
My starting position in this section is firstly to look at how we increase the mental well-being of people and to 
prevent mental illness, and by whom should be given the role to define mental health. Bioethics play an 
important part in psychiatry, and the inter-link between psychiatry and neuroscience; the foray for the 
academics is to supply heuristic models and for psychiatrists to test them. They are heuristic assumptions 
(heuristic meaning serving to indicate, or stimulate investigation) and meant to reify these concepts of distress 
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that can be subsumed under the umbrella term of mental illness. However, being a good psychiatrist does not 
necessarily mean you will be a good bioethicist; we need the ethicist’s detailed blueprinting, the clinician’s 
practical implementation of care and the neuro-scientist’s hardnosed verification. To ask the question whether 
mental illnesses are actual diseases or mere constructs confuses the number of questions posed about mental 
illness so maybe the numerous theories put forward about ECT can enlighten us to lay our marker down in the 
‘camp’ of our belief. We cannot avoid the ethical issues that present within psychiatry or we inevitably act in 
ways that negatively affect the well-being of others, we will make choices, which in our efforts to help others 
may do the complete opposite by violating dignity and infringing rights. When delivering mental healthcare 
there has to be ethical thinking all of the time and it is widely construed to underscore the structure of our 
engagements with others as we think what to do, what to think and how to react (Levine et al. 2004). A 
contentious issue is the nature and nurture debate: acrimony and camp apart, for both sides there is much to 
integrate and assimilate from both viewpoints. Nature refers to all of the genes and hereditary factors that 
influence who we are, from our physical appearance to our personality characteristics. Nurture refers to all the 
environmental variables that impact who we are, including our early childhood experiences, how we were 
raised, our social relationships, and our surrounding culture. Therefore, if we take the viewpoint that genes 
determine and regulate behaviour and behaviour alters gene expression, then we can make the correlation 
that both are interlinked. The task of modern psychiatry is to unravel which determines what and to what 
extent (Singh & Singh, 2009). If we make the statement that absolute or perfect mental health is the absence 
of mental disorder linked to a positive wellbeing, then we can say that perfect mental health is the control of 
mental disorder, which results from optimal social functioning and personal equipoise. Every new step in the 
understanding and control of psychiatric illness must be a clear understanding over the previous, objectively 
verifiable and provide grounds for its refutation. Misuse is an inherent danger in any form, I agree also that 
disuse is due to a fear of misuse as in involuntary hospitalisation and the giving of ECT as a treatment, where 
the concern with misuse is giving rise to disuse and both areas need to be addressed. It is understood that the 
psychiatrist has a responsibility to society, true, but only as an adjunct to patient welfare and neuro-scientific 
verifiability. However, ethics also ensures that the psychiatrist does not become a convenient handle to 
enforce conformity to the above examples.  
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The sensible practice of neuroscience requires that health, illness and other features of the mind can be 
predictably altered by moulding and regulating the body (the brain). The sensible practice of ethics, on the 
other hand, requires the behaviour of the body (the embodied human being) can be controlled by changing 
actions of the mind (Hayry, 2010). Almost from the outset, ECT has been accompanied by a literature on how it 
works, during the 75 years of ECT history a wealth of theories regarding its mechanism have been put forward. 
Some are based on important aspects of the mechanism, some such as psychological theories based on pure 
speculation inspired by the prevailing psychodynamic theories for psychiatric illness and treatment of their day 
(Bolwig 2011). Wordage does not allow me to discuss these theories in-depth, but I have identified theories, 
which are congruent with nursing practice in psychiatry.5 
Finally, if scientists make the claim within psychiatry that human actions are guided exclusively by the brain 
and the ethicists claim that human actions are guided partly by the mind, then their positions are drastically 
incompatible and professional practice within psychiatry. Having studied how science in its various forms plays 
a part, I come to the following conclusion. Any formulation of the mechanism of ECT will encounter numerous 
difficulties; it remains an unresolved issue whether ECT exerts differential effects or whether these obviously 
different disorders have common pathophysiological bases. Therefore, without the aetiology and 
pathophysiology, a theory of ECT cannot be complete. In short, the psychiatric fraternity is no nearer to having 
an understanding of the operative mechanism of the treatment than it did seventy-five years ago. As 
mentioned previously within my introduction, ECT is now widely practised and is safer than when it was first 
introduced. This suggests that there has been some understanding; however, some basic questions about ECT 
remain unanswered. There is a divergence between the views of the clinicians and those who receive ECT. 
Documentation shows practitioners focus on the effectiveness of the treatment, and the successful alleviation 
of disease and symptoms (Rose et al. 2003, Berg, 2009, Mangaoang & Lucey 2009, Tess & Smetana, 2009). 
Patients however prefer to speak about the overall benefits rather than the disadvantages and talk about the 
relief from illness rather than the cognitive and memory problems experienced. Clinicians point to the 
powerful nature of this treatment while consumers point to its negative consequences and uncertainties 
                                                          
5 (Meduna 1936); (Zur 1939); (Hemil & Walter 1942); Cerletti 1950; 1954); (Ottorson 1960); (Abrams &Taylor 
1974; 1976); (Fink 1978); (Abrams 1992); (Lebenson 1999); (Keltner & Boschini 2009); (Michael 2009); (Bolwig 
2011). 
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(Benbow & Crentsil, 2004). Lastly, which of the myriad of post-ECT biochemical alterations in the central 
nervous system, individually or in combination, reflect the therapeutic effect? What these theories reflect, in 
their pursuit that they alleviate signs and symptoms of major mental illness, is the magnitude of the challenges 
facing the researchers and practitioners. If the current scientific theories are unable to determine how ECT 
works and what adverse effects it has, the scant evidence does little to increase public confidence in the 
treatment, which is a position point, put forward by the anti-psychiatry movement.  
2a.5: Conclusion.  
This chapter provided me with the opportunity to argue a position and address the history of ECT, psychiatry 
and science, psychiatry and professional practice and psychiatry and ethics, in many ways the 1960s onwards 
was a watershed for psychiatry during which critics from both ends of the political spectrum besieged the 
speciality. I provided an analysis of controversial innovation of ECT, which then led me forward in my 
discussion on the advent of new machines used in ECT. Whilst dissent and the quest for the truth are germane 
in the discussion of ECT, healthcare professions in psychiatry struggle to come to grips with explanations and 
achieving resolution on its mode of function. I agree with the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence that there is a need for future clinical trials in ECT to develop deeper scientific understanding and 
reflect observer and patients rated assessments of improvement, the impact on cognitive function and deeper 
explanation of side effects. However, I presented a position and argued that the fact ECT even up to modern 
day cannot truly be classed as scientifically proven. As in the past ECT is a complex invention to untangle, so it 
is not surprising that many find it difficult to maintain a balanced view, especially since so many questions 
remained unanswered. However, these questions raised are all significant if we are to render a definitive 
opinion. I challenge the pro-ECT position, which champions the view that anyone with common sense, 
knowledge of basic, relevant scientific knowledge and a caring attitude would come to the conclusion that ECT 
is scientifically valid. Whilst attacking those like me who disagreed with their position and labelled us as biased 
and self-serving. The past abuse of ECT by psychiatry has extended to the manner in which it has been referred 
to in the psychiatric literature. With the scientists always presenting the argument on unfounded claims about 
ECT studies that the memory tests were not sufficiently sensitive, that the autonomic regions studied were not 
sufficiently widespread, that the wrong biochemical constituents were assayed, or that the number of subjects 
studied were inadequate. This chapter provided a brief historical account of the emergence of a categorical 
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medical view about mental illness and disorders of mental health. In recognition of the discussion on the 
conflict between psychiatry and anti-psychiatry, my view was and still is although I distance myself with many 
of the therapeutic implications of anti-psychiatry; I acknowledge there is a need to accommodate all possible 
viewpoints if it is able to enrich the concept and practice of psychiatry for human welfare. Szasz was perhaps 
the most vituperative but, as I have shown, he was not alone. In the final analysis, the debates over mind 
control and, given our current knowledge, it is not the scalpel and the electrode that need worry us, it is the 
word. It is not our brains, which we should be protecting, but our minds. The glib arguments of those, who 
under the umbrella of science without evidence and who manipulate the minds of the mentally ill are, I 
believe, the most dangerous. The menace to watch out for is not Dr. Frankenstein but the Wizard of Oz.  
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Part 2b: The Law and ECT:  
“The aim of argument, or of discussion, should not be victory, but progress”  
Joseph Joubert. French Writer 1754-1824 (in Gaiter &Gaiter 2012)  
Part 2b.1 Introduction 
The area of primary legal scope for this part of the thesis is the mental health service domain of England and 
Wales and the administration of the operative procedure Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) in psychiatric 
settings. 
I aim to present my argument within this chapter by critically reflecting upon the way mental health law has 
changed over the past 50 years. I cover sections 58 and section 62 of the Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 
2007] because they are the prevalent sections that involve ECT. In this chapter, it will be discussed in ‘parts not 
sections’ to avoid confusion when I discuss sections of the Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007]. My 
primary concern is that certain sections of the Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007] create the potential 
for a patient to be given ECT against their wishes. This is a piece of legislation which is important to my claim 
that ECT is unethical and is a tool by which when applied can enforce ECT treatment. At this point I must make 
clear that the Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007] is an important piece of legislation preventing harmful 
actions, but some parts are problematic in regard of ECT. While the Mental Health Act has an important part to 
play in the care of the mentally ill, it should not be used as a tool to enforce ECT treatment without consent. 
Once I have established the outline of the relevant sections and how they are used, I will look at the 
consequences of sections 58 and 62 in regards to ECT and patient care. Currently, physicians cannot administer 
ECT to a detained patient without seeking their consent or using the Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007] 
to justify its use. The position I hold will be in three key areas in sections 58 and 62, the criteria/claims for 
using ECT without consent are outlined as follows. Firstly, the sections claim that ECT saves lives by preventing 
the patient in an emergency going on to commit suicide. In cases where the patient is considered a suicide risk, 
the law dictates that treatment must be given (NICE, 2003). Secondly, the sections discuss how to identify a 
patient as dangerous so treatment has to be imposed. Lastly, the sections address the area of risk and how the 
Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007) solidifies the dominance of risk by providing a legitimising framework 
within which risk can be managed within psychiatric practice or they will continue to be misinterpreted.  
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An important consideration is whether mentally ill patients should be considered autonomous. These patients 
do not lack autonomy; however, they are not fully autonomous agents either. They are in the middle, which 
complicates the issue. Suicidal patients who fall under The Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007] still fall 
into this category. Even if included in the Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007], they can still be 
autonomous agents and therefore make decisions about their own treatment. Patients who are not 
autonomous are those who do not have the ability to show critical thinking ability, therefore, it is evident that 
they cannot display autonomous decision-making skills. The contentious issue is to prove that they cannot 
demonstrate critical thinking ability to a degree that they are not autonomous. 
My intention is to highlight the changes that have evolved within mental health law to give a clearer picture in 
the later sections of the points I address and for which I have an opposing idea and present it to support my 
position. In this chapter, I introduce the ethical theory of Principlism (the bulk of the analysis of the theory of 
Principlism will be in chapter three) and start to identify how it is applied within psychiatry, identifying its 
positive and negative effects in the clinical area. Currently, two psychiatrists’ agreement on using ECT is 
enough for its implementation. The argument that I highlight is the practical problems when requiring a 
judicial order, is this is an unreasonable ethical scenario that makes ECT available to the indigent and those 
that need timely treatment.  
Part 2b.2: Summary of sections and arguments to be presented: both legal and ethical 
In part (2b.3), I will cover the changes in Mental Health law and the impact of these changes on psychiatric 
patient care. This key point is important to my position because these improvements were to increase patient 
autonomy but they did do not go far enough to allow the patient to be autonomous. How it brought a 
different perspective to mental health care. I briefly outline differences between the 1959 Act and the Mental 
Health Act (1983), [revised 2007] and identify ethical and legal key areas of change within the acts. In part 2b.4 
I discuss others and mine arguments that centre on the right to receive treatment and, although I accept that 
liberties as rights should not constrain certain actions, I present discussion, points to further this topic with the 
aid of a case study.  
In part (2b.5) I explore the right to refuse treatment and make my case opposing the practice of administering 
ECT to a patient  on the grounds of their being ‘dangerous’. In part (2.6), I discuss why I am targeting sections 
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58 and 62. To do this, I break down sections 58 and 62 and establish that despite these sections of the Mental 
Health Act, (1983, revised 2007) the violation of the principle of autonomy should not be permitted unless 
there is a need to prevent death and it is the last measure left open to healthcare professionals. I address this 
through the lens of Principlism and the basis of my argument is this is a section that enables the psychiatrist to 
enforce treatment in an emergency, but this emergency is a perception of the psychiatrist alone and often not 
all of the members of the healthcare team. Someone has to make a decision but my point is that consensus is 
far better than individual decision-making. An ethic that overrides refusal of consent , expressively interfering 
with the patient in physical and psychological terms and is legitimised by the Mental Health Act , seems 
paradoxical beyond the emergency. If the subject refuses consent for ECT in these circumstances- the legal, 
socio-cultural and ethics of the subject and identity are continually fore-grounded and needs further 
examination. Therefore, I explore the reasons for giving ECT in an emergency and challenge this position. Lastly 
in part 2b.2.7, (in parts 2b .7, part 2b.7.1 and part 2b.7.2). I will summarise my discussion around the use of 
the two main sections discussed and bring concluding arguments to close this chapter. In that although the 
new Act has provided more stringent and right based proposals for patients, its restrictive criteria has still not 
gone far enough for the rights of detained patients in that they are still subject to types of treatment and 
interventions which can be imposed without their consent. 
Part 2b.3: Ethical and Legal perspectives – areas of concerns identified. 
Let me motivate this section by giving a brief historical context. Because of the legal requirements that 
surround ECT, psychiatrists have found themselves in an adversarial contest in an effort to defend their 
decisions in the use of ECT when prior to the Mental Health Act (1983),[revised 2007] they had much more 
professional autonomy. In summary, changes have been implemented to allow patients’ rights to be more 
freely expressed and recognised since the 1959 Mental Health Act. However, these changes still allow the use 
of ECT under the Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007].The indication from the legal guidelines within the 
Act is that the patient is otherwise incapable and in need of medical care in circumstances in which they have 
not declared an unwillingness to be treated prior to the onset of their mental illness. This gives the 
psychiatrists wide scope to ‘treat’; the caveat being the treatments should always be in the patients’ ‘best 
interests’. This point now leads me where I highlight how the 2007 revisions to the Mental Health Act (1983) 
were implemented to give the patients more legal and ethical protection. I consider this change in legal and 
50 
 
ethical protection in relation to coerced treatment and poor treatment practice, but this consideration leads 
me to question whether the new Act still has omissions and question its usage. In 2007, the 1983 Mental 
Health Act was redrafted and came into being on the 3rd November 2008. This new version amended large 
parts of the 1983 Mental Health Act. Under the old MHA, detained patients had little opportunity to refuse 
treatment that their doctors believed necessary, even when those patients were capable of consenting or 
refusing treatment (Hewitt, 2009). Developing mental health legislation is a slow process; the now revised 
Mental Health Act (1983) has taken over four years to become legislation. However, to understand the 
evolvement of care and rights and what triggered revising the 1983 Act we have to go back to the 1959 Mental 
Health Act. In the 1970s, treatment was already in a period of transition, moving towards community care and 
more effective pharmacotherapy. With the 1959 Act under review, it started to become evident that patients’ 
lives were to be vastly influenced. It is at this point in time that the shape of the 1983 Act emerged. In 
particular on the issue of consent to treatment, an issue that was prominent in the 1983 Act but unmentioned 
in the 1959 Act (I will discuss the issue of consent in more depth in chapter 4).  
The Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007] brought a different perspective on how treatment, including ECT, 
should be administered. The patient’s primary nurse has a threefold duty to ethically, professionally, and 
legally liaise with the doctor to confirm that patients consent before each treatment. This should involve 
explaining again the nature of the effects of ECT, remembering that rumination, perseveration, memory 
disturbance, gloom about the future, mistrust of people and anger are all aspects of severe depression 
(Department of Health, 2008) 
Although the Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007] seemed to make provisions relevant to psychiatric 
patient care and treatment for persons who suffer from a mental illness:  
• It does not include a detailed consideration of the classification of persons who are to be compulsorily 
detained and treated. It also does not cover how they are to be detained and treated and the various 
appeals processes against the sections, (which have been applied) through the mental health 
tribunals in respect of their detention. 
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• It deals with the bureaucracy set up with the administration of this system, and places restrictions on 
the type of medical treatment that can be administered to various individuals suffering from mental 
illness.   
• The Act also does not make clear in detail the care a hospital is obliged to give to its patients or the 
benchmark standard that is to be expected.   
                                                                                                          
Mental Health Code of Practice (2008) 
 
One must ask an ethical question here: if an Act can take away a person’s liberty and has the power to treat 
that person against their wishes, then the Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007] should by all accounts 
make this crystal clear - I make the point it does not. Some sections of the 1959 Act did allow detention for 
treatment but consent to individual treatments was not considered as a separate issue. The Mental Health Act 
(1983),[revised 2007] did make changes in that area and recognised three categories of treatment: (a) those 
that required consent and a second opinion, (b) those who do not require consent or a second opinion and 
lastly (c) those who do not require consent, a point made by Taylor (1983).    
There were distinct improvements in patients’ rights between the 1959 Mental Health Act and the Mental 
Health Act 1983, where in occasional emergency or lifesaving situations treatment like ECT would only be 
administered with the consent of the patient. For ECT to be administered to a detained patient the patient 
must consent to the treatment and also the Responsible Medical Officer (or his consultant) must certify in 
writing that the patient understands what the treatment entails, its purpose and possible effects.  
The ethical question I raise is what happens when none of the above can be achieved and the decision is taken 
away from the patient. In cases where the patient cannot grant consent, The Mental Health Act Commission, a 
controlling body whose role is safeguarding the rights of the patient, are contacted and an independent doctor 
is appointed to see the patient. This independent doctor can then certify that, although the patient has 
refused to consent or is incapable of consenting; in their professional opinion, the ECT may take place. I claim 
that in these cases, the patient is lawfully but questionably given ECT. Although the Mental Health Act (1983), 
[revised 2007] laid out clear guidelines about how the procedure must be followed it gave no guidelines as to 
how judgement of patient capability or competence should be made. In regard to ethical determination of 
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capacity, my first concern centres on the patients undergoing a treatment that I argue from a position of 
experience as doing more harm than benefit. My second ethical concern is the patient’s right to refuse 
treatment: a patient cannot refuse treatment if he or she is severely ill and unable to participate in the 
decision-making process.  
Part 2b.4: The right to receive treatment. 
In chapter one, I introduced the issue of the patient’s right to receive a treatment which has become a major 
ethical and legal issue, which is often determined within our British judicial system. Here, more in-depth I 
discuss the moral and human right to receive treatment within our country with the aid of a case study. It is of 
importance to the theme of this thesis because it gives an understanding of the basis of the moral mandate to 
care and how concepts of care are constructed  additionally revealing the origins of intrusive ideological 
aspirations in the socio-economic and socio-legal domains. The explicit statements from UK government social 
policy directions emphasise the ethical, legislative, and regulative mandates in respect to the liberties, rights 
and diversity of people and their experience. The communicative process of treatment for both subject as 
“patient” and healthcare professionals is also an internal process for each individual placed in the contested 
arena of best interest and necessity. In exploring this position it can be said that liberties as rights should not 
constrain the action of others (Ruthen, 2006). 
However, when a person’s wishes are unknown, such as in the case of someone suffering from a severe 
mental illness, proxy decision-makers try to project what the person’s choice would be and what better 
promotes the rights of that person. However, my position is that we cannot hold something as a positive good 
unless we know it to be good and without harms. Thus, we cannot hold the use of ECT as a positive good 
unless it causes no harm. However, I recognise the counter argument to my position in that we hold many 
things to be good that are still harmful. For example, many forms of surgical intervention can be classed as 
harmful and yet we consider it good because the overall benefits outweigh the harms. However, I refute this 
position on applied reasoning for ECT because there have been numerous researches and experiential papers 
written on surgical intervention with proven cause and effect which cannot be said of ECT. Before I address the 
issues on good and harm, I believe an ethical analysis of our present psychiatric practice will give us a clearer 
picture of our present impasse. The theory of Principlism is needed here to help us understand an upsurge in 
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the interest of the application of ethical principles. The four principles of beneficence (doing good), non-
maleficence (not doing harm), autonomy (self-governance) and justice (equality of opportunity), Beauchamp & 
Childress, (2009) are widely accepted within psychiatry (Ottosson, 2004). The four principles are useful 
conscience keepers for medicine, but they need the utilitarian’s detailed blue printing; the clinician’s practical 
implementation; and the scientist’s/researcher’s  hardnosed verification coupled with the activist’s constant 
surveillance (and of course a well primed legal system too)(Singh & Singh 2009).     
I have been involved in many debates when the question is posed “what should the psychiatrist do when the 
patient immediately requests ECT and flatly refuses other forms of treatment?” Some patients who know the 
risks and side effects are prepared to accept this to achieve what they believe is a “quick fix”. These patients 
are acknowledging the seriousness of using such a treatment, hoping for fast results instead of using patience 
until medicine and therapy produce the same results but over a longer period. I will now consider the 
following case.  
Case study 1. 
A 39 year-old woman was informally admitted with recurrent severe depression and had been hospitalised on 
four occasions in the last four years. Her depressive symptoms included early morning insomnia and an inability 
to concentrate. The latter symptom was very problematic as she was a concert pianist who had become unable 
to concentrate on her music and when this was evident, she suffered suicidal thoughts and ideations. Previous 
treatment of ECT at the psychiatric hospital had provided relief from her illness (but only on a temporary basis) 
and a return to being able to perform. The patient refused all forms of other treatment and requested ECT.  
In the case study above, would it then be unethical to withhold ECT from someone consenting to it, but who 
refuses to be involved in any other form of treatment, which could be said to be less invasive than ECT? If we 
apply the utilitarian social philosophy to this example then we could accept that in this case, ECT is a good 
choice and it would be unethical to withhold ECT. We must consider that the patient for financial reasons 
could not wait for the benefits of other therapeutic interventions, such as anti-depressants or psychotherapy, 
to take place. ECT advocates should re-examine the harms against benefits ratio. Psychiatrists are empowered 
to give ECT to save lives, such as in cases where a patient is suicidal, but I argue the reverse side of the coin is 
that ECT arbitrarily kills brain cells; the treatment’s inherent danger suggesting at best a balance between 
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benefit and harm (Panton, 2001). Unless withholding treatment would be life threatening, the principle of 
beneficence achieves priority over respect for autonomy, and a paternalistic position is adopted to ensure 
treatment. Just as competent patients have the right to accept, abstain, or discontinue an offered treatment; 
incompetent patients and those who request it have the right to receive what they believe is the most 
effective treatment (Ottosson, 2004). However, the counter argument regards treatment, which is futile. Let 
me approach this from a different angle and address the position put forward by physicians that offering 
treatments that are said to be futile is not obligatory. The determination of medically futile treatment is an 
ethical dilemma. Medically futility is generally defined as a treatment or clinical interventions that are not 
likely to result in benefit to the patient or produce the expected outcome (Tera & Powell, 2012). At this point, I 
agree with the position of the healthcare providers, and it might be seen as violating the principle of non-
maleficence if patients concluded that they were expected to choose futile options. It is true that a patient has 
a right to make certain demands on health care providers, those demands, however, are limited (Brieva et al. 
2009). A patient under normal circumstances does not have the right to demand that physicians provide 
treatments that are not indicated. Following this then the patients do not have the moral right to demand 
treatments that the medical community has judged to be without benefit. Physician – determined treatment 
futility encounters a number of reservations, since it is difficult to predict with absolute certainty that any 
treatment is futile, such a determination generally involves a value judgement. A patient may not demand 
unnecessary surgery, for instance, and claim that he has a right that his physician provides it. Therefore, the 
question of patient autonomy only makes sense after it is determined whether the care is medically 
appropriate. The issue of patient autonomy must be put-off until after a discussion of futility and cost 
containment. At that point, the argument is likely to be moot. Cost containment suffers a similar fate as do’s 
patient autonomy (Paris, 2010). All things being equal, cost containment should not create a legitimate basis 
upon which to refuse care to a specific individual. This basic premise may not be true, however, in cases where 
no good is to be generated by the health care expenditure. In a world where health care resources are scarce, 
it would seem irresponsible to "waste" money on treatments that have no reasonable hope of benefiting 
patients. Therefore, the only cost containment issue to consider will hinge on whether the care in question is 
truly “wasteful". In order to settle that question, we must consider whether the care is futile. At this point, the 
question to be asked is; why should patients have the right to demand treatments that will not work? They 
should not. No one expects physicians to render care that is “physiologically futile”, that is, care that will not 
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provide the benefit sought by the patient. If we make the point that, there are only two substantive reasons 
for doctors not to provide treatment that they judge as futile-either based on judgement that treatment would 
harm the patient, or on the basis, that providing treatment would harm others.  
It is here I challenge the proponents of ECT in so far, if the healthcare providers are questioned on their 
position about the efficacy of medical treatment, does an ethical as well as pragmatic concern influence their 
decisions. Working on the basic premise for the provision of healthcare implies there is an illness and a 
subsequent improvement in health, a return to wellness or recovery from illness from injury (Pope, 2009). 
Alternatively, it could be argued that because these decisions regarding relative treatment futility have to be 
based on available scientific literature, a representative societal group who have had ECT should make them. 
Unfortunately, at present, there is no such group, and it is necessary to use existing structures to deal with 
current problems. Therefore in returning to the point that a treatment is futile if it does not improve a 
patient’s condition, then I can present an opinion that ECT is futile  because firstly of a lack of relevant data as 
to its effect and also many patients often need numerous ECT treatments over a number of years. A point I 
made when I addressed the sham ECT-real ECT arguments (Section 2a.4.2) Physicians have a fiduciary 
obligation, and have taken a professional oath, if harms of treatment are excessive, physicians risk 
maleficence, it must then follow physicians must exercise clinical judgment based on scientific data when 
declaring treatments futile. Surely, there is a need to clarify between specific treatments that are medically 
ineffective, yet might still provide perceived benefits to patients; but physicians should also not dictate 
nuances of care for their patients. This argument is worth exploring but wordage does not allow me to do so. 
In the case study above, the interpretation I present is the decision to offer ECT could be seen as ethical, 
humane, well within the psychiatrists’ rights, and importantly felt as beneficial by the patient. However, 
administering ECT even in this seemingly ethical scenario raises questions about the psychiatrists’ violation of 
patients' rights and transgression of ethical standards. My position on patients who request and then receive 
ECT is that it should be based on health promotion and presentation of the true scientific facts, which the 
psychiatrist cannot provide. Therefore, ECT should only ever be given where the risk of suicide is the 
alternative option; however, the case study above has shown that the effects are short acting and the patient 
needed re-admission on different occasions. The fact that psychiatrists cannot provide true scientific facts’ but 
the ethical question remains should a patient have a voluntary right to ECT? One of my major concerns is 
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whether we should be willingly offering a dangerous treatment even if patients request it. The assumption of a 
supposable but straightforward a decision leading to action between ECT and suicide prevention is erroneous, 
however as it is purported to be in the patient’s best interests, this makes the way ECT works, in an emergency 
or otherwise, of critical importance. 
 In summary, in a legal context, a patient can and has a right to request ECT as a treatment and is not 
contravening any rule or law. The patient who exercises their voluntary rights is said to increase their self-
worth and make them more amenable to care and treatment. When this patient’s mental status was good, she 
fully understood the implications of her consent to ECT, but when her mental status was poor, one could argue 
her mental state was compromised, as she clearly did not fully understand the seriousness of her present 
circumstances. The key issues centre on who should decide, who is entitled to choose, and most crucially, who 
is competent to decide. By offering ECT or not encouraging alternative treatments, are we fully entering into 
‘autonomous choice’ (empathising lack of coercion) or authentic wish (empathising consistency of choice)? 
The pro ECT advocates will present the view we should be clear that those patients who are incapable of 
understanding do not meet the standards required to be considered autonomous. In rebuttal, my view is that 
we are not addressing all the issues that centre on ‘autonomous choice’ of a treatment, which has harmful 
effects. At times there has to be competent refusals of treatment from patients that psychiatry must learn and 
respect. 
Part 2b.5:  The right to refuse treatment. 
Ethical concerns related to ECT become more complex when we address the ethics of the right to refuse ECT. 
This right to refuse treatment was expressed by the 19th century philosopher John Stuart Mill. 
“...In the conduct of human beings towards one another, it is necessary that general rules should for the most 
part be observed, in order that people may know what they have to expect; but in each person's concern, his 
individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise. Considerations to aid his judgement, exhortations to 
strengthen his will, may be offered to him, even obtruded on him, by others; but he himself is the final judge. All 
errors which he is likely to commit against advice and warning are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others 
to constrain him to what they deem his good” (Mill, 1963). 
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 If the Greatest Happiness Principle were nothing but the aggregate of each person's happiness, leaving people 
free even to cause harm for themselves we still would be maximizing happiness. If each of us knows better 
than anyone else what causes us pain and pleasure, what causes the happiness or suffering of the majority of 
people does not necessarily cause the happiness or suffering of a minority of individuals that, for whatever 
reason, does not have the same feelings of the majority. In other words, even though humankind has an 
objective criterion, an accumulated knowledge to decide what causes suffering and which pleasures are more 
valuable in society, society does not know what each individual feels. Thus, society cannot impose its views on 
individuals, forcing them to renounce their pleasures, on pain of not maximizing happiness, which would go 
against the Greatest Happiness Principle (Riley, 1991). 
The point Mill was making and the interpretation by Riley is that the decision-making of the individual should 
rest with them solely. He lays out that respecting decisions should be observed and should not be interfered 
with by other third parties. For Mill, his position is the prerequisite for the rich and diverse development of 
humanity is the freedom that enables each individual to seek out and explore his or her own particular ‘path of 
life’ which one would argue is the right to refuse treatment you believe is detrimental to your health. Mill also 
believes the only source of potential within society for continued human development is contained in the 
creativity and spontaneity of individuals: thus the liberty of the individual, expressing the most fundamental 
characteristic of human nature, is at the heart of Mill’s social and political philosophy (Mill, 1963). If I escalate 
this discussion and bring it back to clinical practice I identify (but I am not always in agreement with) the 
position of psychiatrists who are reluctant to agree to the right to refuse treatment. The right to refuse 
treatment is related to the notion of ‘competence, which sometimes was linked to individuals considered 
dangerous by society. Some psychiatrists believe that some individuals with mental impairments, specifically 
psychotic symptoms, may refuse treatment due to lack of awareness and/or understanding. Therefore, having 
‘poor insight’ is the precursor to dismiss/overlook their decision. Yes, poor insight is a key factor but poverty of 
discussion with the individual is disturbing and requires rectification (Rudnick, 2002).  
Every competent adult has the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. This is part of the right of every 
individual to choose what will be done with his or her own body, and it applies even when refusing treatment 
may cause death. The ethics of considering ECT for those patients incapable of making a decision involves the 
concept of ‘parens patriae’. The ethical dilemma that confronts psychiatrists is when the patient’s ability to 
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make a rational decision is compromised by the cognitively impairing nature of their disorder. Also even if 
sectioned, the treatment has to be given because the mental illness impairs the ability of the patient to 
properly consent. 
If the patient is not subject to the Mental Health Act, or if the treatment team feels that the use of the mental 
health laws would be inappropriate, the next question is whether the patient is competent to refuse 
treatment. The standard notion of competence to consent to treatment includes four components: the ability 
to express a choice; the ability to understand the information involved; the ability to appreciate the personal 
relevance of this information, and the ability to reason logically in decision-making (Grisso & Appelbaum, 
1998). In most circumstances, the law recognises that a competent person may refuse medical treatment, 
even if that decision is “not sensible, rational or well considered” and even if refusal will likely lead to death or 
serious injury. 
The notion of competence to consent to treatment refers also to competence to refuse treatment, although 
the threshold for the latter is considered by some to be higher, as the risks of refusing treatment may be 
greater than the risks of consenting to treatment, at least for serious illnesses (Buchanan &, Brock, 1989). 
Admittedly, others have disputed the validity of this difference in threshold for competence (Danner -Culver & 
Gert, 1990). What has become practically the standard notion of competence to consent to treatment includes 
four components: the ability to express a choice; the ability to understand the information involved; the ability 
to appreciate the personal relevance of this information, and the ability to reason logically in decision-making 
(Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998). Therefore, if a patient’s decision to refuse treatment is clearly and 
unambiguously competent, or their legalised advance directive is clearly and unambiguously valid and 
applicable, then health professionals should honour the patient’s decision. Healthcare professionals use the 
qualifier “probably” here because, even in these situations, which I believe will be very rare, there are still 
ethical and legal arguments against giving effect to a decision to refuse treatment that needs further 
consideration.   
Part 2b.6: Conceptual discussion on why I am targeting sections 58 and 62. 
Section 58 of the Act applies specifically to treatment for mental disorder. Treatment for physical disorders is 
outside the remit of the Act and can only be given in the absence of consent if it can be justified under the 
Mental Capacity Act (2005) 
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Here, I question the choice to ‘treat without consent’ which is complicated and cannot be made lightly. Where 
the patient is unable to give consent, they should receive ECT under common law rather than the Mental 
Health Act (the accepted legal position following the Bournewood case (R. v Bournewood, Community and 
Mental Health NHS Trust, 1998).  
Because of changes in the law relating to mental health over the last 50 years psychiatrists’ decisions to treat a 
patient suffering from a mental illness with ECT have changed. Although the patient’s rights have become 
more evident, the amount of information expected to be given as recommended within the Mental Health 
Code of Practice (2008) has increased. Consent to treatment is required for both informal and detained 
patients, and the circumstances in which ECT can be given without consent to detained patients are limited by 
sections 58 and 62. In the case of detained patients, consent must always be obtained for the treatment of ECT 
[Section 58 (1) (b)]. Once the patient has consented to ECT the responsible medical officer completes form T3 
(which was formally known as form 38) to satisfy that the patient is capable of understanding the nature, 
purpose, and likely effects of ECT, and has consented to it. Additionally, a patient signs a standard consent 
form, agreeing to the administration of a general anaesthetic in order to carry out the treatment of ECT. The 
consent form and form T3 are kept in the medical notes so that they can be readily retrieved when the 
treatment is given.  
Part 2b.6.1: Ethical concerns that surround section 58. 
The position I take here is the importance of looking at section 58, through the lens of the law and how it 
influences psychiatric patients. Firstly, one of the criteria, which legally sanction its use within the section, is 
that the patient is a danger to themselves or others. If a patient is suicidal and/or homicidal, they can be 
detained and treated with ECT after three months within a hospital. This strategy approach to risk prediction 
and determination raises some serious psychological and behavioural challenges for those working within the 
mental health system. My second ethical concern is that a Registered Medical Officer certifies that the patient 
is competent and able to consent when, in fact, the whole procedure actually denies the patient the 
opportunity to demonstrate their competence. The patient does not give consent; it is the Registered Medical 
Officer certifies competence without requiring that the patient signify that his or her authority has been 
sought and obtained. 
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Firstly I will identify my concerns about detaining and treatment of ECT within the Mental Health Act (1983, 
revised 2007) and look at how the use of section 58 has the potential to be used. I open up in this section of 
the thesis by making the point that most societies have provisions governing the involuntary treatment of 
people with serious mental disorder. Two broad approaches to mental health legislation have been identified 
(Peele & Chodoff, 1999). Both require the presence of a mental illness. In the first instance, there must be an 
additional need for treatment, which might be in the interests of the person’s health or safety, or the safety of 
others. Secondly, there must be evidence of risk or danger in addition to the mental illness. In this section I 
argue that neither formulation is satisfactory and highlight that today’s mental health legislation discriminates 
against the person with a mental disorder. Presently mental health law addresses two questions in order to 
process detention and care but my viewpoint is that the questions asked are the wrong way round. Firstly, 
they ask if the person has a mental illness. Then, they ask if they are dangerous. Addressing them in this order 
inevitably leads to treatment of people with mental disorder on a different basis than those of the rest of 
society (Bartlett, 2011). However, the questions may be answered differently if answered the other way 
around. The question of dangerousness can be approached in the same way for all people, despite the 
presence or absence of mental illness. The disorder then becomes a factor in determining how to handle 
dangerousness. It follows then, if the first question is negative, and then there is little justification for 
compulsory admission and compulsory treatment. This analysis then opens up where my position lies and is a 
most helpful contribution to the analysis of risk. However, it is important to return to the legislation I 
highlighted earlier to have an understanding of how the legislation within this part of the thesis gives 
understanding that the patients can be detained and treated based on the disorder, even though the degree of 
the disorder is not sufficient to warrant intervention. The Mental Health Act (1983),[revised 2007] presents the 
government’s position and from this gives me the opportunity for me to enable mine .The functionalist stance 
recognises the risk determination process as being one which can prevent hazardous outcomes from 
occurring, or at least to reduce and minimise the impact of risk on others. One of the key foci in the Mental 
Health Act (1983), [revised 2007] is the question of risk posed by the patient primarily to others; a result of 
both the social and political impetus within the reform process of the Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 
2007]. Whilst ‘dangerousness and risk’ are not explicitly stated as grounds for compulsory admission and 
treatment involving ECT ‘it is necessary for the health and safety of the patient or the protection of others 
persons’  ... (My emphasis).  
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This act seeks to find the elusive balance between protecting and facilitating the individual’s autonomy whilst 
providing a legitimate framework for the wider public right to protection. However, following the Mental 
Health Act (1983), [revised 2007], risk assessment and management have become explicit concerns of the civil 
commitment process. Consequently, a patient’s risk to either the self or others forms a significant part of the 
mental health decision to engage the civil commitment procedures (Department of Health, 2012). Yet the 
mental health legislation neither defines risk nor delimits the factors relevant to it, and this forms the basis for 
many professional problems and difficulties on decision making of psychiatric care. National Health Service risk 
assessment tools provide some guidance on what constitutes risk, but how reliable, valid and professionally 
rigorous they are is a matter for the health care providers. Bartlett (2010) makes the point that ‘decision-
makers’ operate on their own experience and base their decisions of how dangerous patients have turned out 
in the past. The NHS Mental Health Trust risk definitions seek to position the particular organisations apropos 
the conception of risk to themselves or society within an abstract sphere of possible risk assessment and 
management protocols. Such broad-brush definitions seek to define what the risk is, to the extent that risk is 
deemed a legitimately acceptable process in decision-making yet leaves sufficient scope for wider professional 
discretion in individual cases (Thomas -Glover 2011). Unfortunately, while such definitions clarify the ‘abstract’ 
concept of risk, what actually constitutes a ‘risk factor’ in clinical practice is left up to the decision-makers to 
determine in accordance with their professional judgement and experience.   
In consequence, the department of Health’s risk framework shows that decision makers often go beyond the 
‘clinical’ when assessing and determining risk, this approach mirrors the Department of Health risk framework 
(Department of Health, 2007). This guidance relates to three areas of risk: violence (including anti-social 
behaviour and offending behaviour); self-harm; or suicide, and self-neglect. The Mental Health Act (1983), 
[revised 2007] judicial framework “then provides the scope to legitimise any potential arbitrariness that may 
flow from the decision making process” (Thomas-Glover 2011. p.596). I challenge this process of applying this 
section because it has already been identified that the relevant ingredients that suggest a patient poses a risk 
to self or others are not defined by an exhaustive list of factors within the Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 
2007] or associated Mental Health Code of Practice (2008), which define risk to self or others with an 
exhaustive list of relevant factors. Instead, risk is often determined by an individual’s decision-makers 
discretion. Therefore, in this way, someone sectioned under the Mental Health Act (1983),[revised 2007] may 
never be certain about which aspects of their diagnosis, characteristics, or circumstances; a decision-maker 
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has deemed relevant material. Decision-makers are free to identify and attribute weight to any factors that 
they believe are relevant to a patient’s risk profile.  
If we break section 58 down, we can see that it appears to discriminate against protection of the self when 
making a decision that relates to a patient’s safety as it refers repeatedly to refer to ‘protection of others’. 
People with mental disorders are unique in being liable to detention and treatment because they have been 
assessed as presenting a risk to others without committing an offence to others.   
Let us assume for a moment that dangerousness can be ‘reliably’ linked to an individual’s mental disorder and 
further that some form of ‘treatment’ will reduce the risk. If the patient has capacity and rejects ECT because 
he or she does not regard the treatment as in their best interests. Can we say that danger to others provides 
an ethically acceptable reason for involuntary treatment? The Expert Committee (1999) offered a tentative 
‘yes’, but also recognized an inconsistency with the fundamental principle of respect of autonomy. It must 
then follow that if we impose ECT treatment under these circumstances then no health interest is being served 
and protection of the public is the sole interest.  It might be tempting to make the case for a ‘best interests’ 
argument—if people with a serious mental disorder (with capacity) commit a serious offence, they would 
probably be viewed in a disadvantaged position. However, a mentally healthy person at risk of committing a 
violent act is not acting in their own best interests, and should therefore be likely to preventative detention 
and treatment; few (I believe) would accept this. Best interests here are not ‘health related’ best interests. On 
the other hand, there is an ethical concern, which allows Mental Health Trusts to detain, and treat people for 
something they have not done or even plotted to do but merely might do. It is a rather serious challenge to 
decide what a person might do when they are not actually conspiring or planning a misdeed. The fact that a 
person could or might do something wrong does not warrant acting against that person and treating them 
against their will. I concede that the obvious exception is when there is concrete evidence that a person is 
plotting to commit a crime. However, these issues are already covered by law, so what would seem to be 
under consideration would be categorising people without adequate evidence that they are plotting to commit 
crimes and to be treated with ECT under the Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007].On the face of it, this 
would seem unacceptable. If I was to try to analyse the reasons given by those who favour giving ECT under a 
section of the Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007]. One obvious argument would be to justify using 
coercive powers against those with mental illness, before they commit a crime or even plan a crime is to argue 
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that certain mental issues are themselves adequate evidence. Therefore it is reasonable to assume  that the 
person will engage in a crime even though nothing they have done meets the imminent danger to themselves 
or others threshold. On an abstract level, this does have a logical appeal in that it makes sense to treat for a 
condition before it manifests itself. If a person objects to medical treatment for a physical condition then one 
could argue that a person should be able to do the same for a dangerous mental health issue. The rationale is 
that the person who refuses treatment for a physical issue is only endangering himself or herself but the 
person, who refuses treatment that, can result in violence against others, then they are putting others in 
danger without their consent and he or she does not have the liberty or right to do this. Hodgins & Muller-
Isberner (2004). 
If we move into the realm of the concrete however, the matter becomes more problematic. My position 
statement (in part 2a) was mental health science is lagging far behind, the physical health sciences (I am using 
the popular rather than philosophical distinction here). As such, using the best mental health science of the 
day to give a prediction of how a person is likely to engage in violence (in the absence of evidence of planning 
and past crimes) will typically result in a prediction that is questionable. Therefore to use the Mental Health 
Act (1983), [revised 2007] as a coercive power against the person based on dubious evidence would not be 
ethically acceptable. After all, a person should only be denied liberty on adequate grounds and such a 
prediction does not seem strong enough to warrant such an action. If preventative detention and treatment 
(using ECT) is to be allowed for the mentally ill ‘solely’ on the account of danger to others, so should it be for 
all of us otherwise it amounts to discrimination against those with a mental illness. Dangerousness is a social 
construct; it is not a psychiatric phenomenon and thus it is a perversity to assume competence on behalf of 
psychiatrists to assess individual cases. Studies have shown that psychiatrists err on what can be considered as 
the ‘safe side’.6 The potential for civil liberties through an unwarranted removal of liberty then becomes 
evident (Price, 1994). Driven by concerns about public safety and the control of violence within our society, the 
United Kingdom has moved towards the present situation of the principle of legalised control of the mentally 
ill. The Mental Health Act (1983),[revised 2007] might be characterised as the iron hand fitted with a velvet 
glove of legalism and expressed in a rhetoric of psychiatric care. What has been identified are that the relevant 
ingredients that suggest a patient poses a risk to self or others are not defined by an exhaustive list of factors 
                                                          
6 Mullen (1997), Taylor &Gunn (1999) Hodgins & Muller-Isberner (2004). 
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in legislation or the Mental Health Code of Practice (2008). It must then follow that our society has not yet 
reached a point of moral sensitivity sufficient to make treatment decisions and only by placing compulsory 
treatment on a form ethical basis are patients who fall under this umbrella protected from powerful societal 
forces.    
My second area of concern is the issue of consent, (I will revisit consent further in chapter 4). This term derives 
its moral force from the principle of autonomy, and that autonomy is most suitably demonstrated by the 
patient’s capacity to act freely. The first essential point in explaining section 58 and its implementation within 
the use of ECT as a treatment is that information given can only be given in probabilities due to the lack of 
sufficient empirical evidence around its use. The provision of section 58 acts as a safeguard in that certain 
forms of treatment shall not be given to the patient except when the patient freely consents. Alternatively, if 
an independent medical practitioner has certified that the patient is incapable of giving his or her consent or 
that the patient should receive the treatment even though he or she has not consented to it.  
The philosophy of care for ‘treatment’,  and particularly for the interests of this section ‘emergency treatment’ 
- is stated in the imperatives of Part IV of the Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007] ECT currently comes 
under the auspices of section 58A of this part of the Act. Here, the Secretary of State reviews individual cases 
and has powers to include or exclude treatments where treatment requires consent or a second opinion. In 
the accompanying Code of Practice (2008), capacity, consent, necessity, and best interest are considered. This 
controversial aspect of capacity and consent carries into legal argument the debates surrounding so termed 
“incapacitated compliant patients” and whether the Mental Health Act (1983),[revised 2007] is an appropriate 
tool for the provision of treatment, or provides any appropriateness or protection for people liable to be 
detained in such circumstances. Section 58 treatments may be prescribed in the person’s best interests under 
the common law doctrine of necessity (Code of Practice 2008; Mental Health Act, 1983 [2007 revised]). 
Explicitly, treatment is required to be; necessary to save life or prevent deterioration or ensure an 
improvement in the patient’s physical or mental health; and in accordance with a practice accepted at the 
time by a reasonable body of medical opinion skilled in the particular form of treatment in question (Bolam v 
Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582). When it was first implemented, section 58 
violated the above principle. It was supposed to support the principle of autonomy, but did not do so. Let me 
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give clarification of this section to show how the principle of autonomy was violated so that a clearer picture 
arises to the ethical point I make regarding its use.  
If the person is capable of understanding the nature, purpose, and likely effects of the treatment and consents 
to it, the Responsible Medical Officer (RMO) has to certify in writing that understanding and consent are 
present. Alternatively, if the patient is not capable of understanding the nature, purpose, and likely effects of 
the treatment and therefore cannot consent to it, then a doctor is appointed by the Mental Health Act 
Commission to give a second opinion. The appointed doctor must consult two people who have been 
professionally involved in the patient's medical treatment, one of whom must be a nurse and the other can be 
either a doctor or a nurse (NICE, 2003). If psychiatric drugs have been given to a detained patient for three 
months without consent, section 58 of the Mental Health Act (1983),[revised 2007] says an independent 
doctor must consider whether the patient should continue to receive them or not. This doctor is sent by the 
Mental Health Act Commission (M.H.A.C. 2009) and is called a Second Opinion Appointed Doctor (S.O.A.D.). If 
a patient does not consent to Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT), section 58A says it cannot be given, although if 
he or she is not capable of understanding its nature, purpose, and likely effects, and a SOAD agrees that it is 
appropriate for the treatment to be given, it can be given without consent. However, if the patient has 
previously made a ‘valid’ advanced decision (see below) refusing ECT which is applicable to the treatment in 
question, then the ECT cannot be given, even if he or she does not understand its nature, purpose and likely 
effects at the time that the treatment is being proposed. In addition, ECT cannot be given if this would conflict 
with a decision of an attorney appointed under a Lasting Power of Attorney, a deputy appointed by the Court 
of Protection, or by the Court itself. My concern is that Section 58 as described in the above paragraph may 
result in a situation in which a patient makes an autonomous decision but it is a decision not accepted by the 
medical fraternity, then the decision is ignored or classed as irrelevant. Decisions made by patients are often 
labelled as irrational if the individual did not have sufficient information to make a decision. The doctor who 
suggests that the patient who states “I’m refusing ECT because I am not having no-one putting electricity 
inside my brain” was suffering from irrational fears is incorrect, as that is exactly what was going to happen to 
that patient. On a professional level, it appears that ECT treatment bias overrides the beliefs of the patient and 
it is ethically wrong in that patient autonomy is considered irrelevant.  
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Part 2b.6.2: Ethical concerns that surround section 62.  
Section 62 of the Mental Health Act can be used to administer treatment without consent in an unethical 
manner. Firstly, let me explain the difference between section 58 and section 62. Section 58 deals with 
treatment requiring either competent consent or a second opinion by a Registered Medical Officer. It applies 
immediately to ECT and drug treatments given beyond three months. It cannot be imposed if it is proven that 
a ‘valid’ directive by the patient has been stated not to receive ECT. Alternatively, Section 62 discusses ‘urgent 
treatment,’ and the requirements of section 58 do not have to be followed when urgent treatment is required. 
Therefore, forced emergency treatment with ECT can still be given without consent even if the patient is 
capable of understanding the treatment. If a mentally ill patient does not consent to ECT, then a second 
opinion appointed doctor is sought from a medical practitioner appointed by the Mental Health Act 
Commission. This doctor interviews the patient and consults with the responsible medical officer and two 
other members of the multi-disciplinary clinical team caring for the patient, one of whom must be a nurse and 
the second someone other than a doctor.  
The doctor appointed by the Mental Health Act Commission (2009) will decide if the ECT treatment is 
necessary and if the patient is capable of understanding the nature, purpose, and likely effects of the 
treatment. If it is felt that ECT will alleviate or prevent deterioration of their condition, the doctor completes a 
T4 (formally known as form 39) which is retained in the patient’s case notes in the same way as form T3 
(formally known as form 38) At this point, treatment occurs against the wishes of the patient. While it may 
seem straightforward, Section 62 gives a false impression as to its use (Emergency Provision of Care). This 
provision serves the purpose of allowing the terminology to change to intensify measures to be used in order 
to save the life of the patient’.  
Section 62 applies to ‘urgent,’ non-consensual treatment which may be given with or without the patient’s 
consent or to a patient not capable of giving informed consent allows for treatment which is necessary to 
safeguard the patient’s life. I wish to explore the level of probability that the patient’s life needs saving, and 
suggest treatment should be given based on this probability. Firstly, consider the direction given to 
practitioners from the Mental Health Code of Practice (2008) on medical treatment for mental disorders under 
the Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007]. It gives specific direction regarding treatment given without 
patients’ consent. 
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Section 62: 23.22.  
It is an emergency only if the treatment is immediately necessary to:  
• save the patient’s life; 
 • prevent a serious deterioration of the patient’s condition, and the treatment does not have unfavourable 
physical or psychological consequences which cannot be reversed;  
• alleviate serious suffering by the patient and the treatment does not have unfavourable physical or 
psychological consequences which cannot be reversed and does not entail significant physical hazard; or  
• prevent the patient behaving violently or being a danger to themselves or others, and the treatment 
represents the minimum interference necessary for that purpose, does not have unfavourable physical or 
psychological consequences which cannot be reversed and does not entail significant physical hazard.  
Section 62: 23.24.  
In addition, force may be used (whether or not the patient objects), provided that: 
• The treatment is necessary to prevent harm to the patient; and  
• The force used is proportionate to the likelihood of the patient suffering harm and to the seriousness of that 
harm.       
                                    Mental Health Code of Practice (2008) 
 
In looking at points one and two in 23.22 and point one in 23.24, the terminology used states the word 
‘necessary’ to prevent harm. Therefore, we must take into account levels of probability that a treatment is 
necessary to prevent harm to the self or others,  which are not stated but inferred, and also take into account 
the level of probability (of self-harm and possibly suicide) which is that the patient will be a distinct and 
present danger to themselves or others. However, this use of terminology would require a very ‘lax’ and 
accommodating interpretation of the word probable. Surely the terminology would have to  accommodate the 
meaning ‘more necessary than not’ or ‘more probable than not’  because on the face of it there is a 50% 
chance the patient will be a harm to themselves or others, and 50% they will not.  
Considerations of probability of a suicide risk might include factors such as; the age of the patient, his or her 
expectation of discounting suicide, the expected quality of life, the likely response to treatment and the 
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degree of probable resistance of his or her objection to being given ECT and being put on a Mental Health Act 
section in the first instance. 7 
There are a number of studies, which support the view that ECT can be a life-saving therapy and improve the 
quality of the patient’s life (Prudic & Sackheim, 1999; Munk-Olsen et al. 2007, Thirthally et al. 2009, Phutane, 
2011). The common dominator in all of these studies is that symptoms of ‘suicidality’ would be reduced and 
ECT was specifically recommended in patients with mood disorders in which suicidality was a main feature. 
However, a beneficial effect on ‘suicidality’ is not the same as a beneficial effect as suicide. Yes, it may 
decrease or help prevent suicidal behaviour, presumably due to its effectiveness in treating the illnesses 
characterised by suicidal symptoms, but I present the position it does not prevent suicide. One of the most 
common reasons cited by healthcare providers for performing ECT is that it prevents suicide. The report of the 
1985 NIH Consensus Conference states that ‘the immediate risk of suicide’ that cannot be managed by other 
treatment, ‘is clear indication for the treatment of ECT’. Further, within these guidelines, ECT should be used 
to “gain fast and short-term improvement of severe symptoms after all other treatment options have failed, or 
when the situation is thought to be life-threatening” (NICE, 2003). Although ECT is not considered a treatment 
for suicidal thoughts per se, it may dramatically decrease suicidal behaviour, presumably due to its 
effectiveness in treating the illness characterised by suicidal symptoms. In patients with severe affective or 
psychotic disorder, many texts and expert groups specify suicidality as a particular indication for the use of ECT 
over other treatments (Andre, 2009). The rationale is that the onset of clinical response may be quicker and 
likelihood of improvement more certain with ECT relative to other treatments. The presentation of ECT as a 
treatment of last resort, which prevents suicide or is only for those with profound levels of distress is common 
within the literature and used as counter argument by those who advocate for ECT. 8  
My rebuttal to this claim is these are the kinds of arguments that represent the rhetorical devices, which are 
used by advocates to minimise its negative impact and to justify its legalised use within a biomedical 
framework. Fisher et al( 2011) enhances my point and also presents the argument that last resort rhetoric is 
unhelpful since it is not clear what level of distress or risk is required for someone to warrant ‘last resort’. ECT 
is not expected to achieve improvement in all patients. Rarely do studies show improvement rates with ECT 
                                                          
7 Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act (2003); ECT Survey (2002); Department of Health (2005);       
Mental Health and Learning Disability (Northern Ireland 2005). 
8 Reisner (2003); Middleton et al (2010); Sienaert (2011); Fisher (2012).   
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alone above eighty percent of people treated, the treatment outcomes for those people where ECT was not 
viewed as beneficial may arguably be unclear (Experts by Experience, 2005). The researchers reviewed the 
literature on ECT and suicide and concluded that these findings do not support the position of those who 
advocate that ECT exerts short and long-range protective effects against suicide’. In fact, there is no proof that 
ECT prevents suicide. Some critics suggest that there is anecdotal evidence that the confusion of memory loss 
after treatment even precipitates suicide in those suffering from mental illness. What we should be doing is 
asking the question can ECT increase the risk of suicide. They point to Ernest Hemingway who shot himself in 
July 1961, days after being released from a psychiatric facility where he had received 20 ECT treatments. 
Before his death, Hemingway had complained to his biographer A.E Hotchner, ‘What’s the sense of ruining my 
head and erasing my memory and putting me out of business’. In their book Shorter and Healey (2007) like 
many others, (National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health (2010), C.Q.C, (2010), they base much of their 
support for ECT on the claim that it prevents suicide. They cite five studies to support their claim. One study is 
incorrectly cited twice with different authors. This is the Metrazol study (Ziskind, 1945). Therefore, the actual 
number is three. In addition to the other study from the 1940’s described above Huston &  Locher (1948), they 
cite Avery & Winokur (1976) and a National Institute for Mental Health (NIMH) study (Kellner et al. 2005). The 
NIMH study is not a study of suicide, it is a study of ‘thinking about suicide’ (which might be justified on the 
ground that completed suicides are a rare event and difficult to investigate without large samples).   
However, let me challenge the counter argument that the risk of suicide is reduced during ECT treatment. ECT 
usually takes place in hospitals under strictest guidance and supervision especially for those patients 
diagnosed as suicidal and displaying suicidal ideations. Indeed these are precisely the extreme sorts of cases – 
acutely suicidal patients in hospital who have stopped, eating, drinking, and communicating, that are 
highlighted to make the case for ECT. I argue if these severely depressed/psychotic inpatients are given ECT 
and do not kill themselves or attempt to kill themselves whilst in hospital, how we can be sure it was the ECT 
rather than the medical and nursing care they received that saved them, we cannot. The presentation of 
preventing suicide I accept as a criterion and I also accept this as an ultimate goal, but I reject their methods 
for reaching this goal and the methods they propose to reach that goal. The reference to ECT effectiveness in 
illnesses characterised by suicidal symptoms is a ‘red herring’. The utilitarian argument would present the view 
(which can be said to be taken by most psychiatrists) that mental illness on many occasions requires the 
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temporary suspension of liberty for the benefit of the patient and society. While this is not an incoherent 
position, it seems a deeply unattractive one.  
Yes, I concede with the counter argument of the pro ECT stance, the removal or reduction of the risk of bodily 
harm is a recognised benefit. However, my challenge to their position, which advocates for the use of section 
62, is that the Act should outline what is considered serious bodily harm. It seems unlikely that the minimum 
level of anticipated harm could be set higher (i.e. that it refers only to injury more severe) than that which 
passes for grievous bodily harm in criminal cases (Durham, 1988).  
Psychiatry’s stance is the suffering imposed by having an acute episode of mental illness will justify the 
treatment and outweighs the lesser grades of bodily harm as they see it. However, if the psychiatric viewpoints 
stance portrayed is suspected of bias, then let me make my point in another way.   
Let us suppose (per impossible but for the sake of argument), my patient (who shall be referred to as a male 
patient, but only to avoid an excess of gender –signifying pronouns) is faced with two alternatives. Firstly, 
imagine that he is exposed to a 50% chance of fractures of the tibia and fibula (a broken leg) with all its 
potential complications. My patient has now the choice to have his leg treated or not, but if not he faces the 
inescapable possibility of his lifestyle being drastically changed.    
Secondly, imagine that he is exposed to the 100% chance of an acute episode of mental illness with most of its 
hazards. The mental illness would run its course if untreated, but the client refuses treatment, and is therefore 
treated with ECT within section 62. 
In the acute stage of his mental illness, he becomes objectionable towards family, friends, and work 
colleagues, making absurd accusations and grandiose claims. My logic is that most people would choose a 
broken leg, but this is still inconclusive in my argument that mental illness is sufficient justification for 
compulsory treatment. What needs to also be taken into account is that I question the treatment can be 
justified because it is ‘necessary’. The patient has no choice, he already has the mental illness, and therefore 
the greater evil of having a mental illness is necessary to treat and to impose treatment than having a broken 
leg and being treated. If the risk of mental illness and serious self-harm is justification for compulsory 
treatment because it is necessary, should the serious consequences of not treating a broken leg , blood 
occlusion, gangrene and possible death,  also lead to compulsory treatment? My point therefore is that 
magnitude and probability of serious self-harm to self and others through mental illness is a greater evil than 
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those suffering from a physical complaint. It is evident to note that where there is a risk to the patient, a 
measure of subjective judgement is allowed, but that when there is a question of dangers to others or an 
express threat, only an overt act or discourse of action can serve as evidence.  
The problem with this provision to apply section 62 is that it can be argued that in the modern day no patient 
fits the first condition that ECT is a lifesaving treatment. Although we speak of ECT as a lifesaving measure like 
defibrillation to start a heart that has stopped or the need for an antidote of a fast killing venom from a 
poisonous snake, we do not or should not portray it as the sole lifesaving measure and ‘necessary 
immediately’. What should be the case at that point and for that particular patient is it is the safest and most 
practicable. It is always possible to defer the death of a patient by immediate admission and custodial care, 
good medical and nursing intervention, but to put this treatment in the same category as for example 
emergency defibrillation the arguments conclusion does not follow the justification. Whilst Deontology and 
Utilitarian theories differ in their coherence, complexity and comprehensiveness, their differences may lead to 
similar moral judgements and recognise the same contexts. Whichever theory we apply, the outcome is 
unwanted treatment, which is unacceptable. 
This unwanted outcome may occur when the utilitarian considers some of the use of the indirect 
consequences of an act, and when the deontologist acknowledges that the use of some moral principles (e.g. 
beneficence) requires that we determine its likely outcomes. The changes within the Mental Health Act (1983), 
[revised 2007] do give more liberty to patients and provide a more stringent and restrictive criteria for 
detaining mentally ill patients. In this chapter, I have argued that within the Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 
2007] there is a given and legalised option that enables psychiatrists to use ECT as a treatment of a first resort 
and not last resort. I understand that psychiatrists are faced daily with the dilemmas that mental illness brings 
but those dilemmas should be given full exploration and are not easily solved (which is the position  a number 
of psychiatrists present)  with the use of section 62 unless it fully fits the criteria of life and death.   
Part 2b.7: Conclusion  
In part 2b in summary, the Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007] still adopts a position of ethical imbalance 
of a rights focussed approach of the patient as against the benefits the legislation portrays and argues for the 
overwhelming benefits of society. The changes that occurred from the 1983 Act to the revised 2007 Act do not 
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follow the premises, which were the driving force that change was needed to give more rights to the 
psychiatric patient. (Hilton 2007). These premises and the subsequent accepted practices created by sections 
58 and 62 give rise to questionable consequences. The ethical issues I have addressed relating to the right to 
treatment, the right to refuse treatment, the competency and capacity of psychiatric patients and the use of 
the Mental Health Act (1983),[revised 2007] to enforce treatment have all become major issues to consider 
within psychiatry. I have to acknowledge that ECT has been found to be a short-term effective treatment in 
certain psychiatric conditions but I still have professional concerns, as to how many other treatments it has 
reduced or illuminated due to issues of expediency 9. The ethical and, I would suggest legal issue is that 
complete documentation of the clinical conditions, medical evaluations, course of treatment is lacking within 
our psychiatric profession. My belief is that ECT should be peer-reviewed and more research carried out  to 
assess its use and over-use, and cases where it has been used and classed as ‘non-respondent’ to determine 
whether ECT should ever have been a consideration as a treatment.  
Let me reiterate my position, It is often difficult to achieve a balance between the complex issues the Mental 
Health Act (1983),[revised 2007], the patient’s rights, the need to treat and duty of care. Such balances have, 
and still do present serious dilemmas. If the patient is deteriorating rapidly, expressing suicidal ideations and is 
in an emergency then decisions need to be made immediately. However, this is not always the case and ECT in 
some cases is used as a first choice treatment rather than a last resort, (a discussion I present again in chapter 
4 when I address consent and ECT).    
The ethics of giving ECT to involuntary patients will always be an on-going argument and the ethical issues, 
which I have argued, relate to its questionably proven effectiveness and its side effects. If a patient is to have 
their liberty taken, away as in the case of the use of section 58 then it can be argued that, the treatment 
should be effective and free of harmful side effects. One of the highest values is personal freedom, liberty 
according to Mill (1963) and to have that taken away then the benefit should be high, and the risks very low 
(Seedhouse, 2009). This argument will be always in the spotlight due to the controversy that surrounds it  and 
our legal system will always be on hand to scrutinise benefits and risk, as scientific evidence cannot rule out 
the possibility of brain damage (unproven) and other recognised side effects (unexplained). The judicial system 
                                                          
9 Andre (2008); Berg, (2009); Chakrabarti et al (2010).  
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directed by the government needs to be more involved in increasing the medical profession’s accountability to 
the area of professional and clinical ethics, standards of practice and public accountability, especially as they 
pertain to involuntary patients and the use of ECT.  
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Chapter 3: The application of the framework of Principlism within Psychiatry.  
‘...It is doctrine that moves the world. He who takes no position will not sway the human intellect’  
                                              William Thayer Shedd: American Theologian. 1820-I894 (in Gomes 2003) 
Section 3.1: Introduction.  
In this chapter, I appraise and review the ethical framework of Principlism with particular focus on how this 
framework influences mental health care and in particular the treatment of ECT. I present my position that one 
certainly has to admit that a convincing ethical theory must have practical application. On its own, the 
framework of Principlism does not fit the bill when we are dealing with dilemmas within psychiatric clinical 
practice. Principlism is the term employed by Beauchamp & Childress (2009) to describe the dominant 
conceptual framework used in bioethics, a framework based on the balancing of four ethical principles: non-
maleficence, beneficence, justice, and autonomy. These four principles, often known as the 4P’s, are the 
cornerstone of Beauchamp and Childress’s principle-based ethics. In psychiatry, ethical decisions are often 
made overtly or covertly with the ethical principles of this theory in mind.10 Clinicians use Principlism to 
resolve ethical dilemmas at the bedside (Kennedy, 2004; Loewy & Fitzgerald, 2003; Mohr, 2010) but this use 
often functions in a way that undermines a nuanced assessment of clinical ethics cases. 
Here, I do not argue against the theory of Principlism itself, but rather against the influential trend within 
clinical areas of psychiatry to use the framework of Principlism as the sole decision making framework. 
Principlism has positive aspects that are often used in the field of mental health, but it is not always an 
applicable theory to use in psychiatry as a standalone theory. When applying Principlism to psychiatry as a 
standalone theory, standards within the theory often conflict, but are important principles used in examining 
courses of action. I argue that these conflicting standards within Principlism would be complemented by using 
another ethical approach known as Virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is person rather than action based: it looks at 
the virtue or moral character of the person carrying out an action, rather than at ethical duties and rules, or 
the consequences of particular actions. The general concept behind ‘Virtue ethics is that it focuses on what the 
individual should choose for his/her own personal inward behaviour (character) rather than the individual 
relying solely on the external laws and customs of the person's culture, and if a person's character is good then 
                                                          
10 Riecher et al (1991); Pymm et al. (1999); Burke (2003). 
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so ought the person's choices and actions be good. Baggini and Fosi (2008) (I will address this in more depth 
when I look at the importance of the virtue of ethics in section 3.7 and 3.8). Principlism as an ethical 
framework does not give us a formula for resolving matters of value such as in the debate around 
implementing ECT and when attempting to apply the principles and in other areas for example in the use of 
restraint. However, it does help us to see the problem for what it is, rather than misperceiving it as no more 
than a reflection of inadequate science, and leads to a recognition of teamwork. This shared decision-making 
provides balance, creating an evaluative basis of good practice in clinical psychiatry. Bioethics links medicine, 
psychiatry, and philosophy by providing an overlap between philosophical theory and medical advance 
(Warnock, 2007).  
The roles of both can be interchanged under active surveillance, but expertise in one area is not generalizable 
to expertise in the other. Being a good psychiatrist does not mean some can be a good philosopher of ethics 
and vice versa. Transgression of expertise may be counterproductive unless the basic tenets of psychiatry are 
followed. My viewpoint is that Principlism can be helpful in adhering to these tenets, but must be 
complimented by virtue ethics, which I would believe, address any violations within decision-making. Certain 
aspects of the application of Principlism, in particular the trend to privilege the principle of respect for 
autonomy over the other three ethical principles, create conflict and unique problems within psychiatry and in 
the context of mental illness.11 The conflict is vitiated by the effects of the mental illness, such as psychotic 
behaviour where the patient often has no insight into their illness, on the patient’s capacity for autonomy and 
the scales are tipped towards beneficent obligation to relieve the patients suffering. These problems within 
psychiatry and the dilemmas they create are often around behaviour control, diminished decision-making 
capacity due to psychosis and involuntary treatment, of which ECT is one example. By using this theory in an 
approach to mental illness, these dilemmas can be easily couched in terms of prima facia professional and 
ethical conflicts of the autonomy of the patient to choose as against the need of the healthcare professional to 
alleviate symptoms (the need for beneficence) and not to do harm (non-maleficence). These are obligations of 
the healthcare professional that few would argue against but difficulties arise in the interpretation of what 
constitutes ‘good’ and ‘harm’.   
                                                          
11 Gillon (2003a). 
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This is a question which I will be preoccupied with when I identify the use of Principlism within psychiatry and 
how effective it is in the decision making process of the treatment of ECT.  
 If we agree that, the purpose of healthcare ethics is to inspire questions and examine what would be the 
ethically right action in health care situations, demanding a choice between at least two undesirable 
alternatives. Let us say then that ethics deals with the construction of criteria for judging people’s behaviour. 
The reasons I offer to accept my view of psychiatric healthcare ethics, is that within clinical practice arguments 
exist where we are in need of utilising principles and theories, which make distinctions on the value laden 
concept of ‘quality of life’. My concerns are that by solely using this framework or allowing its dominance to 
prevail we are in effect providing an ethical cookbook for the mental healthcare providers. There is an ongoing 
problem within psychiatry as to who is best placed to make decisions for those patients with severe mental 
illness. When patients lack the decision-making capacity and no surrogates are on hand to advise or instruct, 
practitioners need to consider what is deemed in the patient’s best interests as their course of action( I will 
discuss the best interest’s issues in Chapter 4 section 4.7.1). 
In psychiatry, various theoretical orientations and treatment approaches coexist or compete with each other 
and have done for a number of years.12 Since each theory purports itself to be the most productive in the 
treatment of mental health care, each theory also has its critics, a point not lost by Reiter-Theil (1992). Within 
the discussion of contemporary ethical issues surrounding ECT, Hoffman (1985) explained that the use of ECT 
highlights the conflict between a scientific psychiatry and a modern society, a situation still prevalent today.  
Ethically though there has progress to find a compromise between the patients’ autonomy and the protection 
of the patient and others from harm, however, there are some serious problems with this approach. 
Therefore, what is it that crystallizes my disquiet regarding some of the thinking within psychiatry by some of 
the healthcare professionals concerning the use (perhaps misuse) of ethics and in particular the framework of 
Principlism to ground out professional decisions and behaviour? 
 My concerns are twofold: 1/ that we may be using this framework as a punitive tool and 2/. Using it as a 
stand-alone framework, does not uncover the ethically problematic issues within psychiatric practice. My 
worry regarding the latter is that unless we are prepared to uncover these issues and engage in a serious and 
                                                          
12 Lutzen and Norden (1993); Breeze (1998); Heffern and Austin (1999); Dickenson and Fulwood (2000). 
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sustained discussion we will remain in a dormant state at the expense of patient care. My belief is that it 
would be beneficial to highlight how this framework is used within psychiatry and the difficulties that those 
people who have used it have encountered. Within any argument, it is in the interests of fairness to address 
the pros and cons of the subject matter. This thesis is no different so I will now address the criticism levelled at 
Principlism and those who defend it, over the use of other theories. 
Section 3.2: What is the most favourable ethical framework for psychiatry?- Is there one? 
In this section, I shall address what makes up the four principles and address the distinction between them 
before then looking at their feasibility within psychiatry. This challenge is significant because in the absence of 
a reliable distinction between the principles, I would not be able consider the strategy of argument to 
challenge Principlism as a sole dominant framework within psychiatry. Ethical concerns about the psychiatrist's 
role and functions have dogged the profession for at least three centuries (Bloch & Pargiter, 2002). In my view, 
psychiatrists must respond to ethical challenges as moral agents. The task, however, is complicated by the lack 
of a coherent framework for ethical decision-making, a conclusion buttressed by two points. First, rationales 
and methods used to resolve ethical questions differ radically, and secondly contradictory ethical theories may 
generate irreconcilable tension for the clinician. Campbell et al (2005) sees psychiatric ethics as having a 
special status in biomedical ethics given the effect of mental illness on autonomy. They argue that psychiatric 
ethics should adhere to three basic tenets of autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence: using validated 
methods to return the patient to proper functioning as a responsible and self-directed individual; refraining 
from any treatments which are harmful and preserving the distance between psychiatrist and patient by acting 
without an ‘emotional entanglement’. They appear to have little time for academic debates about the relative 
merits of one ethical theory over another, arguing, “Patients should not be adversely affected by such 
Olympian struggles among the demigods of the medical pantheon” (Campbell, 2005 p.6).  
There are many ethical theories that provide tools for thinking ethically within psychiatric practice, such as 
virtue ethics, feminist, phenomenological, Kantian deontology, utilitarianism, communitarianism, liberal 
individualism, social contract theory, the ethics of care, casuistry, and countless others, which compete for our 
attention and approval. Alternatives or supplements to Principlism abound, and a detailed description of all 
potential ethical theories is beyond the scope of this thesis. Donnelly (1994) made the point that despite their 
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different labels and tenets, these competing theories all point in the same direction: “reconnecting medical 
ethics with both the more general perspectives of philosophy and the particularities of medical practice” 
(p.142).  However, despite criticism (Danner-Clouser & Gert 1990; Hanford, 1993) Principlism based on ‘the 
four principles’ is generally regarded as the most accepted and popular approach.13 In the next section, I 
examine Principlism through a short account of its history, a breakdown of its framework, a summary of its 
critiques and supports, and a discussion of its application to psychiatry including the treatment of ECT. 
Section 3.2.1: Historical overview of Principlism. 
Principlism, was introduced by Beauchamp & Childress (2009) in the 1970s in an attempt to reconcile the 
divergence between utilitarian and deontological models by linking moral decision-making principles subject to 
change (e.g. in light of new scientific findings) rather than to universal rules. The four principles when 
developed were as a comprehensive starting point for normative standards of conduct in biomedical contexts 
(Beauchamp, 1994). Although never presented as a comprehensive ethical theory, the four principles were 
later adopted by other health professions (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). Additionally, Principlism was 
adopted by other professions such as the law, social and behavioural sciences, politics, and economics 
(Pellegrino, 2002).   
Principlism as a theoretical approach to ethics is often traced back to the Belmont Report (1979) which 
addressed the protection and safety of human beings in biomedical and behavioural research. The Belmont 
Report (1979) did not state specific reasons for its choice of principles: they were simply “among those 
generally accepted in our cultural tradition” that “are” particularly relevant to the ethics of research involving 
human subjects (Hughes and Fulwood, 2005). The Belmont Report was written by the National Commission for 
the Protection of Human Services of Biomedical and Behavioural Research (1979). Part of the reason for its 
existence was due to past deplorable acts in research and to protect human subjects in clinical research from 
this point forward. To understand Principlism, it is useful to have an understanding of an earlier approach to 
principle-based decision-making, which was called the Georgetown mantra,14 which specifies respect for 
                                                          
13 Hewitt-Taylor, J. (2003). Hine, K. (2011) Richardson (2002) Gordon et al (2011).  
14  Principlism has been called "the Georgetown mantra" because both authors were at Georgetown 
University's Kennedy Institute of Ethics when drafting the first edition of their book of Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics (1979).   
79 
 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice as the basic principles of biomedical ethics. Principlism 
has been said to offer the lure of calculability and predictability therefore giving the notion of 
commensuration. Commensuration is the method of “...measuring properties normally represented by 
different units, with a single common standard or unit” in order to “make decision making easier by ignoring 
aspects of the problem” (Evans 2000, p. 32). Principlism is a form of commensuration in that it simplifies a 
complicated process. The tenets of Principlism were created to enhance calculability and to simplify ethical 
decision-making. While simplicity may be efficient, often the medical community finds a commensurable set of 
decision-making principles to be useful, however the patient on the receiving end of this decision-making tool 
may not share this view.   
As Parker (2009) notes, overly abstract and basic principles are too broad when compared with principles 
derived from facts factual assumptions and people’s personal circumstances. This approach tends to abstract 
individuals from their particular social context and deflects attention from the larger social, economic, and 
cultural forces that shape their lives. These factors must be taken into account alongside the basic concepts of 
Principlism and the Georgetown Mantra, especially when treating the patient with ECT. In ECT treatment, the 
patient’s feeling can and often are an afterthought and they become a passive recipient of care. However, we 
must remember to consider the effect of severe mental illness on a patient’s ability to participate in the 
decision-making process. The premise in using this framework is that it will be possible to suggest core values, 
which are based on the four principles. My rebuttal is however, these values cannot be put to use without 
considering the patient’s context. Thus, we must consider other theories and choose from other medical 
approaches. Depending on which of the four principles takes priority in a given situation, we can choose from a 
range of theories (Pellegrino & Thomasama, 1988,) to an elevation of individual autonomy (Harris, 1985).  
Principlism posits that widely held principles, too general in quality to address the particulars of diverse 
circumstances, at least provide a starting point for moral judgment. When the principles are used in 
biomedicine, it is often necessary to ensure that the principles are applied uniquely to each case.  
Beauchamp & Childress (2009) call this process of narrowing a principle’s scope to make it action guiding 
“specification”. Specification involves fine-tuning the scope of the principle by increasing information about 
the specific situation (what time, where, what persons are involved and so forth) (Ebbesen, 2011). Each 
principle is prima facia binding, which means that ‘it must be fulfilled unless it conflicts, on a particular 
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occasion with an equal or stronger obligation’ (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009). If the principles conflict they 
can be justifiably overridden, meaning that none of the principles are absolute. In tandem with other guiding 
information, such as relevant empirical data or consistent clinical observations, the framework offers an 
approach to moral deliberation that adheres to commonly agreed upon rules but permits flexibility in 
interpreting their intent. By embracing tenets of both utilitarian and deontological theories, Principlism can lay 
claim to a broadly based foundation (Fricker & Guttenplan, 2009). 
Section 3.3: Return to the Conceptual Discussion on Principlism.   
The normative and objective standards of what came to be termed ‘Principlism’ provide ‘moral compass 
points’ in differentiating right from wrong (Pellegrino, 2002.p.661). Rules of practice can be formulated from 
the four principles, including not only ideas of medical benefit, but also truthfulness, confidentiality, fidelity 
and privacy, which are then interpreted within specific contexts to develop their meaning, limits and 
application (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009). Clinical, contextual, narrative, hermeneutical, casuistical, virtue, 
feminist and phenomenological ethics (to name only a few of the leading contenders) now compete for our 
attention when making ethical decisions within healthcare.  
Once these principles have been established, the practical activity then becomes that of specifying how the 
principles are to be used in specific situations and balancing the principles with the other competing moral 
principles. In using this approach, every moral decision will be dilemmatic in that the agent will be to some 
degree either morally right and morally wrong under a single principle. There will be two or more competing 
moral principles and the agent will not be able to fulfil one or more moral principles without violating or 
competing with one or more other moral principles. Dilemmatic decision-making is not unusual when making 
pluralistic social decisions (LaFollette, 2014). Textbooks and a wide body of literature 15 have given currency to 
the usefulness of these formal principles in dealing with case analysis. It should be noted, however, that these 
"formal" principles might have different expressions in different cultures or institutional environments. 
Autonomy, for example, although univocal in grammatical sense is different in an Islamic society and a secular 
community and, while highly appreciated in some regions of the world, may have a different value in others 
The same holds true for justice and beneficence. This caveat does not imply relativism, but suggests that some 
                                                          
15 Robertson and Walter (2007) Macklin (2003) Page (2012)  
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degree of cultural sensitivity is essential for an adequate understanding of the contents of each formal 
principle and the details of its impact on a particular society (Gordon, 2011). 
 Beauchamp & Childress’s (2009) approach to the problem of relativism is one of the most widely discussed in 
biomedical ethics, and over the last 32 years has influenced many scholars, physicians, and moral philosophers 
worldwide. Their most recent work, the 7th edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2009) outlines their 
original four universal prima facia principles, noting that  these admittedly ‘do not constitute a general ethical 
theory’ but nevertheless provides a framework  of norms with which [one] can start in biomedical ethics( 
Beauchamp & Childress Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p 16). 
Beauchamp & Childress (2009) discuss particular ethical problems in the 7th edition, and while they insist that a 
balance must exist between guiding tenets (Gordon 2011), they divide the discussion of these problems into 
four sections based on the pillars of Principlism —autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice              
( Tomlinson, 1998). In the 7th edition, the authors provide an expanded and more nuanced account of their 
history and method, which is intended to dispel criticisms of their version of ‘Principlism ’. Their success at this 
goal will be addressed when I look at key criticisms of Principlism. Firstly, however, I will summarize the 
arguments in support and criticism of Principlism. 
Section 3.4: Support and Criticism of Principlism. 
Let me start this section by advancing an experiential observation, which will enable me to highlight my 
position here: healthcare professionals are taught to trace out the consequences of their choices and to 
recommend to patients those courses of action. This then should provide the best risk-benefit ratio. That is the 
best chance for attaining good outcomes and avoiding or minimising bad outcomes. I make this statement 
because it is a core element in the training of doctors and nurses. Within my experiential background, I have 
seen little evidence of various types of ethical decision-making strategies explored in any great depth, and this 
includes Principlism. Many individuals have published papers on the four principles approach and discussed 
the approach in public arenas of which I will now highlight some. The importance of doing this is that I believe 
it will give a better overall view of the use and workings of Principlism. Due to space and word constraints  I 
can only give a snap shot of these discussions and papers and cannot enter into in-depth analysis of how it 
addresses nuances of moral problems. However, having highlighted some of these discussions I will challenge 
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them make clear my position, which I reiterate in my hypothesis. The argument put for by the pro Principlism 
population and principle-based ethics advocates that when approaching moral dilemmas, physicians consider 
the four core principles of Principlism. I recognise the merits of Principlism but I see virtue ethics as an 
important component when addressing psychiatric dilemmas and propose that Principlism and virtue ethics 
make a credible combination in psychiatry.   
 First, I address Gillon’s (2003) paper on the principle of autonomy, which is widely regarded as primus inter 
pares among the four principles, although Beauchamp & Childress reject this particular view. Gillon (2003) 
argues that respect for autonomy should hold a primary place among the four principles. In psychiatric care 
and clinical medicine, respect for autonomy dictates that patients with decision-making ability have the right 
to voice their opinion when addressing treatment preferences and pathways of care (Tsai, 2008). Gillon 
embraces a Millian understanding of autonomy, understanding it as a deliberate self-rule; the ability and 
tendency to think, to make decisions for oneself about the way one wishes to lead one’s life based on that 
thinking, and then to enact those decisions (Gillon, 2003). According to Gillon, the other three principles (can 
be reduced to) respect for autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence towards autonomous moral agents 
presupposes respect of these agent’s even when they chose to refuse lifesaving medical interventions 
(Azzetsop & Rennie, 2010). Gillon also takes an autonomy centred approach to justice, arguing that responding 
to people’s needs justly will require respect for those people’s autonomous views. These include autonomous 
rejection of offers to meet those needs; and, to conclude his praise for autonomy, Gillon writes that respect 
for autonomy contingently builds prima facia moral requirement to respect both individually and cultural 
moral variability (Gillon, 2003).  
While I agree with Gillon that not all autonomy-based approaches to bioethics take the explicit and extreme 
form, autonomy continues to be treated implicitly as a primary value in many controversial psychiatric 
decisions. Considerable theoretical discourse exists concerning the importance of autonomy in relation to the 
remaining principles and how to apply those principles within medical ethics. Several authors respond mainly 
to specific case information and change the importance of the ethical principles based on the situational 
information in each case16. Contemporary readings often accept a ‘Millian version’ of autonomy that is 
                                                          
16 Landau and Osmo (2003) Westin and Nilstun, T (2006) 
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associated with self-seeking attitudes. This approach to respect for autonomy refers to the capacity to act on 
needs, wants, or wishes. Since a person’s action is informed by instrumental reasoning it constricts the scope 
of reason so that the subject to any desire or disposition that happens to endorse at the time one acts (Gillett, 
2008). Let me build on Gillett’s viewpoint and bring it back to psychiatry. Autonomy based ethics should place 
the responsibility for medical decision-making predominantly in the hands of the patient. I say predominantly 
because it does depend on cognitive ability and the capacity to make those decisions. This raises the 
descriptive question of whether this conception accurately reflects how clinical decisions are made. As well as 
the normative question about whether a conception should (or should not) function as a universal ideal. 
Autonomy based bioethics has a tendency to distort the relationship between individuals and the world. On 
the one hand, it exaggerates the power and range of individual agency; furthermore, it underestimates the 
impact of society, culture, and environment, both on the individual and on health (Azzetsop & Rennie, 2010).  
Macklin (2003) agrees with Gillon supporting the claim that there is soundness and utility in the principles. As 
an example, he considers the importance of respecting autonomy in the case of a Jehovah’s Witness refusing a 
lifesaving blood transfusion. The Jehovah’s Witness, makes a choice based on a reasonable cost/benefit 
analysis as defined by his religion. He decides that the harm of receiving the transfusion and being denied 
“eternal salvation and is greater than the harm caused by refusing the transfusion and ending his mortal life on 
earth” (Macklin 2003, p 276). This situation is very different from a situation in which a patient does not and 
cannot understand the risks/benefits treatment of ECT. Consider the ethical framework that Principlist’s 
encourage us to accept when addressing the issue of ECT. Who is the psychiatrist answerable to, the patient, 
himself, or society? If the psychiatrist has a moral obligation to act in a beneficent manner, to promote 
autonomy, be non-maleficent and act in just and equitable way. Can they act appropriately when trying to 
measure the unknown outcome of ECT gives us “when determining the likelihood of an array of potential good 
and bad outcomes” (Macklin, 2003 p.277).  However, if the framework of Principlism is intended help clinicians 
choose an objectively moral procedure, and then there is a question of justification of use on what this theory 
is supposed to do and how it helps with dilemmas within psychiatry. This is where the shortcomings of Gillon’s 
autonomy centred conception of bioethics become the most obvious .I challenge the viewpoint that 
Principlism can be applied as a singular framework in all situations, especially within psychiatry. Tensions are  
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created between the principles when clinicians face moral dilemmas, and psychiatry has become over reliant 
on respecting autonomy. In an increasing culture of self-determination, the concept of autonomy is gaining 
momentum, as the cornerstone of good psychiatric practice. However, counterarguments (and criticism) 
explore the merits of this ideology on in-patient psychiatric care. The basis of these counterarguments is that 
patients are disadvantaged by an overzealous focus on autonomy as they may exercise a right to make a poor 
choice, which leads to subsequent harm (Harnett and Greaney, 2008). Beauchamp & Childress both 
acknowledge the source of John Stewart Mill and Immanuel Kant as a source of their autonomy principle. 
Beauchamp & Childress regard autonomy as one of the four principles, and ascribe this principle to Kant, who 
according to them, ‘argued that respect for autonomy flowed from the recognition that all persons have 
unconditional worth, each having the capacity to determine his or own destiny’ (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994, 
p125). Undoubtedly, Kant does offer such an argument: but whether it can be used to support the principle of 
patient autonomy is open to doubt. What I believe is needed here is to see what Kant meant by autonomy, 
and why he thought it must be respected. Kant’s definition of autonomy is that: ‘Autonomy of the will of 
property of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition)’ 
(Kant, 1997 p47). Therefore on the basis of that definition, he then states the principle of autonomy  as ‘to 
choose only in a way that maxims your choice are also included as universal law in the same volition’ a 
principle which he calls ‘the sole principle of morals, (ibid).  
Matthews (2000) when discussing the work of Kant makes the point that for Kant, then, a person is choosing 
autonomously when he chooses something, not as a pure act of will, based on impersonal general laws. “I 
choose to perform an action or to bring about a state of affairs autonomously, when I am making my choice 
not myself, as a particular individual with particular individual contingent desires and wishes but as a rational 
agent” (Page 60). The Kantian argument is not that human choices are worthy of respect because they are 
free, in the sense of being the expression if the agents own desires and conceptions of good. They are worthy 
of respect, and are genuinely autonomous, only if they are not constrained even by the agents own desires or 
conceptions of the good: if they are based on recognition of what is objectively as such, as determined by 
universal moral principles (Matthews, 2000). It follows then that we can deduce from this that Kant’s 
conception of autonomy differs in respect from that employed by modern ethicists, and so that Kant’s  
argument for respect for human worth cannot be used to justify the modern principle of ‘respect for 
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autonomy’. When making treatment choices, the patient’s concern would be receiving the treatment, which 
will produce the desired result, which may not necessarily, be the one required by universal law. The following 
example will distinguish the differences between Kant’s conception of autonomy and how it is used within 
modern psychiatry. 
A patient suffering from Bi-polar disorder refuses her medication because the side effects are more traumatic 
to deal with than the illness itself. Not taking her medication could cause problems at work, as she is a 
company director who makes decisions involving high levels of financial acumen. In such a case, believers in 
respect for patient autonomy would argue that her wishes be respected. However, the impact of that decision 
has consequences not only for herself but also for her colleagues within the company. The modern principle 
for respect for autonomy in this case would imply we respect the patient’s wishes, but Kantian principles 
would imply the opposite. In the Kantian sense, the patient would not be acting autonomously, but rather 
simply expressing her feelings about the adverse effects of the medication, which she feels are intolerable. 
Nevertheless, if Kantian arguments cannot justify the claim within psychiatry that patient autonomy (in the 
modern sense) should be respected, are there any arguments that can? Given these general considerations, 
the argument for respecting patient autonomy is therefore more Millian than Kantian. The Millian argument 
for respecting autonomy is utilitarian: it is in the best interests of society as a whole that individuals should 
make decisions about their future, including decisions about their medical care including objection to 
treatment that does not promote their wellbeing. Beauchamp & Childress  acknowledge the differences in that 
Mill emphasises that individuals should be permitted to develop in the literal sense and according to their 
personal convictions; whereas Kant emphasizes that autonomy is based in deciding on the base of pure reason 
(Matthews, 2000). (I will pursue this point in more depth in the next section to highlight the problems of 
utilising the framework of Principlism within psychiatric settings). Historical reasoning for admission to a 
mental hospital was that the person was out of their mind, of unsound mind, or was a lunatic (Monat, 1940). 
We have moved away from such terminology, but the fact remains that patients are often unaware that they 
are ill and lack insight when they have a psychotic type illness. On another note, if we believe that patients 
need treatment and care because they make irrational decisions, we must first address rationality. What is 
rational to one person is far from what another would deem rational, but just because an individual would 
rather refuse treatment than suffer the side effects does not make the decision irrational. Yes the person’s 
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thinking may be classed as distorted or exaggerations of inferential thinking, it can be argued that this does not 
render them unable to make autonomous decisions. Deviations from the norm are not necessarily illnesses, so 
how does restriction of autonomy of the patient prove to be positive within this situation? I emphasise this 
point from the work of Dworkin who said “...if the autonomous man cannot adopt his motivations de novo he 
can still judge them after the fact. The autonomous individual is able to step back and formulate an attitude 
towards the factors, which influence his behaviour”. (Dworkin, 1976, p24).  
So consider my last point, many psychiatric disorders are paradigm examples of what we label ‘mental 
illnesses where the person suffers from some degree of cognitive disability’. If we move the argument forward 
that all those involved within healthcare, including other relevant professionals I have worked with like the 
police and social services, can be said to have a duty to help these people. A mentally ill person’ right to refuse 
treatment is found ‘unintelligible’ of irrational form. Alternatively, is it right to restrict, manipulate or totally 
dismiss autonomy to act in a beneficent manner to impose treatment if the patient sees nothing distressing 
about their condition and would rather live with it than endure the negative side effects of varying mental 
health treatments. The link between all the criticisms when using Principlism within psychiatry is that it offers 
the psychiatrist or healthcare worker a method of reasoning but not guidance on how to deliberate the prima 
facia conflicts of the method. This is particularly true when key issues of autonomy are involved. This is now an 
issue I will address in the next section. 
Section 3.5:  Conceptual Discussion of how Principlism is linked to psychiatric practice. 
In this section, I highlight how the four standards of Principlism are used in practice. I begin with a question: in 
what area in psychiatric decision-making scenarios does the over reliance on autonomy occurs? Firstly an 
observation: When dealing with patients that suffer from disruption of cognitive ability, healthcare workers 
start from the position that they believe the patient has a loss of autonomy and is incapable of decision-
making. Clinicians see the patient as making decisions that they might not make if they were not governed by 
their illness, and this leads these providers to believe they have justification for imposing treatment. They 
would take the stance they are justified to apply treatment for patients whose ability to maintain their own 
safety is compromised. Seedhouse’s (1988) analysis of autonomy supports this view, considering autonomy to 
be something that must not only be respected but also created. Seedhouse contends that autonomy is an 
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individual characteristic, an ability, or quality that can be enhanced. Seedhouse suggests that healthcare 
workers endeavour to create autonomy for patients, and that this is not synonymous with granting patients 
absolute choice. Absolute choice would involve the opportunity for recovery, and possibly sufficient 
development of autonomy, in order to enable the patient to exercise greater choice. Seedhouse does 
acknowledge that there is a difficulty in determining at which point creating autonomy takes precedence over 
respecting autonomy.  
Considering examples of these issues creates a route into allowing for the applicability of Principlism to 
psychiatry. I must begin by noting the relative absence of psychiatric literature in the bioethics field. Pockets of 
ethical issues are to be found in the psychiatric and ethical literature, but the everyday ethical problems faced 
by doctors and nurses are not given adequate or realistic consideration. Beauchamp & Childress write 
extensively about high profile issues such as euthanasia and abortion, yet psychiatry is only mentioned briefly. 
Beauchamp & Childress (2001) give a clear reflection of the everyday difficulties encountered in the practice of 
mental health care, a point made by Fulwood (1995), yet no less than a third of the problems described in their 
appendix of case histories are psychiatric. Psychiatry is in the precarious position of having an aging paradigm 
of practice rooted in old customs, beliefs, and knowledge that has been recalcitrant to the adaption and 
incorporation of new knowledge and new realities of psychiatric clinical practice (McCabe, 2002). The 
juxtaposition of an aging paradigm that poorly matches new evidence based realities or research findings 
leaves the profession with seemingly incompatible knowledge structures, which constantly divides the 
psychiatric profession when we search for the most proficient way of treating the mentally ill. Therefore, my 
position here is to say ethical theory and reasoning do not alone solve dilemmas within psychiatry, but they 
can provide a framework to clarify the many issues, which can arise. So following this statement, I reflect on 
questions of the framework of Principlism when used in psychiatry. Under what conditions is it morally 
permissible to impose risk on psychiatric patients, and under what conditions? If guided by Principlism, will 
one identify and perform the objectively moral action? Will the decision to use ECT be justified and 
consequently the action that flows from that decision be justified? When considering the effectiveness of 
Principlism in the decision-making process around ECT, I will keep these questions in mind. Healthcare ethics 
aims to inspire questions and examine ethical options in health care situations, often demanding a choice 
between at least two undesirable alternatives.   
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Involuntary treatment of ECT is one of the most controversial aspects of psychiatric care and has been subject 
to varying legislation (chapter 2b). While there has been progress towards finding a compromise between the 
patient’s autonomy and the protection of the patient, serious problems remain in this area. I am concerned 
with the use (perhaps misuse) of Principlism as a basis for professional decisions surrounding ECT. Unless we 
are prepared to uncover these issues and engage in a serious and sustained discussion, we will remain in a 
dormant state at the expense of patient care. Within my literature search, I uncovered three authors who used 
Principlism within psychiatry and discussed its application. Campbell (2005) looked at the reliance of the four 
principles of biomedical ethics within psychiatry, and Robertson et al. (2007) addressed the overview of 
principles-based ethics within psychiatry and their value when considering the clinical and social context of 
ethical dilemmas within psychiatry. Lastly, Harnett & Greaney (2008) who within their clinical practice tried to 
contextualise the principle of autonomy by reviewing  ethical dilemmas experienced by healthcare workers in 
psychiatry when balancing autonomy against the other three morally justifiable ethical principles. 
 Campbell (2005) promotes the use of philosophy within mental health, claiming that it offers more solutions 
and helps reduce reliance on the simplistic solutions that the four principles provide. This is not because 
philosophy offers solutions to some of the dilemmas, but because it demands coherence and honesty in the 
arguments used to defend specific healthcare policies and clinical procedures, a demand that Principlism alone 
does not make. Campbell applied three ‘rules of reasoning’ to some concepts and controversies within mental 
health: dangerousness, responsibility, and treatability. He first writes about dangerousness, he uses a patient 
suffering from anorexia nervosa as his example. In this case, the patient is a danger to themselves due to their 
self-harming tendencies. He argues that in self-harm situations, “the ghost of John Stuart Mill still haunts us. 
Mills robust defence of liberty led him to want to restrict the freedom of individuals to act only on those 
actions that threatened others” (Campbell, 2005 p.1009). Campbell believes that dangerousness is not limited 
to violent actions towards others, and that the actions of people who engage in self-harm are determined by 
illness, not by autonomous free choice. He recognises that the framework of Principlism is inadequate in 
instances that involve extreme physical situations, these would include patient refusal to stop self-harming 
behaviours when considering the variables of mental lucidity and the patient’s right to self-determination. 
Lastly, he discusses treatability, asking if Principlism can help with the question ‘is there a treatment for mental 
health?’ However, he quickly realises that this questions requires a definition of health. This he cannot provide 
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due to the conceptual debate on definitions of illness, disease, and health. In his attempt to use Principlism to 
aid with dilemmas in psychiatry, he makes the following points: Principlism oversimplifies the important issues 
and that it only opens up new ways of thinking. He believes that it is the diversity of the ethical theory which 
gives the discipline its strength, and that we should use a range of theoretical analyses to compliment 
Principlism like the virtue ethics approach.   
In Harnett and Greaney’s work (2008), they make the point that psychiatric healthcare is currently influenced 
by Principlism, focusing on the fact that this is a ‘normative approach’ to ethics. A normative approach is a 
branch of moral philosophy that applies ethical language and moral theory to a situation to determine what 
one ‘ought ‘to do (Fox & De Marco, 2001). The authors discuss the concept of autonomy between the patient 
and healthcare provider, but I found that the authors prioritize autonomy over the other three principles for 
example when considering detention, restraint, consultation on care, consent, best interests and 
administration of medication. The authors aim to show that current psychiatric practice places significant value 
on autonomy without sufficient discussion of its moral worth under specific conditions. They claim that the 
principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are only utilised in support of involuntary or coercive treatment 
and that these principles fundamentally underpin the ethos of current mental health legislation, for example 
the use of ‘rapid tranquillisation’ (Harnett & Greaney, 2008). In keeping with my own viewpoint, the authors 
note that promoting autonomy is problematic if the patient is violent, while promoting beneficence or justice 
may result in restraining patients against their will for the benefit of others (restraint is an issue I will address 
later in section 3.6.1). As Gibson (1993) described in his account of a moral dilemmas, this is a situation where 
one must choose between conflicting values, neither of which result in an ideal outcome. Harnett and Greaney 
conclude by saying that mental health care providers are required to decide whether respecting a patient’s 
autonomy takes priority over beneficence and non-maleficence. While autonomy is to be respected, it is not 
an absolute principle to be upheld at the expense of others. Robertson et al. (2007) consider the application of 
Principlism in a specific scenario, discussing a 42-year-old schizophrenic female who insists on giving a kidney 
to her son who has been on dialysis for ten years. While she does suffer from delusions, she understands the 
concept and significance of kidney transplantation. The authors write that principle –based ethics is a useful 
tool in many situations, and is often more articulated than other ethical frameworks. However, they use this 
case study to show that Principlism is not ideal for every situation. The authors look at how each principle 
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applies to the situation. First, they consider autonomy, asking whether the patient has the capacity to give 
informed consent. They note that autonomous choice is a dimensional construct and can only be considered in 
regards to specific tasks at specific points in time (Dworkin, 1986). However, they also note that Principlism 
appeals to doctors because it reduces the ethical dilemma to an issue similar to diagnostic assessment. Their 
belief is that Principlism will help them address the possibility that in this scenario, the mother’s delusions 
interfere with her decision-making skills. In certain psychiatric situations, such as the one at hand, respecting 
the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence may in certain circumstances mean failing to respect a 
person’s autonomy. For example, it may be necessary to provide treatment that is not desired in order to 
prevent the development of a future, more serious health problem. Although the mother in this case wishes to 
save her son’s life, the future possible complications of kidney removal paired with her questionable mental 
state must be taken into consideration when making a decision. Physicians are expected to refrain from 
causing harm, but they also have an obligation to help their patients. Ethicists often distinguish between 
obligatory and ideal beneficence. Ideal beneficence comprises extreme acts of generosity or attempts to 
benefit others on all possible occasions. Physicians are not necessarily expected to live up to this broad 
definition of beneficence. However, the goal of medicine is to promote the welfare of patients, and physicians 
possess skills and knowledge that enable them to assist others. Due to the nature of the relationship between 
physicians and patients, doctors do have an obligation to 1) prevent and remove harms, and 2) weigh and 
balance possible benefits against possible risks of an action. However, to the patient it is much more salient 
because her view is she will save the life of her son. 
 When considering an act of non-maleficence physicians should not provide ineffective treatments to patients 
as these offer risk with no possibility of benefit and thus have a chance of harming patients. In addition, 
physicians must not do anything that would purposely harm patients without the action being balanced by 
proportional benefit. Because many medications, procedures, and interventions cause harm in addition to 
benefit, the principle of non-maleficence provides little concrete guidance in the care of patients. Where this 
principle is most helpful is when it is balanced against beneficence. In this context, non-maleficence posits that 
the risks of treatment (harm) must be understood in light of the potential benefits. Ultimately, the patient 
must decide whether the potential benefits outweigh the potential harms.  
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Psychiatric healthcare providers involved in the case of the schizophrenic woman and her son are 
encountering one of the most common ethical dilemmas: balancing of beneficence and non-maleficence. This 
balance between the benefits and risks of treatment and plays a role in nearly every medical decision when, 
physicians give patients the information necessary to understand the risks and benefits in order to make a 
decision themselves. Ultimately, the patient assigns weight to the risks and benefits. Nonetheless, the 
potential benefits of any intervention must outweigh the risks in order for the action to be ethical. Lastly, the 
authors look at how the principle of justice applies to the same scenario. The surgeon’s viewpoint is that he is 
reluctant to recommend the living donation of a kidney by a psychiatric patient. However, if we are to argue 
for the principle of justice, psychiatric patients must be afforded the same entitlements as any other person. 
Again, the authors note the difficulty of applying the principle when the person’s cognitive capacities are 
compromised. As in the case of Campbell (2005), they advise we should use a range of theoretical analyses to 
compliment Principlism like Virtue ethics.  
In conclusion, let me present a viewpoint brought about by reflection on these authors discussion on 
psychiatry and the issues they raise. Their view on Principlism oversimplifying issues and that it is not always 
easy to utilise in clinical practice is something I can identify with. But one very basic and very strong argument  
against the sole use of Principlism is that, psychiatry is far too complex an area of medicine for Principlism to 
be anything other than the most simplistic of guides to ethical reasoning. Therefore, it becomes essential to 
supplement it with a view that is more grounded and nuanced approach such as Virtue ethics in order to avoid 
over-reliance on a simplistic framework. Therefore, the implication being (and something I will discuss later in 
section 3.7 and 3.8) that a good virtue ethicist will know when the ethics framework of Principlism is too 
limited.  
Section 3.6: The Role of Principlism in ECT. 
Compulsory ECT treatment is a clear example of a case when two or more principles apply and conflict. For 
example, if a severely depressed patient is in need of treatment, we have an ethical duty to act in a beneficent 
manner to save the patient’s life, even when this involves overriding the principle of autonomy. Ideally, ECT 
treatment will allow the patient to function in everyday society, but any side effects of the treatment are not 
discussed in advance due to the patient’s mental state. When considering involuntary use of ECT, we must 
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balance the demands of these principles and determine which are stronger given the situation in each 
individual case. The problems associated with applying beneficence may be obscured when we use involuntary 
treatment and compulsory detention. Deprivation of liberty is a maleficent act, yet the patient gains 
protection from harm and necessary clinical services. Does applying Principlism to the debate around 
involuntary use of ECT make the treatment ethically acceptable? I believe that it does not. In fact, Principlism is 
unhelpful because healthcare professionals are expected to respect both beneficence and autonomy 
simultaneously. To use ECT without consent would infringe respect for autonomy, but refraining from 
treatment would infringe beneficence, a point made by Leung (2002). The principle of respect for individuals 
and the values they pursue and hold is central to the ethical conduct within nursing and medicine and 
therefore all patients should as a matter of principle be autonomous. Another reason Principlism is difficult to 
use when considering the use of ECT as a treatment is that ECT has the capacity to diminish the patient’s 
ability to make cognitive rational decisions, or their autonomy. By the healthcare givers, arguing from a 
beneficent perspective it influences an important ethical area, which is the principle of autonomy. The 
question which then begs to be answered is by acting in a beneficent manner without acknowledgement of a 
known side effect are we then reducing the capacity to be autonomous? As an analogy consider the treatment 
‘leucotomy,’ now called ‘lobotomy’, which is the surgical operation of cutting some of the nerve fibres in the 
frontal lobes of the brain as a treatment for intractable mental disorders. History and science has proved that 
this treatment exacerbated the mental illness (El-Hai, 2005; Persaud, 2005). Lobotomies were done with the 
best intention in a beneficent manner, but in many cases reduced patients to a level of non-cognitive function. 
Principlism offers little help because of the possible lack of ability of the individual to make a decision because 
of mental illness. Honouring all four principles for the patient would be unachievable because they are unable 
to make an autonomous choice because of their illness or diagnosis given by others.  
Reiter-Theil (1992) provides support for my argument; she makes the point that according to autonomy, a 
treatment should only be applied if a person is willing to accept it because of adequate information given and 
competency to decide. She emphasises that non-maleficence and beneficence represent the same dimension 
but both can be harmful at the same time. The two principles constitute a risk-benefit analysis frequently 
necessary for a good medical decision; if the risk-benefit analysis favours a particular treatment, it is ethically 
right to recommend the treatment to the patient. In special cases, e.g. a risk of death or suicide, it can be 
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ethically justified to intervene without the patient’s knowledge or consent .The sole use of Principlism as a 
theoretical framework is therefore not justified to hang this decision on. The question I pose is can a certain 
procedure like ECT be judged ethically right for one person but have negative consequences for others, and 
whose interests are served best, society’s or the individual?  
Let me add another variable to support my argument at this point. A leading concept in the bioethical 
literature on the involuntary use of ECT is the concept of adhering to the ‘least restrictive alternative option’. 
Since 2005, it has been one of the mainstay principles within the Mental Capacity Act (2005) (when addressing 
capacity decision-making issues) and requires that the patient be treated in the least restricted way when 
considering their physical and mental wellbeing. What does ‘least restrictive ‘mean in the context of care – it 
means that healthcare providers should always look for and use the least ‘invasive’ pathway of care therefore 
reducing anything detrimental to the patients’. This concept holds that when several approaches for treating 
the mentally ill are available, the least restrictive option should be chosen. The basis for this concept is found 
in considerations of the rational relationship of means and ends (Freedman, 1987). My position is that given 
the restriction of liberty and lack of acknowledgement of autonomy, intervention in the life of another is 
inherently wrong. Justification of interference must show that no other method would cause less interference. 
I argue that as one among several   treatments, ECT fails this test for two reasons. The first is whether the 
problem has been correctly identified. I argue that, for those of unquestionable lack of insight, the idea of least 
restrictive misses the point. For the psychiatric patient, whose inability to express a coherent choice or 
reaction in any way in which they are treated, not the least restrictive way, the most beneficial should be 
chosen.  
My belief is that the second is more relevant. How is restrictiveness to be identified and judged? 
Restrictiveness is not a natural and simple measurable quantity, but some form of combination of factors, 
which can work at cross-purposes. In the cases of the depressed patient who are treated by ECT, by close 
observation and possibly psychiatric medication. A case can be made for any of the possible rankings of those 
alternatives in terms of intrusiveness or restrictiveness. A defensible ranking would need to follow from an in-
depth examination of the values involved. What is it about restrictiveness or intrusiveness that we find 
objectionable? Would it be for example, the number of times individual choice is overlooked? (Freedman, 
1987). Alternatively, the significance of the choices is lost on the patient. My conclusion is therefore that no 
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purpose of clarity is solved by papering over the main issues of basic values by resorting to the formula of least 
restrictive option decision-making. To give my argument more credence I move away temporarily from the 
discussion on the ethics of ECT, and use a different analogy, by looking at the use of physical restraint. I do this 
because I want to highlight a different clinical problem that picks out the difficulties when utilising the theory 
of Principlism within a psychiatric clinical setting. 
Section 3.6.1: Restraint. 
My starting position statement here is by its very definition, restraint is incompatible with the principle of 
autonomy, as far as it involves restricting a patient limiting their freedom in some way against their will. It is 
therefore impossible to use the principle of autonomy, as unilateral decision making by clinicians is that the 
patient is ‘out of control’ and in need of external control and the patient lose their voice in the decision-
making process. The conflict posed by the use of restraint in psychiatry is an eloquent example of the conflict 
between divergent views and principles, all of which equally deserve within their own merit. The issue is that 
the decision to use restraint takes place under a veneer of an appeal to have respect for autonomy. Yet this is 
impossible for a number of reasons, so the processes of consent and patient decision- making are put into 
place to make it seem as if the patient’s autonomy is in some way being respected is simply a smokescreen for 
what is really happening. This is a central criticism of the way Principlism is not being applied properly in 
psychiatric practice. However, this is a criticism of the application of Principlism, not Principlism itself. What I 
argue is that by practising a restraint within ethical practice through the lens of the four principles, it leaves 
professionals in terms of conflict between the ethical principles within a complex and multifaceted problem. 
This decision making process requires the clinician to make a judgement about the effect of the pathology on a 
patient’s behaviour and not a decision judgement about the authenticity of a patient’s physical and mental 
make-up. The unfortunate necessity of physical restraint sadly is part of psychiatric and learning disabilities 
nursing that all nurses find troubling. Others include the use of seclusion, rapid tranquillisation, and the use of 
covert medications. Having worked in an extremely volatile environment where I needed to be part of a team 
to initiate restraint, there are times when physical restraint is the only possible course of action open to the 
caregivers. I have discussed the issue of risk (in chapter 2b.6.1) and I return to it when discussing restraint 
because it puts both patients and practitioners in a clinical quandary. Staff members are morally obligated to 
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keep the patient from being a risk to them or other patients despite putting the restrained individual at risk 
from the restraint itself (Mohr, 2010).    
McCain & Kornegay (2005) make the point that decisions have to be made along utilitarian lines in so far that 
restraint is sometimes necessary and is justified in that it benefits more patients. They contend that restraint is 
designated to meet the needs of the greatest number of people at the expense of the individual. Muir-
Cochrane & Holmes (2001) make a number of assumptions that give weight to their argument that need to be 
challenged. Firstly, it is generally accepted safety needs and therapeutic considerations for the individual, and 
others on the ward must be balanced against the rights of the individual. For this contemporary argument, I 
agree with Myers (1990) who suggests that valid reasons must exist for the use of restraint and it is the nurse’s 
moral and legal responsibility to use the least restrictive means when dealing with potentially destructive 
behaviour. It is not to be used as a treatment of violent behaviour without just cause. The ethical key is that 
this measure should always be able to demonstrate that the level of force applied in the restraint does not 
exceed the violence it was intended to control. The correct course of action may not be clearly defined and 
arguments may exist that would challenge either decision. The dilemmas posed by the use of restraint in 
psychiatry are an eloquent example of conflict between divergent values (or principles) that are equally 
deserving of respect (Berghmans, 2012). These principles can be considered as “prima facie” duties, in 
agreement with Ross (1939) who, in seeking to reformulate the typical Kantian deontological principle of 
ethics, drew a distinction between prima facie or conditional duties and actual duties (O’Neil, 2005). Prima 
facie duties are the primary principles of the moral life: self-evident, intuitive, instantly recognisable, and 
imperative. Actual duties, on the other hand, are currently present or effective obligations. Prima facie duties 
should always be respected, though this may occasionally be impossible, mostly because of conflicts between 
equally prima facie values. When this happens, criteria must be found to decide whether a violation is justified. 
In the case of physical restraint, it is obvious, that freedom (autonomy) may conflict with therapeutic aims 
(beneficence) as well as with the duty to protect the patient from risk to him/ herself or to others (justice) 
(Petrini 2013). Yet Beauchamp & Childress (2009) propose a reference grid to help the clinician decide, when 
there is a conflict between principles- when a violation of one or more of these principles is justified. 
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 According to Beauchamp & Childress (2009), a violation may be justified provided that  
• The moral goal that justifies the violation has a realistic chance of being achieved,  
• The violation of an obligation is necessary in the specific circumstances, meaning that no other morally 
preferable alternatives are available,  
• The violation is of as little significance as is compatible with achieving the goal,  
• The agent attempt to minimise the effects of violation.         
(p.69. 2009).  
In contrast to the Principlist approach, let us also consider an alternative approach the principle of double 
effect, another principle that can be applied, albeit in a soft touch manner, to the issue of restraint. This 
principle comes into play when an act is performed towards a proposed ‘good’ outcome, (treatment, risk 
prevention and patient safety) also has one or more undesirable effects (violation of autonomy, and absence 
of consent). The principle of double effect has already entered the philosophical and ethical arena and has 
been debated and revisited widely in the recent decades (Aulisio 2003). Although in recognition of this 
principle but not discussing in-depth, the principle of double effect is an act performed with good intentions, 
(such as therapy, risk management). However, it also has the ability to have harmful consequences (which in 
the issue of restraint is the restriction of the person’s freedom and movement) is morally acceptable only if 
three conditions are met: 
• The harmful effects are not intentionally pursued; 
• The harmful effects are not the aim of the act, and the good effect is not a direct cause and effect 
result of the harmful effect; 
• The intended good effect is as great or greater than the harmful effects and proportionate to them. 
Boyle (1980) 
So opening up the discussion to protect my position on this issue, I put forward a view to question the 
Principlist approach, when considering restraint it may be prudent to combine the two mentioned approaches 
above for the benefit of patient safety and care. If it is therefore necessary to consider other frameworks, it 
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must then follow that this highlights a problem when initiating the principles of Principlism solely in the area of 
restraint, and when there is a violation of one or more ethical principles. At the core of Western morality is the 
basic belief of individual freedom; it must then follow that respect for autonomy is a reflection of that morality 
and is based on the right to privacy and self-determination.  
Mohr (2010) makes the point that two fundamental components of autonomy are liberty: the right to self-
determination without interference or controlling interference from others and agency: the capacity to make 
decisions and intentionally act upon them. Firstly let me ask you to consider/imagine that a patient suffering 
from a mental illness was given a directive (for their own good) and did not comply, were then threatened 
with restraint, the decision to co-operate would be non-autonomous because it is based on coercion (i.e., 
credible threat difficult to ignore). Similarly, manipulation can result in a non-autonomous act. Secondly, my 
point is also imagine that to accomplish a specific action or behaviour such as the caregiver provides, the 
caregiver limits or withholds information that the patient would be able to process. For this reason, the 
patients are asked to declare their consent, (to be put into a restraint hold) and caregivers are obliged to 
disclose the nature of those procedures and the inherent risks. There is no or little positive good (act of 
beneficence) and definitively doing no harm is not evident (Non-maleficence) as the actual restraint holds 
themselves are painful. By its very definition, restraint is incompatible with the principle of autonomy, as far as 
it involves restricting a patient limiting their freedom in some way against their will. In addition, it could be 
classified as medical malpractice and negligence if a clinician imposes a careless or unreasonable risk on a 
patient. Providing a proper standard of care that avoids or minimises the risk of harm is supported not only by 
our commonly held moral convictions but by the laws of our society as well. In a professional model of care 
one may be morally and legally blameworthy if they fail to meet the standards of due care. The principle 
affirms the need for medical competence and it is clear that medical mistakes occur, however this principle 
articulates a fundamental commitment on the part of the healthcare professionals to protect patients from 
harm (Dimond, 2008). The crux of the conflict in the treatment of ECT could be argued to be that the 
healthcare provider feels it is necessary to treat the clinical condition, while its effects and side effects are not 
acceptable to the receiving party. Both viewpoints are incompatible so which one should take precedence? 
Can another principle solve the conflict? As often is the case, autonomy looms large in this dilemma. I also add 
another concern to consider for my position: To articulate the prima facia conflict there appears a tension 
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between the issues of autonomy and non-maleficence and beneficence. The patient’s capacity to make 
decisions has to be balanced with the need to respect his wishes. Is there a practical way of assessing the value 
of these principles once the boundaries of obligation to care are determined, or should doctors and nurses be 
concerned about what benefits and burdens apply when applying this theory? Ethical questioning begins with 
identification of a problem, a difficulty, a possible harm and bioethical writings often incorporate rather than 
scrutinise the assumptions behind the practices. It is therefore impossible to use the principle of autonomy, as 
unilateral decision-making by clinicians, is that the patient is ‘out of control’ and in need of external control 
and the patient loses their voice in the decision-making process. Precipitating this cycle is often a directive 
from the caregiver to the patient and on the face of it ‘never’ in the patients favour, and autonomy although 
(you could say) not totally absolute is under assault here within a clinical setting (Mohr, 2010). Before adopting 
such radical measures all less radical therapeutic options, that have some chance of success should be 
explored. Healthcare providers have an ethical duty to give information; this obligation is also valid for 
restraint. Clearly, this is not always possible, particularly if the patient is not able to comprehend the 
information given in severe circumstances. What must then follow is that the professional relationship 
between caregiver and patients becomes unequal. The idea of compliance as an expectation from patients 
strengthens and underscores inequality. (Petrini 2013). The expectation of compliance, as opposed to patient 
engagement in their treatment pathway is the antithesis of respecting autonomy. Having said this, I have to 
agree with a specific point when we address the counter arguments and I have experienced this on a 
professional and personal level. It is that the healthcare givers themselves have a right to expect to be safe and 
to have the tools at their disposal to assure this and that their charges are protected against bodily harm. 
Therefore, in the absence of less coercive tools being available, they are forced to breach patient autonomy at 
times when there is no alternative and it is unavoidable. My next point I wish to focus on is the argument put 
forward by the caregivers that restraint is a treatment, and it benefits the patient.  
When addressing the principle of beneficence, can we honestly call the act of restraint a treatment? In order 
to establish the proportionality (between the need for and the application of restraint) each individual case 
should be assessed and all relevant circumstances (e.g. age, mental capacity etc.) needs to be considered 
(Petrini, 2013). The principle of beneficence confers a moral obligation on the caregivers to act for the benefit 
of their patients. Clinicians are rarely able to produce benefits without creating additional risks or incurring 
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costs. As a result, to act with beneficence they must act only when the benefits warrant the risks and costs 
associated with a particular procedure or action, for example, is the safety of others compromised, and does 
this justify restraint procedure (Bigwood & Crowe, 2008). Following that beneficence must be constrained by 
autonomy to prevent the rights of the patient from being subjugated to their medical needs or the medical 
needs of others. Caregivers want to provide care that they believe be in the best interests of the patient but 
must acknowledge patient preference (exercising autonomy). This now highlights an interesting dilemma and 
raises the challenging question of whether the caregiver’s primary obligation is to act for the patient’s medical 
wellbeing and welfare, or to promote their autonomous decision-making.   
 Beneficence usually requires specific action on the part of the caregiver, which includes weighing up all the 
available options to facilitate the maximum benefit for the patient (Mohr, 2010). Therefore having said all that, 
with respect to those actions, they should be therapeutic and be part of a well-being care pathway: otherwise, 
patients would not need caregivers. They could get better on their own and heal themselves. Following 
through this line of reasoning now requires me to ask the question whether restraint is therapeutic. 
Parenthetically, although the number of institutions and clinical environments I have worked in call the various 
holds ‘therapeutic holds’, simply naming them therapeutic does not make it so, and to do so in that 
euphemism has the capacity to convince outsiders that it is something which it is not (Berrios & Jacobowitz, 
1998). The argument and evidence that restraint is therapeutic is unconvincing and a massive analysis from a 
number of sources concluded there is no evidence to say it benefits the patients (World Health Organisation, 
2005). The physical and psychological effects have been well documented within the psychiatric literature. 
Potential adverse effects of restraints increased with psychotropic medication, and the risk is increased when 
the patient is held in the prone position for prolonged periods (Laursen et al. 2005; Nielson, 2005).   
Examining the use of restraint against the principle of justice is problematic and the question of justice is a 
difficult conundrum when patients are detained against the Mental Health Act (1983) [2007 revised]. 
Commitment to psychiatric units on the grounds of public safety necessitates thinking about justice as 
encompassing patients and the public good. It follows that in such instances, consideration of justice issues 
becomes very different from those in maintaining psychiatric units and hospitals. Therefore, can the four 
principles help us with this unique situation where psychiatric healthcare professionals are left with the 
decision to restrain or not. There is a paradox to consider in that the right action to take may be in fact wrong. 
100 
 
When viewed through the lens of Principlism, the practice of physical restraint can be argued to violate the 
four principles, which underpin the numerous healthcare professional codes of ethics. However, in some 
instances within psychiatric healthcare, restraining a patient is unavoidable and is actually the morally correct 
procedure to take within the given circumstances. The dilemma of restraint highlights that in certain 
circumstance restraint is justified because of the lack of alternative procedures to detain certain individuals 
who pose a risk to themselves or others (Berk et al. 2008).  
Following the issues, I have raised in restraint I now illustrate that balancing principles, which Beauchamp & 
Childress (2009) advocate, is problematic, and offer a charge that they do not succeed. They make the point “if 
principles conflict they can be justifiably overridden which is the act of ‘balancing’ (meaning that none of the 
principles are absolute). Balancing principles tells about their weight and strength when balancing two 
principles, one principle is infringed by another” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p15). They go on to make the 
point that “... physicians acts of balancing, and specifying ethical principles often involve ‘sympathetic insight 
humane responsiveness’ and the practical wisdom of evaluating a particular patients’ circumstance and needs”  
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p22). Balancing Judgements and Solving Conflicts. So if the premise by 
Beauchamp & Childress is that ‘balancing’ is best suited for reaching judgements in individual cases , then the 
question has to be does balancing provide us with justification for carrying out these acts? I illustrate my 
contention that balancing is an act of inarticulate intuitions and an array of circumstances need to be 
addressed before it’s  taken that we use balancing  and there is a need for its justification. Different ways can 
be used to enable more in-depth analysis of this clinical case when using a Principlist strategy: (1) to make 
additional specifications and (2 to make use of the method of balancing (Gordon et al 2011).  
1. Additional specifications. 
By applying additional specifications, the Principlist tries to solve the conflict between (a) differing principles 
(e.g. non-maleficence and beneficence or (b) differing interpretations of one principle (e.g. autonomy). 
If the psychiatrist utilises the specification of beneficence, they would take the line of argument that, restraint 
could well be unacceptable and pursue other pathways of care. Therefore, if the evidence is that restraint is 
not of therapeutic value, and therefore questionable tools in the armamentaria of the caregivers within 
mental health, it is timely at this point to question whether restraint violates the principle of non-maleficence. 
Returning to using the framework of Principlism as an assessing tool, I question what direction Principlism 
takes us, when I address how restraint comports with the use of the principle of non-maleficence.   
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2. Balancing.  
This places the psychiatrist in a situation where he now has to choose between respecting an individual’s 
autonomy over his own professional autonomy and the codes of practice he has to follow. The four principles 
approach endorses a systematic way to deal with such conflicts, which is to balance confliction specifications17. 
Professional autonomy needs to be shown the high level of respect it deserves, however there are cases of 
when respect for a patient’s autonomy prevails. The issues I have raised within the use of restraint have 
highlighted a grey area in utilising Principlism as a sole framework and its incompatibility for solving clinical 
dilemmas. When I reflect on the use of restraint it follows that there is significant disagreement about the 
proper balance between contending obligations, the failure to give reasons justifying that balance may be 
problematic. However, the moral controversy centres on differing judgements about what the proper balance 
should be. Simply to assert that one of the obligations constitutes a good and sufficient reason for overriding 
the other, begs the question by failing to give any reason on behalf of the balancing judgement, which has 
been made. Balancing therefore is not a tool or method of justification: it marks the end of reasoned 
justification as a tool of moral reflection (Ebbesen & Pedersen, 2007).  
In fairness Beauchamp & Childress themselves do not, give reasons justifying the balancing judgements, which 
they make is support of their positions on particular issues. They simply assert them. As they acknowledge 
‘Respect for autonomy ...has only prima facia standing and can be overridden by competing moral 
considerations ...The principle of respect for autonomy does not itself determine what , on balance, a person 
ought to know or do or what counts as a valid justification for constraining autonomy’  (Beauchamp & 
Childress  1994, p.126). Finally if we follow the reasons given by Beauchamp & Childress (2009), that when 
using balancing in an ethical situation, the general idea is not to reach absolute certainty, which is impossible, 
but just to approach it. Therefore, my counterargument is the recourse to ‘balancing’, does not answer my 
question with a reason for justification. It answers it by assertion of which is taken to be obvious to moral 
common sense. Then the criteria are not really criteria for balancing, what they are, is criteria for comparing 
differing courses of action, with the one which entails the least infringement of norms, without regard  to 
which norm is the weightier.  
                                                          
17 Beauchamp & Childress (2009). 
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In conclusion, to this section, I return to my original question. Can the four principles help us with this unique 
situation where psychiatric healthcare professionals must decide whether to restrain a patient? While a 
helpful framework at times, the concept of choosing restraint when it violates Principlism cannot help with 
dealing with what is classed as a serious dilemma. Treatments that affect the patient’s integrity and 
psychophysical resistance may be administered only with the purpose of procuring a tangible clinical benefit or 
the alleviation of patient suffering. Restraint is an explicit violation of Human Rights, (Human Rights Act 1998) 
as it impairs freedom and dignity of the patient. Despite this, it is necessary at times. The four-principles 
approach has a number of limitations in psychiatric practice. It assumes that patients will either have capacity 
to be autonomous or only lack autonomy for discreet periods. In defence of Principlism in general, Beauchamp 
(2003) writes that people from different cultures share some moral rules. The examples he uses for these 
moral rules are, ‘Tell the truth’, ‘Do not kill’, ‘Rescue persons who are in danger ‘, and ‘Do not steal’. These 
moral rules are not implemented in the same way in all cultures; however, the norms themselves are cross-
cultural. There is a connection between these rules and the more general principles. For example, the moral 
rule of ‘Tell the truth is justified by the principle of autonomy, the rule of ‘do not kill’ is justified by the 
principle of no-maleficence. The rule of ‘Rescue persons who are in danger’ is justified by the principle of 
beneficence and lastly ‘do not steal’ is justified by the principle of justice. One rule can be justified by more 
than one principle; hence, there is a non-linear connection between the rules and principles (Ebbesen, 2011).   
Applying Principlism to the dilemmas encountered in the use of restraint and ECT may actually lead patient’s 
lives to worsen , therefore firstly the moral rule of ‘Telling the truth’, justified by autonomy, I question  how is 
this possible when the truth of how ECT actually works is still unknown and the psychological damage caused 
by restraint is also unknown. Secondly, ‘Do not kill’, justified by the principle of non-maleficence, research 
evidence has shown that ECT kills off healthy brain cells (Abrams, 2002; Braddock, 2014), and I would put 
forward the view that restraint virtually kills the therapeutic relationship between patient and clinician. 
Thirdly, ‘rescue persons who are in danger’, which is justified by the principle of beneficence. And lastly ,I am 
yet to be convinced by proponents that the premise that using a treatment like ECT which is still to be 
‘scientifically’ proven or to be holding down a patient in the prone position is doing positive good. What is not 
discussed is how autonomy should be conceptualised when patients are in long-term psychiatric care, and 
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where patients are compulsorily detained, autonomy is a concept that needs to be expanded and refined 
when thinking about patients with chronic dependency needs. 
Either to claim that actions that we normally consider distasteful are not in fact distasteful in the 
circumstances of politics or to say that they are indeed wrong, but that it is sometimes right to commit 
wrongful actions. Surely, these are human traits of a virtuous person, which I offer is the physician, who find 
the wisdom to find the right actions in the specific role of alleviating suffering of the mentally ill.  
Section 3.7: The Benefits of Virtue ethics.  
 In this section, I argue for a strong –action guiding approach, which will I believe will complement the theory 
of Principlism for contemporary nursing in psychiatry. There have been many debates as to whether dilemmas 
within psychiatry when faced with unique circumstances in clinical practice can solely rely on one ethical 
theory. Psychiatry needs an ethical framework that can capture the complex moral dilemmas inherent in 
practice, but it also needs a framework that provides a model of ethical practice. The sort of complementarity 
framework that I believe is needed is to balance philosophical principles and virtue ethics into an intersecting 
relationship enabling a wider range of decisional making skills. The theory virtue ethics is designed to link with 
Principlism, which they contend, is a mix of objective rules or Principles and subjective character traits, a 
method they labelled ‘judgement within limits’ (Block & Green, 2006, p 7). Their model is a combination of 
mind and heart that tries to complement each other in attempting to resolve difficult moral dilemmas. While 
recognising problems in both theories, Bloch & Green assert that they can, in combination provide a sound 
moral framework ‘based on conceptual compatibility and synergy’ (p 8). From the outset, I recognise that one 
of the more recent developments in moral philosophy has been the recognition of the place of caring or 
emotional bonds between persons. The status of ‘ethics of care’ theory remains indeterminate but although I 
recognise its merits as a substantive moral theory, it does not form part of my argument when I discuss 
Principlism and Virtue ethics. 
I will utilise the work of various authors on virtue ethics and I argue that the moral virtues and a strong (action 
guiding) version of virtue ethics develops virtue based relationships and a virtue based approach within 
psychiatry. The latter is characterised by three features: 1/ exercising the moral virtues such as compassion; 2/ 
using judgement; and 3/ using moral wisdom, understood to include at least moral perception, moral 
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sensitivity and moral imagination (Armstrong, 2006). To highlight my position as to why I believe virtue theory 
can complement and address the problems associated with using Principlism solely as a framework, for 
dilemmas in clinical practice. I believe clarification is needed on this point. I reject the sole use of the 
framework of Principlism because of the possibility of healthcare providers making decisions, which are too 
dependent on the principles. These four principles are too far removed from a model of holistic care so 
therefore I offer virtue theory, as a supplement to address the problems identified within Principlism theory. 
When we address the issue of ethical decisions and adopt a philosophical stance here, I return to the 
complexity of decision making within psychiatry. Again, I use the examples of dilemmas faced in psychiatry like 
a patient being restrained, receiving psychotropic medication, or being given the treatment of ECT.  
However, the first question that must be asked is, ‘what is a morally good decision? So that it is seen to impact 
on healthcare with positive consequences.  
The healthcare provider may make the decision based on what they feel the consequences of withholding 
information or full disclosure of the treatment of ECT to the patient. This may be in terms of predicted harm, 
side effects, and distress to the patient, or effects on their autonomy and decision-making capabilities 
(Hodkinson, 2008). However, there are difficulties with this approach (Principlism) I highlighted earlier within 
this chapter and are well-rehearsed criticisms of outcome-based frameworks. These include difficulty of 
predicting consequences, both in the short term and long term; whether the healthcare provider is able to 
make decisions about what is important to the patient based only on the patient’s own values. Having the 
rightness or wrongness of actions embedded in the consequences of those actions increases the level of 
uncertainty in decision-making. This is because being able to predict consequences in an absolute sense is 
difficult. The best that can be achieved is to accept that there may be a range of consequences with some 
being more probable than others are. Hodkinson (2008) indicates deontological approaches cannot resolve 
moral conflicts and so the psychiatrist is denied an available remedy.’ Utilitarianism is seen as to difficult to 
calculate benefits and risks and demands an impartiality that healthcare providers would find difficult to 
achieve. Both Deontology, a respect for autonomy and utility, a measurement of consequences, are seen as 
theories’ that do not help psychiatric healthcare providers in clinical practice. Let me return to the problems I 
identified and points made earlier in that the framework of Principlism is useful in deliberating psychiatric 
ethics when dealing with dilemmas in clinical practice. The approach Principlism takes it that it integrates well 
105 
 
with a number of aspects of clinical issues, but lacks guidance in how to deliberate the prima facia conflicts of 
the method; particularly where the key issues of autonomy is involved. Regardless of the instrumental value of 
Principlism, it suffers from a lack of substantive theoretical background (Robertson et al. 2007). Healthcare 
providers in psychiatry may be able to overcome this problem by employing the approach of virtue ethics. 
There is considerable scope for values not to be shared in psychiatric practice. It is important; therefore, that 
psychiatric ethics should be open to this possibility. One of the problems of Principlism is its implicit 
acceptance of a biomedical model, which takes for granted that diagnosis is value-free. In psychiatric practice, 
this is not the case. The person displaying aggression who requires restraint, the patient with psychotic 
depression who needs psychotropic medication or the patient suffering from Bi-polar disorder and prescribed 
ECT may or may not require enforced detention. Therefore, the four principles can readily fail to account for 
the clinical decision that most people would be inclined to accept as correct. “In fact the four principles can 
either seem too indeterminate or even so completely irrelevant as to be otiose” (Hughes & Fulford, 2005 p 
1005). My viewpoint is that virtue ethics provides a useful tool to complement the shortcomings I have just 
discussed within principle based ethics. I endorse this point, because it focuses on the moral character of the 
individual and that a morally good decision can be made by utilising character traits or behavioural dispositions 
such as kindness and honesty.    
Therefore, I start this section by promoting the discussion that in looking at the qualities that makes up the 
virtuous person we can see these character traits are reflected in the patient –client relationship. However, 
the first question should be what are virtues? A virtue is a trait of character, which is good for that person to 
have. Consider the ethical concepts of tolerance, generosity, integrity, honesty, sincerity, and kindness, which 
make up the traits of a good person. Even though perhaps most of them can be put into the form of an 
adjective and applied to actions, (a tolerant action; a generous action and so on) the focus of virtue ethics is on 
traits of character of person (Mizzoni, 2010). Ancient Greek philosophy (Irwin, 1999) provides an early account 
of the roles of the virtues in human lives, understood in terms of human nature, the good life for humans, and 
the notion of human flourishing. The central question posed by Aristotle (1998) in The Nicomachean Ethics is 
‘what is the good life for man?’ Crudely, his response was living the life of virtue according to reason and 
desires. In book two of The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that the soul consists of three kinds of things; 
passions, faculties and states of character. Aristotle believed virtue is neither passions nor faculties’ all that 
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remains is that [the virtues] should be states of character (Aristotle, 1980 p 28). He distinguished between 
moral and intellectual virtue. The latter was taught through instruction and was split into scientific knowledge 
(episteme) intelligence (nous) technical skill (techne), wisdom (sophia) and practical wisdom (phronesis). 
Conversely, moral virtue was acquired through exercising the virtue, ‘moral virtue comes about as a result of 
habit’ (Aristotle, 1980 p 28). 
The emphasis is on the word ‘habitual’. Taking honesty as an example, someone who is honest on certain 
occasions- perhaps when it is convenient to be so-does not possess the virtue of honesty. Within the 
Aristotelian view, the honest person is always honest. For Aristotle, the actions of a virtuous person spring 
from a steady unchangeable character (Armstrong, 2006). The principled healthcare provider asks; how ought I 
to act. The healthcare provider acting from a principled position recognises certain rules or maxims as guiding. 
These rules or maxims provide morality of doing (Mayo, 1993). However, the virtuous healthcare provider 
asks; who ought I to be? The healthcare provider having this disposition lives an ethical life through cultivating 
virtues or character traits that would have them described by others as being a ‘good person’. The virtues are 
embedded character traits, which are held to be societally valuable such as truth telling, trustworthiness, 
honesty, and kindness. Practical wisdom relates to how the virtues are applied or enacted. Virtue ethics is 
about an individual of good character doing the right thing. By incorporating virtue ethics it enables healthcare 
professionals, patients and significant others, to place value or added weight on a particular principle to find a 
balance and rationale for decision-making. A virtue ethicist Rosalind Hursthouse had already addressed this 
issue when she made the point that this is virtue ethical characterisation of ‘right action’ because the rightness 
of the action is explained in terms of virtue and not the other way round. Most of the theoretical weight is 
therefore borne by the account of virtue provide in the theory. To unpack this account of right action, we need 
to know what the virtuous agent would do. We need to have an account of virtue that will give us some way to 
approach this issue (Hursthouse, 1999). Hursthouse herself adopts a broadly Aristotelian account (with some 
qualifications) On Aristotle’s account of virtue she asked questions on what qualities that made up a human 
being. She believed that virtue ethics is concerned with character, prior to action, so it asks the question ‘How 
shall I live?’ before it asks the question ‘What shall I do? Secondly, virtue ethics focuses on eudaimonia, that is 
wholeness, or human fulfilment (Aristotle [350BC] 1976) rather than on specific decisions about right actions. 
Thirdly virtue ethics sees morality as learned ways of being, which are a blend of reason and emotion, the so-
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called ‘habits of the heart’ (Campbell, 2005). Therefore, virtue ethics is not episodic: it is interested in the 
narrative of an individual’s life viewing this as a quest for excellence, in human experience, a quest for those 
things that are of intrinsic value (MacIntyre, 1985). The advantage to healthcare is the approach is that it can 
explain the relationship between human motivation and ethical conduct. Most of us want to live a good life 
and become better persons. Virtue based ethics provide a clear link between natural human desires for 
happiness and self-improvement and moral conduct. Principlism based approaches have difficulty showing the 
relationship between ethical conduct and motivation since following ethical rules may not be in our best 
interests (Resnik, 2012). Kant (1964) argued, for example, that ethical conduct consists in doing our duty, for 
duties sake, but how many people have such pure motives? Most people act morally for a variety of reasons, 
including fear, of punishment, shame, or guilt (Cahn & Markie, 1998).   
The good person of moral excellence has the dispositional character traits of virtue and this trait produces 
good acts: just as a good watchmaker produces a high standard watch, which is fit for purpose, a good nurse 
will deliver a high standard of care, and a good person will behave well in all circumstances. The intellectual 
component of the trait suggests that moral virtue or excellence of character and the intellectual virtue, 
practical wisdom can be taught and that people can develop moral expertise (Begley, 2006). It then follows 
that virtue ethics emphasises that the quality of the action produced is affected by the integrity and 
competence of the moral agent. If the agent is corrupt, the action is likely to be corrupt. If the moral agent is 
incompetent in either a practical or a moral sense then the action is likely to be less than satisfactory. If you 
lack skills or the necessary competence to perform a particular act (e.g. give an injection) then it would be 
morally irresponsible and unjust to patients to subject them to your incompetence. There are close links 
between virtue ethics and professional competence and these moral obligations and principles are imposed 
upon people who work in a number of roles, nursing being one of them, e.g. obligations that are laid down by 
the Nursing and Midwifery Council (2008). One might think that, while there is no doubt, there is much to be 
done on the details- such as identifying and ranking the virtues important in nursing. There cannot be much 
wrong in principle with applying virtue ethics to nursing (Holland, 2010). One of the most common criticisms of 
virtue ethics is that it is circular in character: that is by being virtuous- exercising traits I have mentioned, one is 
a morally good person, but, to be morally good, one needs to be virtuous. Another criticism of virtue ethics lies 
with the emphasis on one’s character and the kind of person one ought to be- both of which are culturally and 
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socially embedded. For this reason, virtue ethics is criticised as being too vague with little ability to guide 
actions (Begley, 2006). Obligation- based ethicists argue that the virtuous person will have no idea what to do 
in a particular dilemma, because they argue that virtue ethics fails to come up with any rules for conduct. 
Indeed the main critique of virtue ethics as a moral philosophy in psychiatry is that it seems to have impractical 
expectations of individuals and places the individual amidst a potentially disabling psychodynamic process of 
identification with the idealised ethical superman (Dyer, 1988). Virtue ethics has been proposed as a 
foundation of psychiatric ethics, with some argument that the sole virtue of phronesis can provide for ethical 
behaviour in psychiatry, or at the very least inform prescriptive codes of ethics in psychiatry (Held, 2006). 
However, and here is an important premise in the argument from the proponents of competing philosophical 
frameworks to virtue ethics theory, all virtue ethics normative rivals can also account for the fact that 
healthcare providers should have kindness as a virtue. For the act–utilitarian, ‘act kindly ’ is a rule of thumb 
that tends to maximise utility; for the indirect utilitarian, it is a rule that would maximise utility if adhered to 
generally; for that Kantian it is universalizable maxim, or the implied imperative to treat others as ends-in-
themselves; and so on. In fact, that a putative normative theory failed to render the injunction to be kind 
would figure in a reduction ad absurdum argument against it (Holland, 2010).  Whilst I recognise these claims, 
my rebuttal is that whilst they are traditional criticisms of virtue ethics, these criticisms do not fatally 
undermine the coherence of virtue ethics. Hursthouse (1999) agrees with my thinking in that people have 
access to a whole range of virtues and within that structure of these virtues, there is considerable moral 
guidance. I shall now defend the coherence of virtue ethics further. As moral professionals, those working in 
psychiatric healthcare should advance opportunities for persons with mental illness to understand their illness, 
manage their illness, and try to engage fully within society.  
According to the school of virtue, ethics ‘good people will make good decisions’ and ethical behaviour is what 
good or virtuous people practice (Oberle, & Raffin- Bouchal, 2009.p 11). Virtue ethics suggests that actions are 
right when they stem from good character, or the disposition to be just benevolent, or courageous in 
situations where someone is in need of help. Proponents of virtue ethics suggest that the complexities of life 
defy the formulation of or adherence to externally imposed principles (Bennett, 2010). Within this ethical 
framework, the accumulation and synthesis of experiences, maturity, practical wisdom and the influence of 
exemplars guide action (Begley, 2006). Rules are therefore, not part of virtue ethics; it is about the virtuous 
agent and personal development (Pellegrino, 2002). In thinking about virtue ethics, it is important to 
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distinguish between two positions: the replacement view and the augmentation view (Cahn & Markie, 1998). 
According to the replacement view, virtue theories should replace principle approaches to mortality. What it 
means to act morally is to practice virtue, not to follow moral principles or rules. According to the 
augmentation view, virtue theories should supplement but not replace principle-based theories, of which I am 
a believer. The augmentation view is not controversial, because most theorists agree that moral theories 
should include an account of moral virtue. For Kant, virtue is a useful by-product of acting morally. By following 
moral rules, we develop the disposition (or strength of will) to continue following moral rules (Kant, 1964). For 
Mill, seeking virtue is a worthwhile pursuit because it contributes to one’s own happiness and the happiness of 
others, and therefore promotes utility (Mill, 1963). In his book After Virtue, Alastair Macintyre challenged the 
dichotomy set up in contemporary moral philosophy between deontological and teleological theories, and 
suggested that virtue ethics represents a bridging third way within ethical theory, which has been neglected in 
the debates between deontology and teleological utilitarianism. Here in this next section I address that very 
issue, I put forward a view that yes it cannot only bridge but compliments and supports decision-making when 
faced with dilemmas in psychiatry.   
Section 3.8: Virtue theory and Principlism -how do they complement each other?  
Even if I have succeeded in motivating the question as to how well Virtue ethics is relevant in psychiatric 
nursing decisions, a detractor might say I have only made a case for its merits and not how it can complement 
Principlism. You might even find those who ask the question of integrity, ‘Which approach should health-carers 
in psychiatry take-the virtue approach or the principle based approach?  
Therefore, in this section I, attend to that criticism and address the advantages of using both theories in 
conjunction for the benefit of those suffering from mental illness. Virtue based ethics and the Principlism 
approach are complimentary because they focus on different aspects of ethical conduct. Although virtue based 
approaches and principle-based approaches can complement each other, I have identified their strengths and 
weaknesses that do affect their ability to serve as conceptual frameworks for promoting integrity. Building on 
my earlier points that a principle based approach stresses the importance of moral rules, while virtue based 
ethics approaches emphasises moral character development, which are essential in healthcare promotion and 
decisions. There is a typical structure: firstly identify a moral sphere of a psychiatric nursing dilemma then 
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secondly define and apply the virtues relevant to that decision and act accordingly to those virtues, discussing 
the implications of certain virtues relevant to the dilemma when utilising the Principlist approach (Holland, 
2010). Following rules does not interfere with the development of moral character, nor does character 
development preclude the following of rules. Indeed one might argue that one of the ways that we develop 
virtue is by understanding and following moral rules. For example, you are asked various questions about ECT, 
the rule will be ‘don’t lie’ repeatedly, this will develop into a habit and they will become more honest in their 
answers (Seedhouse, 2009). 
Principlism as a framework does not allow for a consideration of the specifics of the situation or of moral 
character and reasoning of the individuals involved. There is a danger that adhering to moral absolutes (such 
as truth telling) in all cases may do more harm than good (Begley & Blackwood, 2000). However, it is possible 
to imagine other situations involving unknown consequences where the dynamics are so complex that an 
absolute rule is unhelpful. Virtue ethics provides an alternative, because it focuses on the moral character of 
the individual and on their practical ability to use their practical wisdom (Hodkinson, 2008). This section argues 
that the philosophical approach of virtue ethics is of value in terms of providing guidance and working 
alongside the theory of Principlism in decision making within a psychiatric clinical environment. However, in 
terms of not only providing guidance and support to decision making with Principlism, but to help reflect on 
how decisions are made and the moral character of the individual involved. Therefore let me summarise my 
points if the proponents of Principlism were to challenge my position and ask what the merits of virtue ethics 
are and how can they complement Principlism. They are as follows; firstly, this approach accurately reflects the 
language of virtues and vices  e.g. ‘fair’, ‘well’ and ‘care’ that health-carers use on a daily basis (Armstrong et 
al. 2000). Secondly, this approach places a firm emphasis upon the crucial role played by emotion including 
moral remainder, (Hursthouse, 1999) in the moral lives of patients’ and nurses. Thirdly, this approach makes 
pivotal the importance of using judgement and moral wisdom to enable psychiatric health-carers to make 
morally good choices and decisions with patients’ in different circumstances (Armstrong, 2006). Lastly, this 
approach places a firm emphasis upon moral education, e.g. the importance of morally (and clinically) good 
role models, e.g. (Lutzen & Barbosa da Silva, 1996; Parsons et al. 2011). That is, a psychiatric healthcare 
provider who strives beyond reciting of ethical principles, but also responds virtuously – all of which is 
essential for ethical decisions those are good and right. To recall my previous arguments, some of the 
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normative work can be done by adding the virtue ethics approach. While obligation based theories focus 
primarily on the notions of moral rightness and wrongness, the virtue approach focuses upon ‘goodness and 
badness’. In other words, it is enough for it to secure a role in decision making within psychiatry, and in my 
view the distinctiveness of decision making in psychiatric nursing as a moral domain can be retained.  
Section 3.9:  Conclusion. 
This section has argued that the philosophical approach of Virtue ethics is of value, not only in terms of 
providing guidance when dealing with dilemmas in psychiatry, also how to act  and how it can complement the 
use of the Principlism, of which its shortcomings I have identified. It is important to clarify that my argument 
within this chapter was not about the theory of Principlism but the use of the framework of Principlism. 
Healthcare providers often assume that they know what is in the patient’s best interest and almost invariably 
define that best interest according to what might be the best outcome, or far worse, they might decide best 
interest according to their own personal values. I have no quarrel in using the framework of Principlism but the 
concerns I have are that the moment we start to only use Principlism as the sole theoretical framework in 
psychiatry it then takes on the mantle of superiority over other applicable theories. My aim was never to find 
answers ‘but’ to challenge assumptions that Principlism is always best placed to direct us on quality psychiatric 
patient care. As soon as we start entering the autonomy versus other principles debate, we set aside our 
ability to recognise other ethical viewpoints that other theories give us. However, it then follows these 
viewpoints may not always be easy to address but are essential to afford the patients all their ethical rights, 
and not be selective in what is given to them. I have also argued that with the use of Principlism, it has the 
ability to impose values of the healthcare providers whereas in effect it should achieve the opposite of 
imposing the values of the patient. Mental health care is in a precarious position of having an aging paradigm 
of practice rooted in its historical knowledge and beliefs. This has been recalcitrant to adaptation and 
incorporation of new realities of clinical care. The juxtaposition of an aging paradigm that poorly matches 
current practice realities leaves psychiatry with seemingly incompatible knowledge that seemingly divides our 
profession. Principles are guidelines for action, not rules of conduct (Hodkinson, 2008). Only we as moral 
agents can grapple with the facts of each patient case profile to determine the appropriate course of action. 
To be able to deal with real-life moral quandaries we can utilise the framework of Principlism, but must 
compliment it by using sound reason, good judgement, and display virtues of character. Several forms of 
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treatment make it difficult for the patient to hold or act on any values at all. ECT comes within that category. 
Then it is, by identifying the limitations of what Principlism gives us within psychiatry that I hope gives way to a 
broader outlook of how we address ethical issues. Healthcare providers may be able to overcome this problem 
by employing a method of critical reflection in the light of other competing ethical theories such as virtue 
ethics. “It is important to be able to reflect more deeply on how decisions are made and the moral character of 
the individual involved” (Armstrong, 2006. p 298).  
Healthcare providers may be able to overcome this problem by utilising all that is good with Principlism, but 
also overcoming its shortfall by linking in another theoretical approach, which is Virtue ethics. This sharing of 
the two theories leads to the importance of decision-making, thus giving a balance of evaluative perspectives 
as a basis of good mental health clinical practice in this area. Many people expect applied ethics to be helpful 
in resolving concrete moral problems and are disappointed when they do not fulfil the expectation 
(Hoffmaster, 1994). A natural response to that disappointment is to turn from moral principles that seem to 
general and far removed from the problems to engage in decision-making, which is subjective and not always 
beneficial for the patient. It has to be recognised that virtue –based approaches and principle-based 
approaches can complement each other but do have distinct strengths and weaknesses, which in isolation 
affect their ability to serve as conceptual frameworks in healthcare decision-making. By using Principlism and 
Virtue ethics in conjunction, it provides a venue in which the relationship between ethical theory and ethical 
practice can be pursued in an extended, comprehensive, and one hopes, ultimately productive clinical 
practices.  
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Chapter 4:  Consent and ECT.  
                 “Volenti non fit injuria:”    "A person is not wronged by that to which he consents."    
             (Terence Ingman 1981) 
 
Section 4.1: Introduction and Chapter outline.  
The goal of this chapter is not primarily to resolve the conflict between consent and the mentally ill who are 
prescribed ECT. Rather, I aim to highlight problems related to the violation of consent and the validity of 
gaining consent from a person with limited understanding due to mental illness. In addition, from a number of 
conceptual viewpoints I address the following question: ‘can genuine informed consent for ECT exist if 
healthcare professionals ‘play down’ both the harmful effects and unknown evidence for how the procedure 
works? Informed consent is a lively ethical issue, debated frequently in both general medicine and psychiatry. 
It should be noted that I am using the term ‘informed consent’ as synonymous to ‘ethically valid consent’. 
Informed consent has been termed ‘valid consent’ by writers such as Beauchamp & Childress (2011). Valid 
consent is usually taken to incorporate three elements in that it is informed, voluntary and the patient is 
competent to consent, I will also address the related but significant problem of determining patient capacity to 
opt for ECT. I question the position taken in psychiatry that it is morally appropriate to treat patients who have 
given consent based on a minimal amount of information given by the healthcare provider. The Royal College 
of Psychiatrists (RCP,2013) indicates that it is morally permissible to forcibly treat psychiatric patients with ECT 
in order to preserve their best interests, restore their autonomy to enable their mental health and cognition to 
improve decision-making, and because they are a danger to themselves or others (RCP, 2013). These views 
reflect the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE, 2003) guidelines as well. I disagree with the 
above claim and argue that this viewpoint is ethically and clinically questionable. This chapter shows the 
weakness of NICE and the RCP’s position and examines why their reasoning fails. The argument they put 
forward respects the duty of beneficence towards others while not fully recognising the equally important 
tenet of autonomy. The psychiatrist’s position rests on choosing an appropriate, informed process for ECT, 
which hinges on one’s interpretations of available literature regarding the safety and effectiveness of the 
procedure. Due to personal interpretation of literature, different psychiatrists are likely to have widely 
discrepant views concerning ‘appropriate’ informed consent. For patients who have lost a portion of their 
decision-making skills due to mental illness, where are the limits of informed consent? The concept of consent 
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may take on different meanings depending on whether the approach is medical, legal, philosophical, or ethical 
and whether it is given for the benefit of a third party (Beloucif, 2013). Beyond the previously addressed issue, 
regarding the lack of empirical knowledge on the mechanism of action of ECT lays the concept of the 
‘implications of consent’. If a mentally ill person lacks the ability to understand the implications of ECT, a truly 
autonomous decision cannot be made and consent cannot be gained. In addition, if an overt or covert threat 
of involuntary treatment is present, then there can be no truly autonomous decision made. This point has 
been recognised and documented by authors working within this specialised field of psychiatric healthcare.18 
(A point I discussed in chapter three).  
When examining informed consent within psychiatry, it is evident that a number of assumptions are made 
when determining whether to use ECT. Firstly, the patient giving consent to the treatment that there is a 
reasonable chance of the patient getting better. The second assumption is that consenting to the procedure 
will not impose excessive risk to the patient. Lastly, it is assumed  that consent is gained every time, as consent 
given at the start of treatment should not be the final exchange on the issue and should be re-examined 
repeatedly. These problems with communication can be overcome and there are ways to communicate all that 
which a reasonable person would wish to know. These assumptions must be challenged to examine whether 
consent within ECT actually possible. I argue that gaining informed consent for ECT is not possible, and explore 
this point by asking and answering a series of questions throughout the chapter. Questions addressed are as 
follows: Has an explanation of ECT been given? Is it understandable to patients, and has it been understood by 
patients? Who is recommending ECT and why is it the treatment of choice? How much information has been 
given on the risks and benefits of both anaesthesia and the treatment itself? Lastly, have any other alternative 
treatments been proposed? After addressing these questions, I conclude that patient information needs to 
improve, as existing guidelines and practice falls short of the ethical dictum of patient autonomy. Lastly, it 
must then follow that a patient who lacks sufficient knowledge about the potential risks and benefits of a 
proposed treatment should not be expected to accept or refuse treatment or to be held fully responsible for 
the decision and its consequences. In the following section, I examine what I believe constitutes a violation of 
consent within psychiatry, which I believe will open doors of discussion on the law, paternalism, and best 
interests.  
                                                          
18 Breeding (2000); Ross (2006).    
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Section 4.2:  Violation of consent within psychiatry.  
Consent is often violated within psychiatry in a number of ways, and these violations have consequences. I 
build on work done by John Breeding (2000), who explains the many ways in which informed consent within 
psychiatry is violated. I refer to Breeding’s work because he became a world-renowned speaker on 
‘electroconvulsive therapy survivors’ and his book The Wildest Colts make the Best Horses (1996) is a forceful 
challenge to the use of stimulant drugs with millions of children. Informed consent is violated when healthcare 
providers minimize the risks of ECT, when ECT is used as the treatment of choice before safer methods, and 
when the patient is vulnerable to coercion.  
My first argument revolves around the mind-set of denial and minimisation of the harmful effects of ECT. By 
ignoring these risks, many within psychiatry claim that ECT is a safe procedure and that the benefits far 
outweigh the risks. The American Psychiatric Association (APA, 1990) states that the death rate for ECT is 
“approximately one per 10,000 patients treated” but goes on to say that statistics collected by the Texas 
Mental Health department between 1993 and 1996 show that the rate is 50 times higher. In the United 
Kingdom, the statistics parallel the Texas study (Eranti & Mcloughlin, 2003). The ethical downside of not being 
able to answer truthfully to any question posed by a patient receiving this treatment regarding mechanism and 
long term after effects ,and in recent years, the question of permanently disabling memory loss following ECT 
has become a concern. Although post-ECT amnesia has generally been demonstrated to be transient, this 
report raises the possibility that in occasional instances, the patient may experience permanent memory loss 
(Andre, 2009). We need to ask, is there sufficient evidence about such memory loss to require psychiatrists to 
inform their patient of this possible consequence of ECT? At what level of statistical frequency does it become 
necessary to mention such a risk to a patient? Does the sharing of such information constitute a risk in itself? 
The dictum now in English law imposes a duty on the doctor to inform his or her patient of real risks inherent 
in the proposed treatment. Firstly my argument about ‘inherent risks’ is that these risks are often played down 
unless a patient specifically asks about a particular risk. The doctor is obliged to give a full disclosure (to 
disclose all the details of a problem, which are known) and the onus is on the healthcare provider and not with 
the patient (NICE, 2003). 
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 Secondly, I argue that informed consent exists in name only. In reality, often-minimal information is given and 
guidelines for the administration of ECT are routinely and systematically violated. ECT has become the 
treatment of choice for a number of psychiatric conditions instead of being last resort after less invasive 
treatments have been tried (Ottosson & Fink, 2004). Thirdly, ECT should only be considered when alternative 
pharmacological and/or psychotherapeutic treatments have been given an adequate trial without efficacious 
response. Lastly, more research data exists on the efficacy and side effects of pharmacological and/or 
psychotherapeutic treatments than the efficacy of ECT (NICE, 2003). Because of this, benefits and risks are 
more difficult to calculate when considering ECT than when considering pharmacological and/or 
psychotherapeutic treatments. When a patient is non-responsive to other treatments, factors such as the 
severity of the illness, its natural course, and the risk of other treatments worsening the course (for example, 
anti-depressant medications precipitating a manic episode) need to be taken into account. 
 My third argument takes into account the vulnerable position that patients find themselves in when 
considering ECT. The thorny issue of coercion can play a part when healthcare providers consider the ethical 
obligation to provide patients with enough information to make an informed decision. Healthcare providers 
should provide all information relevant to a patient’s current situation, addressing the treatment in question 
and their condition in general.  
We must consider how much information is sufficient and if a lack of information is a type of coercion, some 
would propose that just enough information is given to ‘get the patient to say yes’. However, decisions are 
made from professional perspectives and most are done in an unbiased way. The art of gaining consent is not 
to give too much information, creating an ‘information overload’, but to gauge how much information is 
needed to make an informed choice. In any caring relationship, healthcare providers are trying to ‘get the 
patient to trust the healthcare providers in order to deliver treatment and care. My viewpoint mirrors Andre 
(2009) in that patients who are prescribed ECT often are reluctant to ask about alternatives. Therefore, 
because of the severity of their illness, and not posing relevant questions the tendency to prescribe ECT first is 
increased.  
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Section 4.3: Conceptual Discussion: Distinguishing the legal and moral concepts of informed consent. 
To validate my argument surrounding informed consent, it is necessary to distinguish between the legal 
doctrine of informed consent and the various moral principles of informed consent. ECT and informed consent 
has been treated as a moral principle in biomedical ethics, but we cannot conflate this role with the legal 
understanding of informed consent. Within the UK, legal principles of informed consent were created by the 
courts dealing with battery and with medical malpractice within the context of negligence of the law.19  I am 
primarily concerned with the justification and ethical ramifications of informed consent as a moral principle. 
The justification, which I give, constitutes a partial justification of a legal principle, but a full justification will 
not be discussed here due to space constraints. Following that statement, whether in its legal or moral 
manifestation, a principle of informed consent will provide that, with certain exceptions, a patient is not to be 
subjected to a medical procedure, including tests and experiments, unless the patient knows the relevant facts 
concerning the procedure and consents to the procedure in light of that knowledge (Gunderson, 1990). This 
concept is almost impossible to achieve within psychiatry when dealing with issues of consent around ECT with 
mentally ill patients. However, to make this claim we must pursue the question of what actually constitutes 
consent.  
 Consent is defined as “to give permission” and “acceptance or approval of what is planned or done by 
another” (D.O.H, 2009), I mention frequently the term of ‘valid informed consent’. For consent to be valid 
there is a basic tenet in the law of trespass that, to consent to a medical intervention, the patient should know 
in broad terms in a ‘full disclosure’ format, outlining what is involved and to be expected. For informed 
consent to be ethically valid, is must be maximally autonomous, which occurs when there are no apparent 
defects in a patient’s ability to control desires or actions, their reasoning, or their ability to understand the 
information upon which their choices are made (Harris, 1985). A theme in this chapter is the concept of 
coercion and its implications for informed consent. Patients suffering from a mental illness should not be 
singled out as different for the very nature of their illness, but this often occurs when they are coerced into 
ECT treatment. The voluntary aspect of consent is meant to ensure that patients are not coerced into 
participation and are free to withdraw from treatment at any time. Within psychiatry, patients with mental 
                                                          
19 Kennedy and Grub (2000); Mason and McCall (2006); Dinmond (2008); Brazier and Cave (2011). 
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illness are particularly vulnerable to coercion because of the severity of their illness and often have had no or 
little experience in exercising their rights. Whilst researching for this thesis, I came across two authors who 
were looking at this problem within their own countries. Jacob & Rajan (1991) made the point that: ECT has 
been given a special status among treatments and hence requires special consent according to the law of the 
Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007]. Although informed consent and true voluntarisms are ‘ideals’, they 
are rarely attained as such decisions contain an element of coercion ranging from subtle to overt (Jacob & 
Rajan 1991.p. 576). Informed consent to any medical treatment  represents a mutual agreement between the 
practitioner and the patient, the validity of this agreement requiring that the consent be informed, rational, 
voluntary and competent (Fisher, 2002). Many psychiatric patients have been placed in a vulnerable position 
where they are unable to understand the potential risks, benefits, and alternative options to ECT and have 
been subjected to coercion. Numerous articles have been written about coercion in psychiatry,20 and a 
number of authors make the point that coercion is justified in order to prevent disorientation, to protect the 
patient from harm, and to protect others (Kaltiala-Heino et al. 2001; Cowman et al. 2001; Olsen, 2001). Those 
who coerce patients argue that their actions are justified because they are doing something to the patient in 
the name of therapy or treatment. The use of coercive treatment violates the two universal principles of 
liberty and autonomy. Liberty is defined as the condition of being free from restriction or control, and the right 
and power to act, believe, or express oneself in a manner of one's own choosing (Bloch & Chodoff, 1991). 
Respect for autonomy is grounded in liberty because the healthcare provider accepts the obligation to do good 
for the patient, but the patient is an autonomous agent who defines what is best for them. In forced or 
coercive treatment, liberty is denied by restricting the patient’s choice. Due to experience and training, a 
psychiatrist can state that they are in a better position to predict a patient’s prognosis. Nevertheless, it is a thin 
line between prognosis and future judgements of value and possible mental states of the patient, on which 
they base this better position to prescribe a treatment with unknown long-term effects. Earlier, I posed the 
question of whether valid consent can be achieved from a mentally ill patient for ECT. As shown by this 
discussion of coerced treatment, true consent must be voluntary—the patient must choose freely without the 
overt or covert pressures from others affecting the autonomy of the patient. I will therefore confine the use of 
                                                          
20 Not used: Dolan (1997); Erikson and Westrin (1995); Haglund et al., (2003); O’Brian and Golding (2003);          
Taxis (2002). 
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conditions necessary for informed consent to those patients who are unable to make an informed decision 
because of their mental illness, rather than mentally ill patients who refuse ECT logically and with sound mind. 
Staden and Kruger (2009) suggest the following conditions be put in place.  
• A mental illness should not prevent a patient from understanding what he/she consents to. 
• A mental illness should not prevent a patient from choosing decisively for/against the intervention. 
• A mental illness should not prevent a patient from communicating his/her consent (presuming that at least 
reasonable steps have been taken to understand the patient’s communication if present at all).  
• A mental illness should not prevent a patient from accepting the need for medical intervention.                                                     
 
The key point is that patients must receive relevant information to enable choice. In certain situations when 
the patient refuses or is unable to give consent or sign the consent form, it becomes necessary for the 
treatment to be given against the patient’s wishes. In cases like these, a second opinion doctor will assess the 
patient. If they feel that the treatment is warranted then the treatment will be given, irrespective of the 
patient’s views. I argue that ECT is often used without consent too soon; before the patient is extremely 
suicidal or so physically debilitated that, he or she may die from uncontrollable behaviour or medical 
complications if treatment is not initiated (Kradecki & Tarkinow, 1992).  
Section 4.4: Conceptual Discussions: Systematic analysis of the concepts of consent. 
The importance of this section is to highlights the different versions of consent, with different theorists using 
different meanings to defend their position. When Miller & Wertheimer edited their latest version of the 
Ethics of Consent (2009), many asked if the medical community really needed another book on informed 
consent (Dresser, 2011). Miller & Wertheimer (2009) answer was yes for two valid reasons; firstly, ‘despite 
considerable literature on consent in different contexts, there is surprisingly little systematic analysis of the 
concept of consent and the moral and legal work that performs it’ (Miller & Wertheimer, 2009, p 5). Secondly, 
they point out ‘those bioethicists sometimes write as if the concept and principle of informed consent was first 
developed for their purposes (Miller & Wertheimer, 2009). These authors offer an analysis that expands the 
conventional view that valid consent is the element that makes an action morally permissible. In their view, 
valid consent transactions must be ‘morally transformative’ (p. 79). To meet this standard, consent 
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transactions must incorporate more than valid individual consent. The background conditions for a transaction 
determine whether the consent is morally transformative. In Miller & Wertheimer’s book, Joffe & Truog 
extend this ‘fair transaction’ concept of consent. They claim it is the physician’s fiduciary obligation that 
constitutes the background condition for a morally transformative consent to medical intervention. Through 
exploring the fiduciary of the doctor – patient relationship, Joffe and Truog (2010) develop an approach to 
discerning which medical decisions require individual patient consent and which decisions physicians may 
defensibly make without consulting their patients. In Kuflicks (2010) work on ‘Hypothetical Consent,’ Kuflick’s 
explores two areas in which consent is used to justify medical decisions. One is treatment decision making for 
incapacitated patients where the substituted judgement standard is often invoked to support a choice to 
administer or forgo a particular medical intervention (Kuflicks, 2010). This is similar to when surrogate 
decisions are made for those with mental illness in the ‘best interest’ of the patients. Secondly, Kuflicks 
described is the ‘thank you theory of medical ethics’ in which a health intervention is imposed on the grounds 
that an individual will later appreciate and ‘retrospectively consent’ to that intervention. In my view, the 
underlying argument against this concept of what Kuflicks presents is, I have (and concede to this point in my 
experience) been presented with patients who consented and say that ECT has been beneficial for them, at the 
initial outset. However, only for them to return to ill-health and state apparent side effects, which  far 
outweighed the treatment and illness for what they were treated. It must follow from this that positing the 
existence of a ‘beneficial treatment’ of unknown action raises as many problems as it purports to solve, and so 
the argument to use ECT or not leaves us in no better position than when it found us.  
Section 4.5: Conceptual Discussion: The Quality of Consent and Autonomy.   
In this section, I hope to recognise the significance of a person’s authority over his or her own body, which is 
central to moral reflections around consent regarding ECT. A patient should be allowed freedom of choice over 
his or her mind, which is central to maintaining personal integrity. Here relevant moral considerations can be 
gathered under three general rubrics; firstly, the authority to be secure against unauthorised touching or 
battery; secondly a liberty interest and an acknowledgement of the value of autonomy and thirdly a general 
patients best interests concern (Cherry, 2010.p 789). I highlight two main arguments that have predominated 
in previous years and receive respect to this day. The first concept concentrates on free actions, and was 
advocated for by Faden and Beauchamp. These authors focus on autonomous actions and characterise 
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autonomy in terms of a liberty model, in which an agent acts autonomously only when he or she acts 
intentionally, with understanding, and without controlling influences (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986, p. 238). 
These authors outline how they derive the standard of informed consent from the principle of respect for 
autonomy, which they describe as the principle that ‘persons should be free to choose and act without 
controlling restraints imposed by others’ (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986.p.8). As a rebuttal, I argue that the 
analysis given by Fadden & Beauchamp fails to take into account the difference in roles between the patient 
and the physician, especially within psychiatry. Firstly, the psychiatrist is forced to divulge information, which 
he or she may believe is better, undisclosed, such as recognised side effects of ECT and the unknown 
mechanism of action. Second, if the patient decides to withhold consent, this may compel the psychiatrist to 
actively pursue other avenues and refrain from engaging in alternatives. Fadden and Beauchamp’s argument 
fails to justify a principle of informed consent based on autonomy. This is because the principle of autonomy 
they provide fails to account for the fact that informed consent should increase the autonomy of the patient 
by restricting the autonomy of the physician (Gunderson, 1990). In addition, their argument allows physicians 
to perform procedures on patients when consent obtained has been gained but when the patient has not been 
given complete information about the treatment or procedure (Gunderson, 1990). Full information would 
enable the patient to make his or her wishes known. I return to Miller & Wertheimer as an alternative to the 
above theories. They believe that ‘autonomous authorisation’ is not ideal and it does not do justice to 
transactional fairness and present their ‘fair transaction’ model of consent. Although the ‘fair transaction’ 
model applies clearly too clinical research, many of its principles can be utilised within psychiatry. In their 
explanation of the ‘fair transaction’ model of consent, they discuss the function and value of consent from a 
narrative perspective. Their reasons are that consent, when valid, is a transaction between two or more 
people that generates ‘moral transformation’. A major function of consent is to ‘make permissible conduct 
that would be impermissible’ without consent (Miller & Wertheimer, 2011, p. 203). Their next point is that 
consent should be ‘morally transformative’ by virtue of creating rights and obligations. Any adequate theory of 
consent must provide guidance as to when a person’s token of consent is valid and when it is morally 
transformative. Consider the following example: if a (healthcare provider) coerces B (patient) or deceives B 
about a material issue relating to a transaction between them (honesty about ECT), then B may express 
consent, but that consent will not be valid. It then becomes obvious that B’s mere expression of consent is not 
sufficient to render A’s action permissible. Their view is that ‘morally transformative’ consent not only must 
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protect the patient’s rights and interests of consenters, it must give those who solicit consent fair notice of 
what they need to do in order to gain valid consent and therefore avoid wrongful interaction with others 
(Miller & Wertheimer, 2011, p. 204).  
Attempts to qualify the word ‘consent’ with terms implying that the subject has to have a full and proper 
understanding of a proposed treatment first appeared in 1946 with the appearance of the Nuremburg Code on 
medical experimentation. The code outlined fundamental principles aimed at the protection of human 
subjects for the first time in history, and included the prohibition of research on children or incapacitated 
adults. The Nuremberg Code (1946) details what information patients’ must be given for a person to know if 
he or she is to give consent: a full explanation of the nature and duration of a procedure, as well as sufficient 
knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter. A patient must also be aware of 
purpose, method and means, inconveniences, and possible hazards and effects upon their health or person 
(Nuremberg Code, 1946). The code clearly articulates the requirement on the part of the person making the 
decision. Other examples of abusive practices, which violate informed consent, show parallels to the 
discussion I put forward about ECT used in an experimental way. In 1932, the Tuskegee Syphilis Study began 
(Moon 2008). Two hundred black men diagnosed with syphilis were never told of their illness, were denied 
treatment in the interests of human experimentation, and were used as human guinea pigs to examine the 
disease. All subjected died from syphilis, and their families never told that they could have been treated. In 
1940, 400 prisoners in Chicago were infected with Malaria in order to study the effects of new and 
experimental drugs to combat the disease. Nazi doctors, later on trial at Nuremberg (1947), cited American 
studies to defend their own actions during the Holocaust. Consider the following paradox: it can be argued the 
effectiveness of ECT has been demonstrated within limited populations: non-consenting patients and those 
whose consent may not be valid. However, for the research hypothesis to validate the findings and to 
demonstrate effectiveness, a key variable, which is lack of information to validate consent, could not ethically 
be included, due to the lack of empirical evidence. Therefore, ECT ethically should not be carried out on this 
group of patients. Why, because also it is questionable whether individuals with mental illnesses are the best 
judges of their own best interests, bringing together long standing moral and jurisprudential considerations 
that establishes as an authority over themselves to make important decisions of this nature. Such a judgement 
‘recognises the difficulty as to what it means to choose correctly in a secular, moral pluralistic society’ (Cherry, 
2010, p. 791). It must follow that such a judgement recognises the dilemma of the divergent understanding 
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meaning of beneficent action. Because of the different understandings of the good life and what, actually 
counts as doing that which is good, general bioethics cannot simply comprehend beneficence as the ‘Golden 
Rule’ (Cherry, 2010, p. 791). I move on now to the second conception of autonomy that has prevailed in the 
field, addressed by, Gerald Dworkin. Dworkin characterises autonomy in terms of an authenticity model in 
which persons are autonomous when their first order preferences are in line with their rational second order 
preferences. His definition of informed consent is derived from a principle of autonomy as ‘the capacity to 
reflect upon ones motivational structure and to make changes in that structure’ (Dworkin, 1988, p. 108). Any 
justification of a principle of informed consent must consider the fact that patient autonomy sometimes 
conflicts with the autonomy of the physician and that principles of informed consent secure the patients 
autonomy by limiting the autonomy of the physician. I challenge Dworkin’s position on respecting autonomy 
between the physician and the patient when he discusses first and second order preferences. Dworkin 
characterises autonomous persons as persons who have the capacity to reflect critically upon their first order 
preferences to enable a decision within second order preferences (Dworkin, 1988, p. 109). Dworkin’s definition 
of consent does not address what it means to respect a person’s autonomy. When we prevent a patient from 
acting on his or her first order preferences, which correspond to second older preferences, formed under 
critical reflection, we diminish autonomy. Similarly, we diminish autonomy when we treat a patient in a way 
that reduces that person’s capacity to reflect critically on their preferences. Here, there is a conflict between 
the autonomy of the psychiatrist and the autonomy of the patient: the patient fails to consent to the ECT, 
which may thwart the psychiatrist’s first orders preferences, just as the psychiatrist may thwart similar 
preferences of the patient by failing to secure the informed consent of the patient (Gunderson, 1990). It would 
seem that Dworkin’s conception of autonomy does not provide an adequate basis for a principle of informed 
consent because it fails to account for the way in which principles of informed consent give preference to the 
autonomy of the patient.   
Section 4.6: Conceptual Discussion: Consent, Assent and Critical Engagement: Professional and Inter-
professional relationships.  
The relationship between a patient and their healthcare provider creates issues around consent that have 
implications for effective healthcare. In a successful patient-provider relationship, both the patient and 
provider should collaborate in a continuing process intended to advance the patients best interests, both in 
their health and their right to self-determination. Although it is still a matter of controversy, consent is central 
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to patient-provider relationships as well as central to healthcare overall. While this may seem good in theory, I 
highlight weakness of this relationship and claim that there is tension between theory and practice relating to 
informed consent in the patient-provider relationship. This has given rise to a lack of clarity about and 
application of theory to practice. I believe (as do others)21 that this prevailing thinking about patient-provider 
relationships, especially within the arena of mental health care, is flawed. Two things are of particular interest 
when considering consent. The first is why some people may be looked at as being unable to give consent, and 
the second is the phenomenon of medical paternalism. I start by looking at the issue of assent to treatment, 
which states that if a conception of autonomy is accepted, then treatment decisions ultimately remain with 
the patient. Before the use of modified ECT and the use of muscle relaxants with ECT, persons who sustained 
fractures and other injuries during ECT brought several lawsuits. The allegations were that the patient was 
negligently managed during ECT or was not given full facts. In the case of Bolam v Frien H.M.C. [1957], Mr 
Bolam was diagnosed as a manic-depressive and prescribed ECT. Unknown to Mr Bolam was that the 
treatment could cause seizures and that the likelihood of fractures was very high. Restraints were available, 
but were not given to Mr Bolam and he suffered severe fractures of the pelvis, after which he sued the 
hospital. The doctor failed to tell a patient about the risk of fractures being sustained in the course of ECT, but 
the judicial system held that he could not be criticised if he was acting within current medical practice. 
Following Justice McNair’s direction to the jury, Mr Bolam lost the case. A critical passage in the judge’s 
direction regarding the amount of information provided to the patient was as follows: 
“The doctor is not guilty of negligence if he acted in accordance with the practice accepted as proper 
by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art … Putting it the other way round, a man is 
not negligent if he is acting in accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a body of opinion which 
would take a contrary view” (Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, in Griffith 
and Tengnah, 2008, p.86).  
The courts took the view that fractures and dislocations were acceptable as inevitable risks of ECT. If proper 
indications for the use of ECT were present and standard precautions were taken, the injured person had no 
grounds for complaint. Moreover, the courts in ECT cases were unwilling to apply the doctrine of ‘res ipsa 
                                                          
21 Appelbaum et al (1982), Reisner (2003), Sreenivasan (2003), Fetterman and Ying (2011), Gazdag et al (2012). 
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loquitor’ a rule, which permits a plaintiff’s cases to go to the jury even though the plaintiff does not introduce 
expert testimony relating to the defendant’s alleged negligence.   
The most striking manifestation of this was in the change, which came about in Chester v Afshar (2004). Carol 
Chester underwent a spinal operation that carried a 1%-2% risk of cauda equine syndrome. After she 
developed the syndrome, it was established that she had been warned of the possibility. The court voted in 
her favour. The surgeon appealed, but by a majority of three to two, the House of Lords upheld the decision. 
The defence argued that even if she had been warned she still would have had the operation. However, in this 
case, the traditional rule of causation (which would have required the claimant to show that she if she had 
been warned, she would not have undergone the operation) was waived, as the majority of the judges felt that 
the right to self-determination was fundamental. Self-determination, or the right of every person to decide or 
determine the course of his/her life, is a presumption of English law and a critical value of nursing. In a 
healthcare context, self-determination means that every competent adult has the liberty to consent or refuse 
a medical treatment (ibid). The self-determination of health care consumers is intrinsically connected to 
informed consent policies, procedures, and practices of healthcare providers. Informed consent is the ethical 
doctrine and legal procedure that embodies the value of self-determination and provides necessary action. 
Informed consent has become a more stringent requirement in the provision of health care in recent years 
(Maclean, 2005). There is a great deal of debate over what exceptions should be made, what information must 
be given to the patient, and when a patient is competent to provide informed consent (Gunderson, 1990). 
How these disputes are settled depends on how the principle is justified. Further, different arguments 
justifying principles of informed rely on the different conceptions of autonomy (Beauchamp, 2009). Many find 
it difficult to agree as to what represents adequately informed consent (Reisener, 2003). Clinical psychologists, 
psychiatrists other healthcare professionals are currently working towards ensuring that patient-led research 
provides that consent procedures and consent forms give a true reflection of up to date data. Ensuring that 
what healthcare providers tell patients adequately reflects findings from studies would help make sure that 
ECT patients gain an array of different perspectives.   
Space does not allow permit me a full discussion of these factors but it is worth noting that these complex 
concepts can be made accessible by using such simplistic terms. Therefore, let me quickly challenge a position 
that psychiatrists put forward in the ‘last resort argument’ where they feel that ECT is the last hope that the 
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patient has left in their care. By making this statement, what they are actually saying is in fact that by ECT 
being a last resort treatment, we are actually taking away the patients’ power and forcing them into a decision 
out of desperation. However, it is not clear how ‘last resort ‘is defined or what level of distress or risk someone 
should be experiencing to warrant a ‘last resort’. Believing ECT is a ‘last resort’ impacts on patients’ 
perceptions of their choice to consent, as in the study by Johnstone (1999). The premise is that patients felt 
unable to decline ECT because of the belief that other options had been exhausted. This represents an implicit 
pressure to agree to ECT. If we do not accept the premise of this argument, we do not have to accept its 
conclusion, no matter how clearly the conclusion follows from the premise. My rebuttal is what then becomes 
of patients, if they are one of those, who do not respond to ECT if this is their ‘last resort’? Therefore, I 
personally do not accept their arguments’ conclusion because it does not follow from its premise. Why, 
because mental illness is not a terminal illness, therefore terminology like ‘last resort’ takes away hope and 
should not be used. We can research and look for treatments as long as the patients necessitates, often over 
tens of years.   
I have emphasised that ECT has to be a major consideration when the only avenue left open for the patient is 
death. This I have emphasised is the rare occasion where death is likely without ECT (for example, a depressed 
patient who refuses to eat or the patient is actively seeking a suicidal act), therefore my choice is either life 
over death, in this case I will always choose life. The obligation of securing consent arises both to meet the 
appropriate standards of care (negligence) and to avoid liability in battery (trespass to the person) (Mason & 
McCall, 2006). Even if it were possible to ensure that disclosure could be neutral, ‘this will not solve the 
problems that arise from misunderstandings’ of information (Schneider, 1998, p. 59). While the information 
may be disclosed in a non-directive way, it will not necessarily be received in that way. If information is 
misperceived, then the patient’s ability to make a rational decision is effectively undermined. If autonomy 
involves some degree of rationality, rather than self-determination, and if healthcare professionals have a duty 
to respect patient autonomy, ‘then this should require some attempt to enable the patient to understand the 
information disclosed’; autonomy requires knowledge not information’ (Maclean, 2006). It is the role of the 
healthcare provider to assess the patient’s understanding and avoid their misunderstanding of information 
given.  
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4.6.1 Patient Capacity.  
This section examines whether the current legal test for capacity protects the autonomous patient or gives too 
much leeway for paternalistic action. Unless a psychiatric patient is truly incompetent because of the severity 
of their illness, non-consensual psychiatric treatment violates the foundational principles of medical 
jurisprudence and secular bioethics. The weight of this moral and jurisprudential tradition establishes patients 
as an authority over themselves and as the presumed authoritative judge of their own best interests in 
deciding what clinical care is beneficial for them (Cherry, 2010). The legal concept of capacity is that touching a 
patient without consent is recognised as battery or assault (Kennedy & Grub, 2000). For consent to be legally 
valid, it must be given freely by someone with decision-making capacity. It follows that when a competent 
patient refuses treatment, under law; their decision must be respected, even if it appears irrational or could 
place their life at risk (Halliday, 2009). 
The Mental Capacity Act (2005) states that a patient must be presumed to have capacity unless there is 
evidence otherwise. This statute provides guidance on assessing capacity and acting in the best interests of 
those who lack capacity with the fundamental aim of ‘balancing’ rights of the potentially vulnerable with their 
protection. The act makes it clear that if a patient is considered to lack capacity following assessment, they 
should still be involved in the decision-making process as far as possible; thus enhancing their ability to 
exercise autonomy. There may be doubt over a patient’s capacity if the functioning of the mind or brain is 
impaired or disturbed in some way. To conclude that a patient lacks capacity to consent or refuse treatment, it 
must be shown that the patient is unable to understand, retain, and/or weigh the costs and benefits of the 
information regarding a potential treatment (Mental Capacity Act, 2005).   
The provisions of the Mental Capacity Act (2005) represent a triumph of the right to self-determination over 
the paternalistic stance taken by doctors. However, the Mental Capacity Act (2005) is not rigorous enough to 
protect those who suffer from mental illness. The Mental Capacity Act (2005) plays second fiddle to the Mental 
Health Act (1983) [2007 revised] because a patient can undergo treatment without consenting if their 
capability to decide on treatment is compromised by an irrational belief. The Department of Health Guidelines 
on consent to examination (2009) state that when a decision, which appears irrational, is based on a 
misconception of reality, it can be concluded that the patient is unable to comprehend the information and 
therefore lacks capacity. However, the “irrationality” of decisions and even “misconceptions of reality” are 
largely subjective, and some personal or religious beliefs may seem unreasonable to a doctor but make perfect 
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sense to the patient. A patient who has demonstrated capacity in previous decisions may state, that ‘I don’t 
want ECT; it destroys my personality and takes away my part of my soul. I want to leave this world with 
everything I came into it with’ can be argued is able to pass the test for capacity and has a valid point where 
their healthcare is concerned. The middle ground is to recognise the relevance of both the patient’s autonomy 
and the ethical and legal judgement of the healthcare provider. This requires that consent be seen as both a 
state of mind and an act of communication (Malm, 1996). The doctor’s duty is to ‘balance’ requirements 
necessary to allow a patient to exercise their autonomy with the need that the duty is reasonable (Maclean, 
2005). Autonomy should provide the driving force behind consent and should demand that the doctor give 
particular attention to the patient’s informational needs.   
I understand the position healthcare providers put forward when discussing ‘balancing’ and margin-for-error 
approaches, which allow that the patient is legally competent to make a decision. One drawback of the 
balancing approach to competence, according to Checkland (2001), is that it leaves no room for incompetent 
wishes that should nevertheless be respected (p.35). Whatever qualities of a person lead us to respect their 
autonomy does not disappear when the patient becomes legally incompetent. In proposing the ‘balance 
model’ Eastman & Hope (1988) argue in favour of a ‘trade off’ between considerations of competence of the 
patient to decide whether or not to do a procedure. What Eastman & Hope claim is that as the danger of a 
procedure increases, the patient must be increasingly competent for their decision to be respected. They also 
suggest an outside agent, such as a doctor, judge, or close relative should determine the consequences 
because their views have an ‘ethical significance’. It is based on the syllogism: If treatment were beneficial, it 
would be unreasonable to refuse it. Competent patients’ do not make unreasonable decisions; therefore, the 
patient is not competent (Maclean, 2005).  
There are two main problems with the above argument. Firstly, what the doctor sees as beneficial may not be 
seen as beneficial from a patient’s view. A patient who admits to having relief from acute depression after ECT 
but loses part of their capacity to remember may have a different viewpoint than their doctor. There is a stark 
contrast in viewing a treatment, which gives some relief from their mental illness and loss of function of 
memory. The second problem is that ‘competent’ patients do make wrong and sometimes unreasonable 
decisions. As Maclean (2005) says, ‘if we were all perfectly rational agents then all our decisions would be 
correct and reasonable’ (p. 285). However, having perfect rationality is unrealistic; all that should be expected 
of a patient is ‘minimal rationality’ (Cherniak, 1986). Essentially, ‘minimal rationality’ requires that only some 
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decisions match with the agent’s value and belief system. Incompetence would not follow from an isolated 
irrational decision. The position that psychiatrists put forward is that mentally ill patients are not able to 
consent freely because of the nature of their illness, but I refute this claim. Having a mental disorder does not 
necessarily prevent a patient from accepting their illness and their need for psychiatric care/intervention. 
Many patients, including those suffering from psychotic illnesses, do accept their illness. While some may not 
realise the full extent of their illness, they can still give informed consent. If the patient’s acceptance of the 
need for a medical intervention is not prevented by their mental disorder, is a condition necessary for 
informed consent. If any patient were to agree to treatment when they did not believe that the treatment was 
warranted or necessary, this would cast serious doubt as to whether that patient had actually given informed 
consent.  
My defence here is as follows; consider a severely depressed patient who has been prescribed ECT and suffers 
from Cotard’s delusions, which means they believe that they are already dead. Because of this, they consider 
treatment to futile. The patient understands that they are consenting to ECT, and communicates their decision 
to proceed at the advice of their psychiatrist. This patient meets the three conditions necessary for informed 
consent to ECT. However, they would still not be capable of giving informed consent. The capacity to make 
decisions is required for someone to give informed consent, but informed consent requires more than capacity 
to make decisions. It requires that the mental disorder does not prevent ‘actual understanding’ of treatment, 
rather than a mere capacity to understand (Staden & Kruger, 2002). Following this, note that the incapacity to 
give informed consent extends to incapacity to give informed consent for medical interventions. Consider a 
patient who agrees to a medical intervention for a life-threatening condition, but their mental illness prevents 
them from understanding the nature and purpose of the treatment/intervention. This prevents them from 
communicating their consent, despite all practical steps to help them understand. One would be mistaken to 
claim that the patient’s assent to the intervention would constitute valid informed consent. Due to their 
mental disorder, they do not meet the conditions necessary for informed consent.  
O’Neil (2000) opens up another avenue for consideration when she discusses the reasoning model of consent 
and patient empowerment, which involves advocating for oneself to participate maximally in significant 
decisions. I will not address recognitional and constructive models of consent due to space constraints, but 
both have their advantages and disadvantages. That said patient disempowerment is an issue when discussing 
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consent. A reasonable compromise would be to examine O’Neil’s position—that one’s individual ability to 
reason must be judged against, ends, norms, or commitments that are accessible to others (O’Neil, 2000). 
O’Neil’s position is that reasoning is defective when reasoners misjudge or misunderstand information. She 
emphasises the role of patient empowerment and makes the point that the purpose of the consent 
requirement is to provide ‘reasonable assurance that the patient ... has not been deceived or coerced’ (O’Neil, 
2000, p. 26- 27). In her later work, O’Neil is quick to admit that the mere signing of the consent form may not 
in itself provide reasonable assurance, but does point out that this model of rationality allows an individual’s 
decision to be challenged. If respect for autonomy means assisting the patient to make the best decision, then 
a duty to respect autonomy requires the patient’s decision to be challenged (O’Neil, 2002, p. 5). O’Neil’s 
position varies over time. In 2000, she says we are to assure enough information is used so as not to deceive or 
coerce the patient into signing the consent form. However, in 2002 she makes the statement that ‘... the 
inclusion of excessive or technical detail ... will eventually overtax even the most energetic and undermine the 
possibility of informed consent (p 60.) I challenge the latter viewpoint, as some patients wish for more 
information than others do, and the amount that an individual patient can comprehend varies. O’Neil says that 
by challenging the patient decision and presenting alternative options, the healthcare provider may facilitate 
reflection. Furthermore, although the notion of best decision must be determined by the patient’s subjective 
values, the patient may still make an irrational decision, which might be corrected by the physician. O’Neil 
accessible ends model requires a patient’s irrational decision to be confronted and rational argument used to 
reach a position that is mutually accessible. O’Neil’s model does not require the assessor to agree with the 
person’s decision, but the assessor should appreciate that someone with different beliefs could make such a 
decision (Maclean, 2006). O’Neil highlights a further problem in her discussion of the ‘opacity’ of consent: 
suppose that a patient consents to a procedure, A which logically entails B and has the consequence C. If the 
patient, for whatever reason, cannot understand the connection between A, B, and C, they have not given 
informed consent to B or C. While these connections may be obvious to healthcare provider, these providers 
should not assume that a patient would make the same connection. In the Alder Hey case, for example, some 
parents consented to the retention of tissue from their children but did not believe they were consenting to 
the removal of organs (Royal Liverpool Children’s Hospital, 2001, O’Neil, 2003).  
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Therefore, my position is that patients may retain decisional capacity even if they are somewhat impaired. 
Informed capacity requires more than mere capacity; it requires that a mental disorder does not prevent 
‘actual’ understanding of what is being consented to (rather than a capacity to understand). Whichever model 
of rationality is adopted, respect for a person’s autonomy requires the healthcare provider to challenge an 
apparently irrational decision in an attempt to reach a more rational choice. Arguably, it also requires an 
apparently rational decision to be challenged. However, some decisions require a choice between options 
where more than one choice is rational. This position still reflects the argument that autonomy provides the 
driving force behind consent and demands the healthcare provider address the patient’s informational needs. I 
take my lead on the last point from Maclean, who has written numerous works on the legality of consent. 
Having a decision based on empirical evidence, which supports the decision-making process is important when 
determining what people should do. The law supports decisions based on ‘fact’. This means that empirical 
evidence is the only way of discovering what information should be disclosed (Maclean, 2005). It would 
perhaps limit the patient’s self-determination and undermine their autonomy if the doctor’s duty was limited 
to disclosure of rationally required information. As the mentally ill patient may not be fully able to understand 
everything, their informational needs may be irrational. In these cases, it becomes less helpful to try to 
constrain them by rational normative judgements. Whilst autonomy is still a valid principle, patients should be 
entitled to decide how much autonomy they wish to exercise. Although the Mental Capacity Act (2005) has 
laid down guidelines for capacity and competency, a more consistent approach to determine these standards 
should be put in place by psychiatrists to determine these standards. I believe that by shifting the burden of 
proof from patients suffering from a mental illness, mental health professionals believe they are safeguarding 
the best interests of the patient. However, they are actually denying the rights of the patients both legally and 
ethically.  
Section 4.7: Conceptual Discussion: Consent, Paternalism, and Best Interests. 
Mental health care involves restraints on the actions and decisions of patients. These restraining practices are 
often justified by paternalism, seen as being for the patient’s own good. I challenge the paternalistic position 
of healthcare providers. This challenge also involves the traditional paternalistic treatment of mental illness, 
which involves limited autonomy and thus limited capacity consent. To recap, a patient’s incapacity to give 
informed consent to one intervention should not be assumed to imply incapacity to give consent to all medical 
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interventions. A mentally ill patient incapable of giving consent to their asthma treatment may still be capable 
of giving consent to their schizophrenia and vice versa. Decisions are often made for the mentally ill 
sometimes without ethical justification, which leads to treatments including ECT being given to the mentally ill 
that they have specifically refused. Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007]. Paternalism is a system by which 
an authority attempts to supply needs or regulate conduct of those under its control in matters affecting them 
as individuals as well as in their relations to authority and to each other. An analysis of paternalism involves 
the concept of limitation on the freedom or autonomy of an agent. As often is the case, the first question to 
address is whether the concept itself is normative or descriptive. Is the application of this concept a matter for 
‘empirical’ determination so that if two people disagree about the application to a particular case they are 
disagreeing about some matter of fact or of definition? (taken from Plunkett & Sundell, 2013) or does their 
disagreement reflect different views about the legitimacy of the application in question?  
I suggest the following conditions as an analysis of X acts paternalistically towards Y by doing (omitting) Z 
1. Z (or its omission ) interferes with the liberty or autonomy of Y 
2. X does so without the consent of Y 
3. X does so because Z will improve the welfare of Y (where this includes preventing his/her welfare 
from diminishing) or in some way to promote the interests, values, or good of Y.                
(taken from Plunkett & Sundell, 2013) 
Condition 1 is the hardest to capture. Clear cases include withholding relevant information that a patient has a 
right to have or imposing unnecessary requirements or conditions on a patient. Let me highlight the problems 
by presenting the following case. 
Case study two  
Sally, a 52 year-old employed woman with a long history of recurrent depression who had never been 
prescribed medication, was voluntarily hospitalised with a psychotic depressive illness. She agreed to ECT 
without seeming to pay much attention to the explanation of the treatment. Because she was not paying much 
attention, the psychiatrist proceeded to give a brief outline. The treatment was given with no attention to 
detail regarding any risks or side effect, or the possibility of receiving an alternative treatment. After reading 
and signing the informed consent, the patient remarked, “it doesn’t make any difference any way because this 
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is all over for me, I am dead.” This voluntary patient would probably have consented to any procedure, because 
of the acute severity of her illness, so did she truly understand the treatment, the effects, and side effects, to 
which she gave permission? 
The second condition above is meant to read as distinct from acting against the consent of an agent. This 
condition implies that the agent does not consent, nor do they refuse treatment. They (Sally) may for example, 
be unaware of what is being done to them. The third condition can also be complicated. There may be more 
than one reason for interfering with Y. In addition to concern for the physical and mental welfare of Y (Sally) 
there may be concerns for how Y’s action may affect third parties In order to decide on the above issues, one 
must decide a normative issue; e.g. does someone have a right to some information then the concept is not 
purely descriptive. Ultimately the question of how to refine the conditions, and what conditions to use, is a 
matter for philosophical judgement (Coons & Weber 2013). The stance I take from an ethical and legal position 
I have stated previously (earlier in this chapter) is that valid consent within this psychiatric scenario is not 
possible. I have also argued that healthcare providers demonstrate paternalism seldom looking at differing 
alternatives in decision-making. Miller & Wertheimer (2009) enhance the discussion by saying that paternalism 
does not always involve interfering with someone’s liberty of action; sometimes it involves deceiving another 
for their own good or withholding information from them. However, the question remains, what does 
paternalistic interference entail and how does it occur within psychiatry? 
It is important to distinguish between what Feinberg calls ‘soft paternalism’ and ‘hard paternalism’ (sometimes 
referred to as weak and strong paternalism). Soft paternalism is the view that only conditions under which 
state paternalism is justified is when it is necessary to determine   whether the person being interfered with is 
acting voluntarily and knowledgeable. A soft paternalist believes it is legitimate to interfere with the means 
that agents choose to achieve their means. Soft paternalism operates to restrict conduct only when the 
agent’s decision-making is judged non-voluntary or non-autonomous. In contrast, hard paternalism involves 
restricting the freedom of persons who are substantially autonomous to protect them ‘against their will, from 
harmful consequences even of their fully voluntary choices and undertakings’ (Feinberg, 1986, p. 12). Hard 
paternalists believe that people may be mistaken or confused about their ends, and it is legitimate to interfere 
to prevent them from achieving those ends. Strong paternalism is considered harder to justify than weak 
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paternalism, and some authors (e.g. Beauchamp & Childress, 2009) have even argued that weak paternalism 
does not require ethical justification.  
I reject the acceptance between strong and weak paternalism and hold that all actions involving the use of 
authority to override a patient’s choices are coercive, even if those choices are not autonomous. Whether a 
coercive action has, a paternalistic justification depends on whether or not that action can be justified in terms 
of prevention of harm. Some would argue that paternalism justifies psychiatric medical intervention to prevent 
harm. This is countered by the principle of autonomy and each person’s right to be a self-determining 
individual. However, the principle of autonomy was limited by the self- harm principle, therefore giving 
justification to paternalists to intervene in order to prevent harm to self and others. That said I hold that the 
use of coercive actions towards substantially autonomous patients cannot be justified by making an appeal to 
beneficence. Acting under the guise of the patient’s ‘best interests’, requires the clinician to make a judgement 
about the effect of a pathology on a patient’s behaviour and not a decision judgement about the authenticity 
of a patient’s physical and mental make-up.  
Additionally, (and to reiterate from chapter 2b) we must address the need to defend others from harm. 
Dangerousness is often a trump card in decisions on hospitalisation to psychiatry, and patients can be 
hospitalized if they are deemed a ‘danger to others’. However, dangerousness is not specific to any one 
psychiatric diagnosis. In rebuttal, I note that one must be cautious: mentally ill patients are not a significant 
danger to others until proven otherwise. While somewhat rhetorically phrased, the moral point is clear: just as 
criminal guilt must be proven, not assumed, a psychiatric patient’s significant danger to others must be proven 
not assumed (Cherry, 2010).  
Section 4.7.1: Best Interests. 
Firstly, let me address the premise of the ‘best interests’ argument. Dawson (2005) breaks down “best 
interests” into objective and subjective accounts. Objective is to be “explained in terms of maximising the 
individual’s welfare, wellbeing, or good” (p. 195). Dawson (2005) notes that an action is only classed as ‘best’ if 
the action would be most beneficial for the patient. In contrast, subjective accounts of best interests refer to 
the decision an individual would come to if they were able to make a competent decision (Loewy & Fitzgerald, 
2003). It has been long established that when a patient lacks decision-making capacity and there are no 
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guardians or recognised surrogates available, decisions are made with the patient’s best interests in mind. 
Buchannan & Brock (1989) make the point that any decision is driven by the competence to make that 
decision. A patient may be competent to make the required decision under certain circumstances but lack 
competence to make a decision under different circumstances. I argue that the idea that informed consent 
should be prioritised above ‘best interests’ rests on the claim that a patient has privileged knowledge as to 
what constitutes their best interests. Healthcare providers who challenge this premise and who actively 
demonstrate paternalistic behaviour, base their position around three points: Firstly, the patient lacks non-
medical information, in so far their lack of medical knowledge places them in a position on inequality. 
Secondly, the patient’s decision is influenced by cognitive biases and thirdly, the patient poorly judges the risk 
element in their decision. Taken together, these arguments hold that the patient is not always the best party 
to make a decision, as the patient’s ability to make a decision that protects their best interests can sometimes 
be compromised. This group of people also go on to say that in the majority of cases there is no reason to 
question a patient’s decision. However, there is a presumption that patients with mental illness lack the 
competence to make decisions, and thus their decisions are often not respected. Buchannan & Brock (1989) go 
on to say that, the benefit of the best interest’s decision should bring about a ‘net’ benefit to the patient. 
However, this alone is not sufficient, as treatment results also need to be greater than the option of the 
patient suffering. While many people with a mental illness lack rationality and the ability to make a judgement, 
there is a growing realisation that these people are capable of considered judgement. Buchannan & Brock 
(1989) say that decisions in the patient’s best interests should take into account quality of life judgements and 
consider the ways in which a proposed treatment affects the patient’s life. If a patient is deemed incompetent 
to give or refuse consent to clinical procedures, what criteria do others use to decide on the patient’s behalf? 
Who should decide, by what criteria they should decide and what the limits of surrogate decision-making are. 
Healthcare professions need to develop a more nuanced approach to balancing the demands of informed 
consent and duty of care. An autonomous agent cannot be expected to investigate all information before 
accepting it as truth. However, one should have good reason for accepting any source of information. The 
more authoritative the source, the more believable the information (Hogarth, 1987). No matter how credible 
the source, the patient is still free to believe or not believe the information supplied. Before the Mental 
Capacity Act (2005), the problem with determining capacity to believe was similar to that of determining 
capacity for understanding, it depended on unobservable and inferential mental processes rather than on 
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concrete and observable elements of behaviour. At this time, law courts were filled with overly optimistic and 
often morally empty and evasive rhetoric, which did not serve as a beneficial benchmark in the interests of 
patient care. Since the Mental Capacity Act (2005), authors have developed a hierarchy of guiding principles 
for surrogate decisions. Some of these include advance directives, substituted judgement, and best interests. 
Advance directives are considered a decision about the care a patient wants to receive if they become unable 
to make a decision in the future. Substituted judgement occurs if no valid expressions of the patient’s wishes 
are available. Then, decision-makers would try to judge what the competent person would have decided. 
When deciding what is in a patient’s best interest, we have to consider the problem of ‘moral imagination’ in 
decision-makers. What criteria do the decision-makers use when trying to imagine what the patients would 
have chosen? When considering ECT, can the healthcare professional set aside his or her own interests and 
acting beneficently for the welfare of the patient? This situation is especially relevant if healthcare providers 
have known the patient for a long period and come to a conclusion that they believe is reflective of the 
patient. If ECT is directed towards a patient with severe depression and suicidal ideations, then it could be 
argued that this treatment is in the best interest of the patient. However, I have noted in previous chapters 
that ECT irreversibly damages brain tissue, so what is in the patient’s best interest may not be as clear as it 
seems. Consider the analogy of a patient who has a brain tumour and needs an operation that may involve 
damaging further tissue but is necessary to save the patient’s life. Here, an objective view of best interests is 
that surgery is justified, because in the end we save the patient’s life. The patient may suffer from minor brain 
damage rather than an early death.  
ECT is different in that doctors are not taking out diseased brain tissue, which would otherwise continue to kill 
healthy brain cells. ECT actually kills off healthy brain tissue, (Ross, 2006) but in principle saves the life of the 
person by lifting the person’s mood to reduce suicidal ideation. Whereas not removing a tumour will almost 
certainly lead to the death of the patient, not treating a depressed individual with ECT does not have the same 
certainty. In addition, when removing a tumour, doctors know what the outcome will be. This is not the case 
with ECT, as we scientifically do not understand its mechanism of action in the brain (Loewy & Fitzgerald, 
2003). Moreover, ECT should not be an option if their depression could be relieved in other ways. This 
determination requires the doctor or nurse recognising the patient’s best interest to make a judgement about 
the effect of their illness on their behaviour as well as understanding what the patient would prefer. The 
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answer lies in deliberation and prioritisation of ethical principles, which should be taken on a case-by-case 
basis in a more nuanced model of medical decision-making.  
Lastly, we must address the limits of surrogate decision-making. Does the question ‘are our patients under-
protected’ need to be addressed? When investigating the limits of surrogate decision-making, the central 
question will be whether we should have a moral system in which there is intense, close ethical review in 
research protocols and choices should be respected. When the courts and a detailed patient’s history conclude 
that the patient’s mental capacities are intact, there comes a point that any decision to refuse treatment 
should be respected. Therefore, if there is a principle that operates to raise the threshold level of mental 
capacity required for legal competence, therefore the operation of that principle may be limited at extremes 
of capacity and gravity (Buchanan, 2004). The practical consequences have not been described systematically; 
most decisions have often not reached the courts, and those that do not always describe the court’s rationale. 
However, it is most frequently proposed that the good of acting in the patient’s best interests always has to be 
balanced against another good, that of respecting the same patients autonomy. According to the ‘balancing’ 
justification for proportionality, capacity is either a measure of how much autonomy someone has, or a 
measure of how much value should be attached to respecting that autonomy (Eastman & Hope, 1988). As a 
result, the threshold level of capacity required for legal competence should rise as the consequences become 
more serious. Numerous writers22 refer to the threshold varying with seriousness of a proposed treatment and 
what is at stake for the patient. However, the consequences of any one decision are different from the next. 
Under the balancing approach, the same psychiatric patient can decide whether to take medication, but is 
denied the right to decide whether to undergo ECT (Buchanan, 2004).  
Central to the argument of determining capacity to consent is the information given to a patient in regards to 
what is at stake if a procedure does not result as planned. It follows that the balancing approach appears to 
place a peculiar burden on the process of seeking consent when dealing with the mentally ill. In conclusion, 
any measurement of capacity is subject to error, even modern legislation decisions. These errors are 
disrespectful to the autonomy of the mentally ill. Surely, a balancing approach has to establish what needs to 
balanced, which must include an honest and thorough explanation of the risks and benefits of a procedure. 
                                                          
22 Fadden and Beauchamp (1986); Buchanan and Brock (1989); White (1994); Wilks (1999). 
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Section: 4.8. Conclusion. 
My goal questioned whether ethically valid consent is achievable when considering ECT for the mentally ill. I 
challenged a number of assumptions put forward by those who argue that current practices for gaining 
consent for ECT are legally and ethically sound. Despite the fact that ECT may improve a patient’s state, there 
may still have been a lack of honesty in the method of gaining consent through minimisation of the side effects 
and process itself. By not telling patients about alternative treatment methods long-term effects, the consent 
process imposes excessive risk to the patient. All individuals have the same protection under the law, even if 
they are placed under a section of the Mental Health Act (1983), [revised 2007], and patients should be 
allowed to make decisions concerning their care and treatment. Throughout this chapter, I have shown that 
the issue of consent and personal patient choice is far from resolved. Valid consent is an essential pre-
condition to administering ECT, and an essential element of consent is a meaningful assessment of the 
patient’s capacity to consent un-coerced. Lastly, the problem of communication between patients and 
providers can be overcome, and there are ways to communicate all that which a reasonable person would 
wish to know in an accessible manner. To accomplish this goal, healthcare workers must investigate a more 
nuanced approach to medical decision making. With respect to obtaining consent for ECT, every patient should 
be fully assessed to demonstrate that they are able to participate in the consent process. It is not ethically 
appropriate to address the issue of from the mentally ill if the full facts of ECT are not provided. If consent is 
gathered without the appropriate information given, it is a dismal failure in respect of autonomy. 
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Chapter 5. : Conclusion: Final thoughts. 
‘Opposition comes to those who have taken a position’. 
                                   Reginald Gatsi - Pastor 
Throughout this thesis, what I have argued for is not a general critique of psychiatry or the many personnel 
who work within it but against the use of a particular treatment, which is Electroconvulsive Therapy. The 
conclusion of this argument is “Clearly, Electroconvulsive therapy which will continue to be used 
within psychiatry in its present form is unethical”. Until there is scientific and technological 
advancement the use of Electroconvulsive Therapy  as a treatment for mental illness is highly questionable, 
its prescription and its new machinery is dangerous in its modern day format and should not be used except in 
extreme emergency circumstances. The viewpoint I take is that if ethics had been a factor when ECT was 
discovered and applied to psychiatry, ECT would have been abandoned or prohibited. As society becomes 
increasingly high tech, we might plausibly argue that psychiatry and medicine will similarly 
develop and advance, but that is not reflected in the present day. Nonetheless, the validity of 
the author’s argument depends on the idea that psychiatry and medicine has not advanced as 
rapidly as technology. A treatment that can cause such devastation, while producing such limited and 
questionable results, has no place in the practice of medicine and psychiatry. At best, ECT offers a very poor 
trade-off – potentially irreversible brain damage and mental dysfunction, in exchange for the docility and 
temporary emotional blunting or euphoria that result from the damage. 
 
Within my thesis, I made a number of points to support my main argument and it is very important for me to 
clarify my supporting arguments and my approach to psychiatric healthcare when I challenge ECT and to 
distinguish them from other similar seeming conclusions.  
Firstly:  Central to the argument lies the premise which the proponents of ECT base their position on, which is 
that relief from acute mental illness is in their best interests, and therefore good (which I agree with ) so the 
justification of using ECT as a treatment is perfectly right given these circumstances (Which I disagree with). 
Ambiguity and vagueness are the enemies of analytical philosophy and consequently applied ethics within 
healthcare. The medical use of ECT presents an integrated spectrum of clinical, ethical, and legal problems. The 
salient points within this thesis are that ECT is an iatrogenic treatment which has the ability to cause brain 
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damage, manifested in forms of severe and often permanent loss of memory and should not be used (except 
in absolute emergency circumstances)  
Secondly, I have not argued about the role of ethics in decision making in the prescription of ECT, because 
there is an important role for ethics to play in psychiatric clinical dilemmas and the emerging field of 
healthcare ethics within psychiatry. The implication of the arguments I have put forward in this thesis is not 
that bioethics should not be a consideration factor, but one of major concern. The conclusion to be drawn is 
that ethics in future development has a large part to play when considering using ECT as a treatment.  
Thirdly, I have not argued for not using the ethical theory of Principlism. In fact I happen to think Principlism 
has merits which can be seen to utilise established moral ways of thinking. There are still many questions that 
arise from the unresolved tension between clinical care and patient rights  coupled with legally binding 
treatment decisions based solely on claims to ‘therapeutic efficacy’. I have argued that one ethical theory is 
not to be advocated over another, but a combination of Principlism and Virtue theory is needed to address the 
wide expressions of professional and clinical practice in psychiatry. The unique quality of psychiatric ethics is 
that it pulls us on the one hand into clinical conceptual analysis; and on the other hand, it pulls us in the 
direction of the contradicting nature of diverse and disputed values that society places upon us. This thesis has 
argued that the philosophical approach to Virtue ethics is of value, not only in terms of providing guidance 
regarding how to be, but also how to act. This perhaps may be an unsatisfying conclusion to those who favour 
the theory of Principlism against those who favour virtue theory; but my position is that for the benefit of 
patient care what we can achieve by implementation of both sets of principles is justified action and a morally 
right action. While doing so, it will at least set an achievable standard, while allowing room for evaluation 
(criticism and reward).   
However, returning to my main thesis argument, as in the past, ECT is still a most complex 
intervention to untangle, so it not surprising that it is difficult to maintain a balanced view, 
particularly as so many questions remain unanswered. Whatever is claimed and counter claimed 
in the ongoing scientific debate of ECT, and particularly while our understanding of the healing 
and transcendental potential of brain/mind is still incomplete. Neurophysiological knowledge is in its 
infancy regarding this treatment's precise mechanism of action. Science has not yet given us a definite answer 
as to how it works and the reasons for the side effects of this treatment. When I questioned the 
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relationship between psychiatry and science, I am reminded of Dworkin’s statement on the role of 
scientists in the processes of social change, offered in her book Life and Death. Extrapolating from her 
statements concerning battered women: 
Social scientists find a pattern of injury and experts describe it…They are listened to 
respectfully, are often paid to give evidence in legal cases. Meanwhile, the voice of the 
victim still has no social standing or legal significance. She still has no credibility such that 
each of us-and the law-is compelled to help her. (p.45) 
With the voices of individuals and political movements continuing to enter the debate on the administration 
and efficacy of ECT, coupled with further possibilities of further in-depth involvement from legal frameworks in 
compelling socio-cultural change “those of us who are not jurors have a moral obligation to listen ‘p.47)  
However, a significant gap exists in what information and what perspectives are being given to patients, it is 
often only the pro-ECT viewpoints that are communicated, only the pro-ECT research (limited and 
unsubstantial it may be) which is cited and only pro-ECT perspectives, themes and ethics which are given a 
voice. A gulf is seemingly apparent from positions of peoples’ experiences of the affects and efficacy of ECT, 
situations of consent or refusal, and those involved in the administering and administration of the process. Yet 
little literature is available viewing the effects of involvement in ECT administration and surrounding processes 
for individual staff, staff teams, carers, families, friends - the social milieu of relationships and personal and 
professional interfaces, whether they be in the clinic settings or beyond.  
The methodologies from trauma-based perspectives coupled with the fact that the people subjected to ECT 
and the mental health system are both the expert witness and, for an alleged ECT medical research “industry”, 
the personal evidence that is appropriated to drive this “industry”. Alternate evidence-bases assertively 
challenge the widespread adherences of state-endorsed medicalised practise to prescribed hierarchies of 
method. Retaining prevailing structures of evidence recognition that predispose the extrapolation of certain 
medical/scientific models for  ECT’s  functional efficacy and placement in a diagnostic and operative setting 
mean limiting possibilities for fully informed debate, and collaborative research (Ruthen, 2006). 
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Advocates of ECT will give many explanations and reasons to rationalise its use. ECT has been so strategically 
repackaged that other professionals often condone the use of it even with the most controversial client groups 
(Jones & Baldwin, 1992). An important and subtle feature of the maintenance of the dominant power positions 
of healthcare providers is the possession of a body of knowledge that structures how mental illness is be 
understood and treated. Although exceedingly complex and painful, this discussion is necessary, and possibly 
increasingly, so as the debates about ECT and all the issues attached to it becomes challenged within 
professional, legal, and ethical circles. However, for such debates to be meaningful, the much more complex 
issue of healthcare provider –patient relationship, needs to be meaningfully addressed. The changing influence 
of power paradigms is not easy, but needs to be addressed if patients are to have more of a say within their 
psychiatric care pathways, commensurate with their desired level of involvement in decision-making. It has 
become increasingly clear to the author this must be a subject open to discussion. Avoiding it is not only 
detrimental to the wellbeing of the psychiatric patient, but also to that of our profession and its place within 
psychiatry and medicine.   
To the pro-ECT advocates I set down a challenge, what is needed is a more balanced representation of ECT’s 
controversial nature, prescription, side effects and outcome, if healthcare providers wish to profess that they 
are acting from a position of knowledge . However, here is where I underscore my position, when I state ECT in 
my view is here to stay; there is a need for the pro and against ECT professionals to work together. The validity 
of a position which finds something intrinsically and unanalysable distasteful about ECT cannot be questioned. 
However, neither can it be supported (Freedman, 1987). It is imperative that the patient referred for 
ECT makes an informed decision whether to accept treatment or not based on information and 
not perceived ideas or unreliable accounts. Specifically, the author assumes that since research 
into ECT has decelerated as technology has improved the pattern of ECT use will be continued 
with no empirical knowledge to provide its evidence base. For those who say such an assumption 
is unwarranted; many trends reverse direction entirely or eventually. My rebuttal to this is that 
the present research does not reflect this, your argument relies heavily on assumptions of which 
without research your position is weakened, and you could argue presently gives an invalid 
conclusion.  
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In my section on the law and ECT, I have not argued that psychiatry is irrelevant to the law and ethics, I agree 
anyone committing dangerous acts of place, and person whilst suffering from acute mental illness needs to be 
treated. I did not argue against the Mental Health Act (1983) [2007 revised] to enable this process of 
admission. What I did argue against was using the law to enforce ECT treatment especially when we cannot 
even answer the question how strong is our presumption that relief from the mental illness is achievable. 
Following this, the argument I pursued was the real ECT and sham ECT debate. My position was 
since there is no demonstrated benefit from real ECT compared to sham ECT, except during the 
time the treatment is being administered. Since the difference is modest and since ECT has 
associated morbidity and mortality, those who advocate for it and wish to continue prescribing 
it should undertake an adequate empirical study of the effectiveness of ECT. The burden of 
proof that ECT is safe and can be prescribed ethically without long-term side effects lies with the 
advocates. In the absence of such a study, whatever its outcome, the sham ECT literature 
supports the conclusions that real ECT is no more effective than placebo ECT (except during the 
time the treatment is being administered), and that ECT will repeatedly endorsed due to custom 
and practice.   
I would suggest that consent forms should be adequately designed and state, there is no 
difference between sham ECT and real ECT and during treatment, the difference is modest. It is 
difficult to understand how anyone would give meaningful consent without this information 
being given to him or her. Psychiatry raises fundamental questions such as those linked to the 
definition of the person (Seedhouse, 2009). Therefore, in the quest for harmony in the 
relationship between psychiatric patients and healthcare providers, tensions on all sides 
between means and ends need to sustain recognition. If healthcare providers wish to project the 
premise of practising from dominant power positions then this must be from possession of 
knowledge that structures mental illness and treatment and not from subjective value 
judgements. The position of subjectivity only encapsulates what is wrong with psychiatry and 
will receive sustained criticism. The implication of the arguments I have put forward in this 
thesis is that, it is vitally important  that emphasis is placed on all areas where knowledge is 
underdeveloped and addresses all the psychiatric medical issues not just one part. Let us 
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recognise the challenge, to accommodate all possible viewpoints and enrich the concept and 
practice of psychiatry for human welfare. Although exceedingly complex and painful, this 
process is necessary and possibly increasingly necessary. Additionally, in other areas of 
psychiatry, like rapid tranquillisation, seclusion, restraint, forensic care and the care of the 
attempted suicidal patient. Given these examples and the countless questions, debates and 
unresolved ethical quandaries, it has become increasingly clear to the author they must be 
subjects open to discussion. Avoidance is not only detrimental to the wellbeing of the 
psychiatric patient, but also to our profession and its place within psychiatry and medicine. This 
thesis has sought to find a position in a transitional domain between the differing perspectives, because the 
importance is at the centre of the discussion remains the unique human person who is mentally 
unwell.   
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